Japan’s Increasingly Tough Defense Choices

In the early morning hours of August 29, 2017 many Japanese citizens in the northern prefectures were awakened by a jarring J-Alert notice warning that a missile from North Korea was headed in Japan’s direction. The test of Pyongyang’s new intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) – the so-called Hwasong-12 – had a trajectory that flew over Japan’s northern island of Hokkaido. The missile test added to Japan’s sense of vulnerability in the face of the region’s growing threats. Indeed, the August 29 test appeared to break the threshold of ballistic missile overflights of Japan’s airspace – an informal practice that the North had avoided up until that point. Pyongyang then followed up its initial test over Japan with a subsequent Hwasong-12 test in September that also had a trajectory over northern Japan but traveled a distance much farther than the earlier launch.

The intensity of North Korea’s missile program – both in terms of frequency of tests and speed of enhanced capabilities – is presenting Japan’s defense community with very difficult strategic choices. The Japanese defense community is simultaneously grappling with limited budgets, looming concerns about the U.S. role in the region, and a host of other needs beyond deterring and defending against Pyongyang’s bellicosity. It should be noted that the priority on mitigating threats from North Korea is not a new development in Tokyo. Indeed, Pyongyang has fired projectiles over Japan on four prior occasions (1998, 2009, 2012, and 2016). The key difference, though, is that previous tests were satellite-launched and did not re-enter the earth’s atmosphere. Contrast this with the two IRBM tests over Japan this year, which involved ballistic missiles capable of delivering a nuclear payload.

Further raising anxieties in Tokyo, and more broadly in the region, is the North’s concurrent nuclear development – as evidenced by its test of a hydrogen bomb in September and its rapid improvements on the process of miniaturizing a nuclear warhead to fit on top of one of its ballistic missiles. Pyongyang has also raised concerns in the region due to its efforts to perfect its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability. North Korea has already successfully tested such a delivery system through its “lofting” trajectory tests this past July. These developments have further convinced Tokyo to double-down on deterrence efforts with its U.S. ally, and look to bolster trilateral security cooperation with South Korea despite persistent bilateral strain.

Instability on the Korean Peninsula, along with deep uncertainty and anxiety about the non-traditional rhetoric from the White House, continues to shape Japan’s defense policy. There are other important drivers as well, especially growing threat perceptions in Tokyo regarding China’s assertiveness in the region and the rapid modernization of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and the Chinese Coast Guard. The touchpoint of Japan’s concern focuses on the maritime domain, where Tokyo and Beijing are embroiled in a longstanding dispute over the Senkaku Islands, referred to as the Diaoyu in China, in the East China Sea. China and Japan also are loggerheads over maritime boundaries and natural resource extraction in the East China Sea. Moreover, Tokyo continues to levy pressure, both diplomatically and through its capacity building efforts with littoral states in Southeast Asia, on Beijing’s salami-slicing tactics in the South China Sea.

In addition to the most pressing concerns from the Korean Peninsula and managing the long-term challenge of China, Japan also continues to face the benign, but still resource intensive, task of managing the frequent – and longstanding – air incursions from Russia around its vast northern prefecture of Hokkaido. While few Japanese defense officials worry about Moscow’s intentions or the possibility of armed conflict, the problem contributes to a resource drain, as evidenced by the high amount of annual scrambles by Japan’s Air Self-Defense Forces (ASDF) in response to intrusions by Russian jets.

Defense Planning and the Abe Administration

On October 22, Japan’s ruling party – the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) – scored a decisive victory in a snap election called by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. The victory ensures political stability in Tokyo in the near term and indicates that Abe is on track to serve out his third and final term as LDP president, which expires in 2021. One of the main selling points for Abe during the October election was his stable hand on security issues – especially increased provocations from North Korea. Abe has also invested deeply, since his election in late 2012, in retrofitting Japan’s antiquated national security and defense architecture through a host of security and defense reforms, including new legislation which took effect last year.

By the end of 2018, Japan’s Ministry of Defense (JMOD) will submit its new Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP) to cover a four-year period until 2022. Before this point, JMOD will present recommendations to the Abe cabinet after review of the current National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) and the MTDP. Abe requested a review of both policy documents earlier this year amid rising tensions on the Korean peninsula. The current NDPG was crafted in 2013 and is intended to last ten years.

Ballistic Missile Defense

As a result of rapid developments of Pyongyang’s missile programs, there is expected to be a considerable focus in the new guidelines on ballistic missile defense. Currently, Japan has a two-layered missile defense system in place with Aegis-equipped JMSDF destroyers – often placed in the Sea of Japan – serving as the first layer of defense. The JMSDF destroyers essentially act as Japan’s first line of defense in the event of a ballistic missile threat and have the capability – depending on the trajectory of the launch – to intercept a missile during the midcourse phase of the flight path. The Aegis-equipped destroyers are complemented with a “second-tier” in the form of land-based Patriot PAC-3 batteries, which are able to make interceptions in the terminal phase of the missile flight path, assuming the target is Japanese territory. Both of these systems are integrated and coordinated through the Japan Aerospace Defense Ground Environment.

With the frequency of provocations from Pyongyang increasing significantly, in tandem with rapid qualitative improvements in the North’s missile capabilities, Japan is looking at ways to further enhance its security against the ballistic missile threat and there is a push from Abe and others in the LDP to increase the budget of JMOD in order to procure more capabilities. Most indications from Tokyo are that JMOD is focused on procuring the Aegis Ashore system – a land-based version of the BMD system Japan currently has in place with its JMSDF destroyers in the Sea of Japan. Like the JMSDF vessels, new Aegis Ashore batteries would be equipped with SM-3 interceptors with an altitude range of approximately 500 km.

Eventually, the Aegis systems in Japan will likely be also be equipped with SM-3 Block IIA interceptors, which Tokyo is jointly developing with Washington. The new SM-3 Block IIA, which was successfully tested twice this year to date, enhances the capabilities of the current SM-3 interceptors through an increased altitude range of interception and also increased simultaneous engagement. The new interceptors, slated for deployment by 2021, also possess more capabilities to work around ballistic missiles that have interceptor avoidance technologies – such as decoys or missiles on a “lofted” trajectory. Japan also hopes that it can deploy the still-developing AN/SPY6 radar to its Aegis systems to replace the current AN/SPY1. The Spy-6 X-band radar would provide much greater coverage than the current radar. The new radar system’s development, though, remains delayed and is not slated to be deployed on U.S. ships until at least 2022.

The likely decision to procure Aegis Ashore is significant for a few reasons. First, the system is aimed at reducing the burden on the Aegis-equipped JMSDF destroyers – currently four – which are spread thin with long deployments in the Sea of Japan. The JMSDF ships need regular maintenance and inspections, which makes it all the more difficult to ensure adequate coverage in the area. Through pre-existing procurement plans and vessel refurbishment, Japan will add two more Aegis-equipped Atago-class destroyers by 2021, which would bring their total to eight destroyers (four of the older Kongo-class and four newer Atago-class models). This should help the resource-drain issue and also allow for more flexibility in deployments outside of the Sea of Japan.

The second key reason for the decision to go with Aegis Ashore is due to its natural complement with Japan’s current BMD infrastructure and seamless interoperability with the JMSDF destroyers and also the PAC-3 batteries. In addition to the move on Aegis Ashore, JMOD is also planning to roll out an enhanced version of the Patriot batteries – the PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) – as soon as possible. The updated Patriot batteries will more than double the range of interception from the current PAC-3 system in place.

Another important reason for the decision to bolster BMD through Aegis capabilities is the joint defense production of Aegis systems in Japan by Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and Japan’s biggest defense contractor, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI). Thus, defense industrial interests in Japan play another key role in the evolution of missile defense. This may also be part of the reason why Japan opted not to procure the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system. THAAD, a terminal phase BMD interception system, is produced by Lockheed Martin and there are currently no plans to jointly develop with Japanese contractors, such as MHI.

While the deployment of THAAD looks unlikely in the near term, it is possible that JMOD may revisit the issue if tensions continue to increase. Indeed, THAAD provides different capabilities than the Aegis system and would be focused on greater protection from missiles in their terminal stage, especially those targeting metropolitan areas such as Tokyo. The benefit of deploying THAAD in Japan would be the existence of a true multi-tiered system, with Aegis destroyers and batteries targeting mid-course interception, while Patriot and THAAD batteries would target the terminal phase. THAAD’s uniqueness from the PAC-3 system is its high-altitude interception (thought to be around 200 km, versus 20-30 km for the PAC-3 MSE) and also its superior radar. Therefore, in theory, a successful interception at the terminal stage would reduce the leakage of missile aimed at a metropolitan area.

Strike Options?

Another debate swirling around defense circles in Tokyo is the potential development of so-called strike options – such as the procurement and deployment of cruise missiles – that would provide Japan with retaliatory offensive strike capabilities in the event that it is attacked. Another related, but more provocative, option would be to field these strike capabilities as a “pre-emptive” option in the case of an imminent attack on Japan. The debate around strike capabilities is not new and this has long been debated through the evolution of Japan’s defense policy, and its alliance relationship with the United States, over the past several decades. But, while the argument is not new, there is more strident and public discussion on the matter with an LDP-backed study report on the matter earlier this year and a number of influential advocates for a change in Tokyo’s posture.

Despite some concerns that pursuing strike options would be unconstitutional in Japan, there actually is no explicit ban on such capabilities or options if done in self defense. Indeed, as far back as 1956, former Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama remarked, “It is unreasonable to think that the purpose of the Constitution is that Japan has to sit and wait for death when it comes under attack by missiles and other weapons.” That said, there likely would be domestic scrutiny in Japan over a strike capability, especially in light of Abe’s controversial goal to revise the country’s constitution. Tokyo would also have to brace for the impact that such a move would have with its other relationships in the region, especially those with China and South Korea.

Boosting Maritime Capabilities

Despite the focal point on deterring and – if necessary – defending against threats from North Korea, Japan also remains intently focused on building up its maritime security capabilities in light of Chinese assertiveness in the East China Sea. The level of incursions from Chinese vessels in the waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands has somewhat stabilized but still remains fluid and the nature of those incursions (including territorial sea passes) is changing. This continues to be a significant driver in Japan’s defense planning as it looks to balance scarce budgetary resources (with Japan’s defense budget still hovering around 1 percent of total GDP despite very modest increases under the Abe administration) with the diversity of threats. The enhancement of Japan’s BMD infrastructure – which is very costly – is one of the most significant near-medium term challenges.

While some of the core capabilities Japan needs are effectively dual-use (such as the deployment of additional JMSDF destroyers), others are more narrowly focused on maritime security and the defense of Japan’s southwest islands or Nansei-shoto. In light of this, the current NDPG emphasizes a focus on enhancing the SDF’s intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), intelligence, and transport capabilities while preparing contingencies for any attack on its remote islands. On the ISR side, Japan will likely look to continue its emphasis on building up its patrol capabilities through further deployment of fixed-wing patrol aircraft and ship-based helicopters. By 2023, Japan looks to field at least 80 patrol helicopters and also increase its submarine count from 16 to 22. Tokyo also will look to reform the JMSDF through introducing more destroyers (including those not equipped with Aegis capabilities) and scaling back its number of mine-sweeping vessels.

In line with its more flexible change to dynamic defense, which began with the 2010 NDPG, Japan will also be realigning its Ground Self Defense Forces (GSDF) to meet evolving challenges. One key example of this will be the development of rapid deployment divisions and brigades aimed at responding to any attack on remote islands. These changes are outlined in the dynamic defense concept, which aims to transition the GSDF from a dated posture that was very heavy with large brigades and tanks, to a more agile unit that is capable of modern wars. To put this in perspective, Japan has reduced its number of tanks from 900 in 1996 to approximately 300 currently. The GSDF also will continue to transition itself increasingly southward as threats shift away from Russia and more toward China. On the issue of maritime threats, the GSDF will also play a key role through the future establishment of an amphibious rapid deployment brigade, which will be specifically tasked with responding to armed attacks on Japanese islands.

From the Air Self Defense Force side, Japan’s choices are constrained in budget terms due to its large procurement of the F-35A – which will be the centerpiece of its fighter jet cache for years to come. That said, the ASDF will remain focused on building up its early warning and control units to provide improved ISR capabilities. Japan also has ordered three Global Hawk unmanned air vehicles from the United States to assist its intelligence collection and ISR.

Conclusion

Adapting and planning contingencies on China and North Korea will consume the bulk of Japan’s defense policy and procurement questions. The instability on the Korean peninsula and the drive for effective BMD infrastructure continue to shape Japan’s defense policy and will be a primary driver. Despite this, there are other important factors as well – including the sustained concern on China’s military modernization and its maritime activities in the East and South China Seas.