Let Open the Borders

In the spring of 2010, as the aftermath of the second Kyrgyz revolution sparked ethnic violence in the country’s south, neighboring Uzbekistan closed the border crossing which lay between Osh and Andijan. Indeed, all along the convoluted and contested Kyrgyz-Uzbek border the gates were closing. Twelve of 15 border crossings between the two states were shut in 2010.

The Dostuk border crossing, between Osh in Kyrgyzstan and Andijan in Uzbekistan, remained closed for seven years. But in September 2017, a year after the death of Islam Karimov and coinciding with new Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s first visit to Bishkek, the gates were flung open.

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Initially the closing of the border was a reaction to the massive influx of refugees fleeing the violence in Osh. Over the course of a few days in June 2010, an estimated 100,000 ethnic Uzbek and Tajik refugees fled across the border.

Then-Deputy Prime Minister Abdulla Aripov said, in announcing the closure, “Today we will stop accepting refugees from the Kyrgyz side because we have no place to accommodate them and no capacity to cope with them.”

Dostuk was closed on both sides. Human Rights Watch reported at the time that the Kyrgyz side was heavily guarded, with troops firing shots at families who approached.

Long after the violence in Osh — in which as many as 2,000 people may have died — the border remained effectively closed.

Technically, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan maintain a visa-free regime. Citizens flying between the two states have little beyond the usual troubles; however, starting in 2005 after the violence in Andijan, the land border became more difficult to cross and as described above, in 2010 the border crossings hardened much further.

As RFE/RL’s Farangis Najibullah and Sanjar Eraliev explained recently, people wishing to transit through the border checkpoints “have been required to present official invitations for business trips or so-called telegrams — or private invitation letters — for personal visits.”

The “telegrams” were acquired by first obtaining a letter from the mahalla — the neighborhood committee, the lowest level of civic government in Uzbekistan — which would then have to be approved by the local police, who would ostensibly confirm that the reason stated for the personal visit was valid. Usually only weddings or funerals qualified.

For two countries which less than a generation before were part of one country — the Soviet Union — the shutting of Dostuk was devastating. It split families and stifled business, but moreover was a testament to the arbitrary nature of state policymaking in Uzbekistan. The border with Kyrgyzstan remained closed for seven years because Islam Karimov wanted it to be. And because new Uzbek President Mirziyoyev wants it to open, it has.

Mirziyoyev made his first visit to Kyrgyzstan as president in early September. His was the first visit of an Uzbek president to Bishkek since Karimov’s trip in 2000. During the “historic” two-day visit, Mirziyoyev and his Kyrgyz counterpart, Almazbek Atambayev, signed a pact on the demarcation of more than 80 percent of their mutual border. Only 230 kilometers of the 1,400-kilometer border remain disputed, with plans in motion to continue talks.

On September 5, Mirziyoyev said, “We have to turn our [Uzbek-Kyrgyz] border into a border of friendship.”

Dostuk or Dostik, in Kyrgyz and Uzbek respectively, means “friendly.”

Thousands attended the reopening of the Dostuk border crossing on September 6. According to Eurasianet, “Many were visibly moved and wept.” The border opening had a festive atmosphere, with a stage, replete with musical entertainment, set up not far from the crossing.

The governor of Uzbekistan’s Andijan region, Shukhratbek Abdurakhmanov, addressed the crowds, announcing to lively applause that citizens would be able to cross the border simply by showing their passports. “You won’t need any telegrams or any other documents,” he said.

The Bishkek-based coordinator for the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Yusuf Qurbonov, said that on September 12 alone 2,500 people from each side of the border and 300 vehicles crossed over. Dostuk is now reportedly operating 24/7.

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The opening of the border serves several purposes and is thus important for a number of reasons. First, it is a continuation of Mirziyoyev’s opening gambit as Karimov’s successor. Karimov was Uzbekistan’s founding father, and in a sense will always be above reproach — the argument being that Karimov did what he had to to forge an independent state. (Reasonable people can disagree with that logic, but nationalist sentiment does not always take such objectivity into account.) Mirziyoyev, however, has no such claim and thus, in a way strongman Karimov never had to, he has to do something to give people a reason to love him.

Second, the opening of the border is not just a soft diplomatic move, it is part and parcel of Mirziyoyev’s stated focus on economic issues. Uzbekistan, with more than 30 million people and significantly more developed manufacturing and other industries, should rightfully see Kyrgyzstan as an important and easy market. As of 2015, Uzbekistan was the origin for only 1.2 percent of Kyrgyzstan’s imports, behind China (36 percent), Russia (27 percent), Kazakhstan (11 percent), Turkey (4.6 percent), the United States (2.5 percent), Germany (1.7 percent), Ukraine (1.5 percent), and South Korea (1.5 percent). As noted above, the two countries share a 1,400-kilometer border; there rightfully ought to be much more trade across it. And opening the corridors for people is a meaningful step in that direction.

Lastly, both the long closure and the recent reopening of the border were functions of the personal power of the president. Karimov wanted it closed; Mirziyoyev wants it open. The power of personality in governance in Central Asia has long hamstrung the region’s development. Because policymaking is personal and politics — the kind of politics that see leaders voted out of office by their people for making bad decisions — is nonexistent still, the border is something to watch closely. It remains a barometer not only of Kyrgyz-Uzbek relations but a measure of how meaningful Mirizyoyev’s supposed reforms really are.