The Pacific Island Forum’s New French Territorial Members

The forthcoming Pacific Island Forum (PIF) summit to be held in Samoa in early September will be the first to be held with two new members, New Caledonia and French Polynesia. The two French Pacific Territories were admitted to the PIF at last year’s meeting, with little fanfare – just a single sentence in the Forum’s communiqué. The PIF has provided no explanation for the decision, or of the criteria it used for the admission of new members.

The admission of the two French overseas-territories adds the first members to the PIF who are not wholly sovereign states. The decision to admit New Caledonia and French Polynesia also demonstrates a reversal of one of the PIF’s founding sentiments. The PIF was initially formed in 1971 without French territories in the Pacific due to France continually blocking any attempts to discuss issues such as nuclear testing or self-determination within the previous South Pacific Commission. 

The full membership of the two French territories was first suggested by French president Jacques Chirac in 2003, seven years after France ceased testing nuclear weapons in the Pacific. Compensation for its nuclear testing in the Pacific continues to be debated in French courts, with a clear criteria for eligibility yet to be fully established. 

While France has been keen for its territories to join the PIF, the pro-independence movement in French Polynesia, and the New Caledonian independence movement, Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (FLNKS), both opposed the territories being granted membership, seeing the move as one that would primarily serve France’s interests, rather than those of the territories. FLNKS wished a decision on New Caledonia’s membership wait until after the territory’s referendum on independence, to be held in 2018.

While FLNKS has significant sympathy within the Melanesian states of the Pacific (the organization is a full member of the Melanesian Spearhead Group alongside the four sovereign Melanesian states), this was not enough to prevent an unanimous decision among all members of the PIF to grant full membership to the French Pacific territories.

That the PIF seems so keen to have the two French Pacific Territories as members, but also so quiet on the subject, poses a number of questions as to the motivation for this move. Undoubtedly, France has the potential to be a positive influence within PIF, providing extra funding and resources, and a boost in expertise in areas such as health, education, and vital modern infrastructure. Yet there may be a larger role envisaged for France with it being welcomed back into formal Pacific structures.

French diplomatic weight has the potential to provide a greater balance to China’s growing influence in the Pacific, something Western-oriented states like Australia and New Zealand may desire. The fact that France also maintains some of its naval fleet, and around 8,000 troops in New Caledonia may have also contributed to concerns within the PIF about regional stability. Does the PIF hope that France will help to enforce public goods like freedom of navigation in the Pacific if the continued political instability in the United States leads to a retrenchment from the region?

If the presence of France’s military infrastructure in the Pacific was part of the PIF's assessment for ascension, does this indicate that the PIF will be opposed to the independence movements within the French Pacific Territories? It would be difficult for the PIF to remain neutral during New Caledonia’s referendum on the independence next year if it wishes France to maintain a significant presence in the Pacific. Will this potentially lead to tensions within the Melanesian Spearhead Group, if the Melanesian states prioritize regional security over their sympathy and support for FLNKS?

While the PIF may be keen to increase its weight within global society with the addition of a major power, it does pose the question whether French interests in the Pacific are great enough for France to invest more of its resources in the region. As an external power, whose primary interests are not based in the Pacific, France will certainly have a different set of priorities than states based in the region. France’s influence therefore may make finding greater foreign policy consensus within the region more difficult.

Alongside this, the current instability with French politics should also cause concern for the PIF. While President Emmanuel Macron and his new La République En Marche! party should not seek to disrupt the liberal-democratic norms the region strives for, that other more radical actors have significant political traction within France may prove a disruptive influence in the future.

The other glaring question to arise from the addition of France’s Pacific Territories to the PIF is whether this sets a precedent for the addition of the U.S. territories in the Pacific? Guam and American Samoa are both currently associate members. Without the PIF stipulating any criteria for its decision to include New Caledonia and French Polynesia in the Forum, this would be deemed a consistent move.