Pakistan’s Changing Politics

Pakistan is without doubt one of the world’s most important countries. The only Muslim-majority nuclear-armed power recently became the world’s fifth most populous nation, surpassing Brazil. Yet, its political situation remains as uncertain as ever, with no faction – civilian or military – seeming able to hang on to power for long enough to steer the country onto a more stable, nonviolent, and growth-oriented trajectory. In the meantime, Pakistan remains plagued by enormous security, education, health, demographic, and economic challenges.

When the erstwhile prime minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, was ousted from his position by a court in July, the future of Pakistan’s political system seemed uncertain, with the future of his Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) questionable. Sharif’s ousting called into question whether elements of Pakistan’s establishment in the military, courts, and bureaucracy will ever allow electoral democracy to become fully entrenched in the country. Sharif, whose government was set to remain in power until scheduled parliamentary elections in 2018, failed to complete a full five-year term, like almost every other elected government in Pakistan’s history (the period between 2008 and 2013 being the only exception).

Sharif’s position was long considered precarious because of his previous clashes with Pakistan’s military establishment. A previous government led by him was overthrown in a military coup by General Pervez Musharraf in 1999, possibly because Sharif favored (and favors) better relations with India, a position that would reduce the importance of the Pakistani military. So it was not the biggest surprise both within and outside of Pakistan when Pakistan’s supreme court disqualified Sharif from office for ten years for failing to report that his family owned residential properties in London under Pakistani disclosure rules when he ran for office in 2013. There is no evidence, however, that he appropriated public funds while in power to purchase properties in London. (The allegations became public with the release of the Panama Papers, exposing his family’s overseas financial activities.)

Notwithstanding the likelihood of at least some of the corruption charges against the Sharif family being accurate, there is no doubt that the Sharif government did a good job for Pakistan in difficult circumstances. Pakistan’s economy improved, and the country negotiated a major trade and infrastructure initiative with China, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which will improve the country’s ramshackle infrastructure and improve its connectivity to the powerhouse of the Asia-Pacific. While Sharif was unable to reset relations with India to the extent he would perhaps have liked to, no doubt hampered by military interference, he did manage to keep potential crises from escalating too far. Furthermore, Operation Zarb-e-Azb, launched in 2014, rolled back the endemic violence plaguing the country, especially in the northwestern province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa near Afghanistan.

Many Pakistani political figures reacted in an opportunistic manner to the troubles facing the PML-N. Imran Khan, the chairman of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), an opposition party in power in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, argued that Sharif’s ouster was beneficial to Pakistan’s democracy. Khan said of the decision: “Instead of democracy, we have so far had a kleptocracy in Pakistan. But things are getting better… In my opinion, democracy will be strengthened.” Meanwhile, the main opposition party, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), and another party, the Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid (PML-Q), both condemned the Sharif family for questioning the motives of the judiciary instead of facing its verdict. Sharif and the PML-N meanwhile claimed that the judiciary was biased against their interests.

In legal terms, things do not seem to be getting better for the Sharif family. In mid-October, an anti-corruption court that the Supreme Court had ordered to take up the case of the Sharif family’s corruption indicted Sharif, his daughter Maryam Nawaz Sharif, and her husband, Muhammad Safdar, on corruption charges. Nawaz Sharif spent most of October in London – where his wife is undergoing treatment for cancer – though pledged to return to Pakistan in order to face trial. Asif Ali Zardari, the PPP co-chairman, has called for the arrest of the Sharif family. As of writing, Nawaz Sharif was scheduled to return to Pakistan on October 25.

However, although it appears as though the Sharif family, and by extension, the PML-N have fallen on hard times, this is not necessarily the case. His party has a firm hold on the political landscape in the country (it still forms the government and the caretaker prime minister, Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, “consults” with Sharif frequently), and especially in the powerful province of Punjab. This will make it hard for Pakistan’s main opposition parties, chiefly the PPP and the PTI, to capitalize on the Sharif family’s misfortunes, and win more seats in Punjab in Pakistan’s 2018 elections. The PPP is associated with Sindh province, and the PTI with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, whose combined population is still less than Punjab’s. Thus electoral demographics are in the PML-N’s favor as long as it can continue to dominate Punjab.

After his ejection as prime minister, Nawaz Sharif returned to Lahore, where he was mobbed by supporters. Although at first it seemed as though Nawaz would promote his brother, Shahbaz Sharif, in his place as party leader, and as prime minister, he did not do so, perhaps fearing a rival. Instead, he had himself reelected as the party leader of the PML-N in October, running unopposed, after he had a law changed to allow him to run despite the pending case against him. Last month, his wife, Kulsoom Nawaz Sharif, was elected to the National Assembly in a local election in Lahore, in a campaign run by Maryam.

While Pakistan’s major opposition parties have so far proved unable to capitalize on the misfortunes of the PML-N, some smaller Islamist parties may gain more influence, possibly bolstered by elements of Pakistan’s security services. This development could bode ill for a country renowned for its intolerance, where mobs frequently lynch people accused of blasphemy. At the very least, none of Pakistan’s main parties have been violently Islamist.

In the by-elections in Lahore that led to Kulsoom Sharif being elected, two Islamist parties made gains. The smaller of the two parties, Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan (the Movement of “Here I am [O Messenger of God]”) won six percent of the vote. The party was founded to promote the memory of Mumtaz Qadri, who assassinated the former governor of Punjab, Salmaan Taseer, in 2011 because of the latter’s opposition to Pakistan’s blasphemy law. The larger of the two Islamist parties, the Milli Muslim League (MML), gained more votes than the PPP. The party has subsequently threatened to contest all seats in the general election in 2018, making it likely that it would enter the National Assembly in such a scenario.

The MML is the political front of Lashkar-e Taiba (LeT) (“Army of the Good”), a jihadist group based in Pakistan and protected by some elements of Pakistan’s security forces. LeT is headed by the notorious jihadi Hafiz Saeed, who is living openly in the country without fear of arrest, despite being accused of masterminding the 2008 Mumbai Terrorist Attacks, which killed 166 people. It is clear that the political cooperation between the military and Saeed is thus likely to continue; the formation of an Islamic political front for LeT bodes ill for the region, as it legitimizes, through electoral democracy, a dangerous jihadist group, one that ironically was headed by a man opposed to democracy for most of his life.

Yet, Sharif and his opponents in the PPP have proved wily, surviving various military governments and coups to remain major players in Pakistani politics. It remains to be seen if new forces can reshape Pakistan’s political landscape. While the result of the current crisis may be to slow down the pace of decision-making in Pakistan for a while, its long-term consequences are debatable.

In short, it seems as though Sharif and his party will continue running the country until the next elections without any glitches, and have a good shot at retaining power in 2018. While Nawaz Sharif may not return to power directly for years due to his various legal entanglements, he will likely continue to run affairs by proxy, as Aung San Suu Kyi does in Myanmar. The most likely scenario is one in which Sharif will bide his time, until more favorable political conditions prevail, and then use his political influence to have certain laws passed to allow him to run for office again. Such is the way of things in Pakistan.