The Longest War Gets Longer

 
Kabul's infamous de facto “Green Zone” – an increasingly militarized district of the city that houses everything from foreign embassies to the offices of international organizations – is set for a few important improvements. Over the next two years, this area of the city will expand to allow U.S. and NATO-allied civilian and military personnel to move between the buildings housing their missions and a nearby base.

Though the decision to take on this ambitious expansion of Kabul's “Green Zone” may date back to much earlier this summer, after a major suicide bombing near the zone's frontier in late-May, the changes are an important illustration of the fact that the United States' war in Afghanistan – now the longest in its history – shows no signs of abating.
 
In late August, in a highly anticipated policy address, U.S. President Donald J. Trump unveiled what his administration's approach to the war would be. As a candidate, Trump criticized the United States' involvement in costly wars overseas, though neither he – nor his opposition – gave much attention to Afghanistan. The longest war, by the time the elections came around, was mostly forgotten.

Trump's address reminded the U.S. public of the country's ongoing involvement in Afghanistan – a theater that not only remains the site of a highly contested counterinsurgency fight against the Taliban, but one that has seen measurable regression in recent years. The U.S.-backed Afghan government, led by President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah per a precarious 2014 power-sharing arrangement, has steadily lost territory to the radical Taliban insurgents.
 
Meanwhile, since 2015 the Taliban have become less of a monolithic group fighting for a well-defined objective. Ever since the death of their reclusive founder and long-time leader Mullah Mohammed Omar became known, the group has splintered and its affiliates have drifted between various warlords claiming to rightfully lead the group's struggle.
 
In the meantime, the Islamic State declared its Khorasan Province – using the ancient Islamic appellation for the region that today encompasses Afghanistan and Pakistan. In short: since the United States declared the end of its combat mission in Afghanistan in 2014, the Afghan government has lost considerable territory to the Taliban and the insurgent landscape itself has both expanded and become more complex.
 
And then there's the question of Pakistan.
 
Trump's speech minced few words on the question of Pakistan, winning him praise in New Delhi and criticism in Islamabad. "For its part, Pakistan often gives safe haven to agents of chaos, violence and terror," Trump said. "We can no longer be silent about Pakistan’s safe havens for terrorist organizations, the Taliban and other groups that pose a threat to the region and beyond."
 
While much analysis of the strategy speech highlighted the acerbic tone toward Islamabad's duplicity, Trump wasn't really treading much new ground. His predecessor, Barack Obama, took a similar tone in 2009 when announcing his own plans for Afghanistan. Obama even devoted more of his speech to discussing Pakistan. As far as Afghanistan is concerned, the United States has been able to diagnose the problem in Pakistan, but unable to find the necessary treatment.
 
Trump was no different in this regard. He did not answer that crucial question that has bedeviled U.S. policymakers over decades: how can Washington condition Pakistan's behavior? For some – certainly many observers in India – that question is unanswerable, owing to the stubborn interests of Pakistan's powerful military. For the Pakistani military, Afghanistan has long been seen as an important source of strategic depth; whatever government may exist in Kabul must be subservient to Pakistani interests and unable to unite the entirety of Afghanistan.
 
If there is a coercive playbook that the Trump administration is planning to deploy against Pakistan, it hasn't been revealed just yet. Despite murmurs of sanctioning individuals in the Pakistani government known to have ties to militant groups, there is little clarity. Trump did invite India to continue its role as a net contributor to Afghanistan's economic stability – a gesture that will only amplify ill will in Islamabad.
 
Curiously, Trump's strategy for Afghanistan omitted every other regional stakeholder, including China, Russia, and Iran. These three states, since 2014, have changed their approach to Afghanistan in important ways. Beijing is also an important player by virtue of its financing for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor projects in Pakistan. Without a comprehensive regional approach to Afghanistan, the Trump administration will find itself adrift in Afghanistan.
 
And sadly, this appears to be the most likely way forward. If there is a clear and measurable strategic end-state that the Trump administration is seeking in Afghanistan, it wasn't articulated in the August speech. Instead, Trump has taken ownership of an open-ended counterterrorism mission in Afghanistan. 3,900 more U.S. troops will be committed to what will amount to an endless game of militant whack-a-mole while the Afghan government and security forces will struggle to recapture large swathes of territory that have fallen to the Taliban.
 
The United State's longest war is poised to muddle on and on, with no end in sight.