Bhutan’s Relationship With India Is Under a Spotlight

India’s privileged relationship with the small Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan is currently undergoing one of its most severe tests ever as Indian and Chinese troops square off over a boundary region claimed by both Bhutan and China. If India backs down, it risks the termination of its special relationship with Bhutan, because that would show its unreliability as a security provider and guarantor of Bhutanese sovereignty. Bhutan’s relationship with China has always been contentious: the two states do not even have diplomatic relations. Nonetheless, it is possible that this could change if Bhutan’s relationship with India deteriorates.

Bhutan’s foreign relations were guided by the Republic of India and its predecessor state, the British-controlled Indian Empire, for well over a century, until 2007. Relations between Bhutan and India are still very close at all levels, including high levels of economic and military cooperation. In 1910, British India and Bhutan signed the Treaty of Punakha, which stated that “the Bhutanese Government agrees to be guided by the advice of the British Government in regard to its external relations.” Similarly close relations were maintained between independent India and Bhutan, as per a 1949 Treaty of Friendship that gave India total guiding influence over Thimphu’s defense and foreign policy. The two countries revised the treaty in 2007 to give Bhutan greater autonomy, although Article 2 of the revised treaty retained a clause noting that “[n]either government shall allow the use of its territory for activities harmful to the national security and interest of the other.”

Bhutan's relationship with India is closely related to its historical geography. While traditionally Bhutan has been part of the Tibetan cultural sphere (its name means the “end of Tibet”), its location has made it a player in northeastern South Asia as well as on the Tibetan Plateau. Bhutan was founded in 1616 by Ngawang Namgyal, a Buddhist monk of the Drukpa lineage, which was in conflict with the dominant Gelug school of Tibetan Buddhism, the school that produced the Dalai Lamas. Bhutan thus has a long history of resisting control from lands to its north, particularly because these entities posed existential threats to its political and religious autonomy, unlike the Indian states to its south. As the modern Indian military knows well, projecting military force up from the flat plains of Bengal and Assam into the Himalayas is particularly difficult because of the sharp altitudinal gradient and changes in temperature.

The historical evolution of Bhutanese sovereignty cannot be understood in contemporary terms. As I’ve noted in an article at The Diplomat, “until modern times, hundreds of independent entities existed in the [Himalaya] mountains, all with varying degrees of control over and suzerainty to each other.” Bhutan was one of that multitude. Bhutan was allied with Ladakh (now in the eastern part of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir), which also followed the Drukpa tradition, in fighting Tibet. During the 17th and 18th centuries, multiple Tibetan invasions of Bhutan were beaten back. Bhutan’s alliance with Ladakh resulted in the acquisition of exclaves in what is now western Tibet. These were seized by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army in 1959, which contributed to the chilly relations between China and Bhutan. Thus China has a very tenuous claim that parts of Bhutan have, in some way or the other, always been under its sovereignty or the sovereignty of Tibet, of which it claims to be the successor state.

On the other hand, Bhutan had close relations with the Indian state of Cooch Behar to its south, now in northeastern West Bengal. After an attempt to slip out of Mughal control in 1661 failed, the ruler of Cooch Behar fled to Bhutan. A more successful attempt in the 1730s led to Bhutanese influence in Cooch Behar. Following a succession dispute in 1772, the candidate in Cooch Behar who was not favored by Bhutan invited the British East India Company to drive the Bhutanese garrison out. British control extended gradually over much of Bhutan’s southern territories, annexing them to British India, culminating in the 1865 Treaty of Sinchula. Despite this contentious history, Bhutan maintained close relations first with the British, and then with independent India because of an alignment of geopolitical goals: neither wanted the spread of Tibetan, or Chinese, influence toward the Indian side of the Himalayas. In particular, if Chinese territorial claims mirrored historical Tibetan ones, or included any state that paid tribute to the Qing Dynasty, then portions of Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan all lay open to Chinese territorial aggrandizement. Although the Bhutanese border with Tibet was formalized in the Sino-British convention in 1890, several ambiguities have led to today’s crisis near the Doklam triboundary area.

The Chinese calculus has shaped India’s strong relations with Bhutan. Bhutan’s status as a sovereign country was confirmed in 1949 and, with Indian encouragement, Bhutan gradually established foreign relations with a host of other countries starting in 1971, when it joined the United Nations. This move to greater sovereignty, finally culminating with the Indo-Bhutan Friendship Treaty of 2007 that removed the provision that Bhutan be guided by India, was likely drawn out over such a long period of time by Chinese actions in Tibet.

After the People’s Liberation Army entered Tibet in 1950, Bhutanese authorities grew increasingly wary of Chinese actions against Tibetan culture, shared to a large part by Bhutan, and the increased flow of refugees from Tibet into Bhutan. Bhutanese authorities became particularly anxious after the Chinese crackdown in Tibet in 1959, resulting in the exile of the Dalai Lama. As a result of Bhutanese fears, India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru pledged to protect Bhutan against any foreign incursions that year. Because of this guarantee, and the example of Chinese heavy-handedness in Tibet, Bhutan closed its border with China in 1960 and developed particularly strong relations with India. India began training Bhutan’s army in 1961, and during the 1962 conflict between India and China, Bhutan called up all males over the age of 16 to serve in alliance with India if needed.

As Bhutan’s autonomy has grown, it has sometimes voted the opposite of India on international forums; the two countries do not always coordinate their positions on foreign affairs. However, security and political relations between the two countries remain strong, particularly because such arrangements suit both countries. As evidence of this importance, the current Indian prime minister, Narendra Modi, chose Bhutan as the destination of his first foreign trip.

India is particularly concerned that Bhutan will take unilateral steps in its relations with Beijing and settle its border with China in a way that could threaten India’s interests; Chinese incursions may in fact be partially aimed at driving a wedge between Bhutan and India. After all, Bhutanese leaders realize that there is little they can do to prevent China from seizing disputed territories, while the benefits of relations and trade with the powerhouse of Asia are a tempting prize. Yet a lack of Chinese goodwill and consultations with India have so far prevented the normalization of relations between Bhutan and China, although informal consultations have occurred, thus allowing India to retain its special role.

For example, in 2005, India expressed concern that Bhutan had adjusted its border claim with China too generously in the western sector of its disputed territory with China, potentially risking the Indian strategic position in the nearby Siliguri Corridor. While India dispatched top military leaders to Bhutan to explain the situation, Chinese actions did not help its cause; in June 2005, China began building roads over the international border into Bhutan. Additionally, over the past decade, there have been dozens of incursions by Chinese troops into Bhutan each year. Therefore, Bhutanese leaders rightfully suspect that even with closer relations with China, there will be constant violations of sovereignty from their larger neighbor, but without the added benefit of Indian support.

India’s relations with Bhutan will likely retain their special character for a while to come, regardless of whether Bhutan establishes formal relations with China. The current standoff demonstrates that while normalcy is not around the corner; Bhutan knows that India will send troops to defend it, whereas what it would get out of closer relations with China is still murky. After all, even the smallest territorial concession to China would be a disproportionately large area for a country as small as Bhutan.