Michał Lubina

Russia, a superpower a little past its prime, and China, a superpower ascendant, make an interesting match. Their relationship is not quite equal, Michał Lubina, an assistant professor at Jagiellonian University in Kraków, Poland, argues in his recent book, Russia and China: A Political Marriage of Convenience – Stable and Successful. But while it’s an asymmetric relationship, Lubina tells The Diplomat, it’s still a “win-win.”

This interview has been edited for length and clarity.

The subtitle of your book describes the Russia-China relationship as a political “marriage of convenience.” What does Russia bring to the marriage? What does China?

They bring the sense of security, stability, and predictability. They’ve learned from the Cold War’s bitter lesson that good neighborhood is better than enmity. They want to have their strategic rears covered so that they can concentrate on other, more important policy dimensions: the South China Sea for China and “near abroad” and Western Europe for Russia. To put it metaphorically: now Russia represents “peace from the north” for China while China is “peace from the east” for Russia.

Moreover, they mutually support each other on the international stage: as long as they do so, neither of them would be isolated on the global scene. In recent years we could observe this when China was sympathetic to Russian actions in Ukraine and Russia leaned toward China’s position on the South China Sea.

There are also commercial interests, from energy to arms (Russia is still the key weapons provider to China). This binds them. Despite the fact that economic relations are asymmetric in favor of China, from Russia’s perspective something is better than nothing. Moscow gets money for its resources and by cooperating with China can upgrade its bargaining position vis-à-vis Western European partners.

What are the primary challenges in the Russia-China relationship?

The rise of China represents the biggest challenge. So far China has been able to achieve spectacular growth. It benefits from the cooperation with Russia more but at the same time Beijing knows its limits and does not humiliate Russia or exploit it completely. Should China rise too much, this can change. Deng Xiaoping’s “keep a low profile” concept has already been challenged and China has a long tradition of Sinocentric behavior. So, Beijing must be careful not to overuse its advantage over Russia as it may provoke Moscow to change course. 

It works the other way around, too. Despite the sense that China is not a danger to Russia among Russian ruling elite, deep inside there is still an anti-Chinese anxiety. So far this has been balanced by Putin’s pro-China message. Should circumstances change, Russia may decide that enough is enough of this overdependence. 

Despite these challenges, what makes the relationship work? What are the benefits?

The marriage works because the benefits outweigh the losses. This is more obvious for Russia. Its best partner in East Asia should be Japan, but Russian-Japanese relations are in a chronic state of stalemate (despite recent positive activity between Tokyo and Moscow). So Russia stays with China. There is a similar story when it comes to energy issues. In the 2000s Russia wanted to play China, Japan, and South Korea off one another by the geopolitics of energy but it turned out that China was the only real option. China (together with India) remains also the most important receiver of arms but India is barely interested in anything else but arms. Finally, there is geopolitics: Russia would love to pivot to Asia, but as it has little to offer beyond resources, arms, and anti-Americanism; China remains the only country where Moscow can score concrete results, hence it pivots to China only. Russia had tried to cooperate comprehensively with other countries of the region but realized that currently its only real option in the Asia-Pacific is China. Therefore after a while Moscow correctly decided that if you don’t have what you like, you must like what you have. This is the logic behind Russia’s acceptance of the “asymmetric win-win” relationship.

As for China, it needs Russia for securing its northern border, for its energy, its weapons, its position in Central Asia, its UNSC seat, and perhaps its Northwest Passage one day. And Russia is there to stay in all these aspects so Beijing has little reason to spoil relations with Moscow by, say, engaging too much in anti-Russian post-Soviet countries like Ukraine or Georgia or overusing its newly achieved position in Central Asia. 

You note that the Russia-China relationship is asymmetric in that China gets a little more out of the “win-win” than Russia does and that this is a bit of a return to a previous age in foreign policy. Can you describe how modern Russia-China relations are similar to their relations in the 17th century?

I’m perfectly aware that it’s very risky to make historical comparisons but I believe there are striking similarities with the first period of Sino-Russian relations in the 17th century. Moscow then sacrificed its Far Eastern territorial gains for peace and trade with China. The Qing court, having achieved dominance in bilateral relations, granted Moscow a privileged position within the Sinocentric world in order to achieve a long-lasting peace and stability. Russia, although weaker, was nevertheless strong enough to be able to construct an acceptable modus vivendi with Beijing. China, though stronger, could not fully impose its will and had to restrain; the deal was brokered on Chinese terms, but Russia did not become a tributary state, even though it was not equal to China. This model proved to be very stable – it lasted until the mid-19th century.

Now, as before, China is stronger and Russia does not challenge it. Instead, Moscow quietly accepts this fact and it tries to maximize its options in the new situation. China sets the agenda of bilateral relations but does not overuse its advantage over Russia as it wants a long-term relationship on Chinese terms. The “asymmetric win-win” is the result: both sides gain, but China gains more.

If Russia-China relations are predicated on convenience, what could happen to upset that calculation?

In my book, I wanted to combine the achievements of two most important schools in international academia on Sino-Russian relations: The pessimistic Bobo Lo “axis of convenience” school and its optimistic constructivist response. So I chose the “marriage of convenience” title to refer to the first school, but added the subtitle “stable and successful” to emphasize that building relations on convenience is not at all risky or prone to changeability (as the first school claims). Besides, the very term “marriage of convenience” has a negative meaning in the West, as it goes against the romantic notion of marriage. Not so in East Asia (at least before globalization). The marriage of convenience was for many centuries considered the proper one: a wise choice for a long-term relationship. I believe this East Asian understanding is very well suited to political reality, at least in its Sino-Russian dimension. 

So, this mutually win-win political marriage would change only if China overuses its advantage over Russia and/or the United States decides to reshape the geopolitical foundations of the world by offering Russia a much better “reset.” However, both seem unlikely for now.

How is Beijing’s Belt and Road initiative viewed in Moscow?

Initially Moscow responded with uneasiness, if not anger: Russia does not like others to enter its “near abroad” even if Moscow itself is not very active there (Moscow politically follows Oscar Wilde’s maxim “there are many things that we would throw away if we were not afraid that others might pick them up”). Therefore Russia blocked Chinese railways in Kyrgyzstan. But then the Ukrainian crisis hit and Russia needed China to help demonstrate that it is not isolated. The price was OBOR and Moscow paid it. The Kremlin keeps proclaiming that this project is impossible without Russia and even announced a route for the planned “one road.” This happened most probably against the wishes of the Chinese who prefer to keep the route, or routes, undecided to have more political options open (OBOR is generally, and purposely, very vague). Russia does exactly the same thing with OBOR as China does. It uses it politically on PR grounds. The technical difference is that in China, OBOR’s primary political goal is to strengthen Xi Jinping, while in Russia it is to show that establishing a new world architecture without Russia is impossible.

How does the Russia-China balance impact adjacent states -- in security, political and economic terms -- like those in Central Asia or Northeast Asia?

The situation in both regions is completely different. In Northeast Asia Russia bandwagoned to China and almost ceased to be an independent actor. By doing so Moscow lost space to maneuver, but gained access, although secondary, to decisions in regional affairs. In most issues, like North Korea, Russia usually echoes China’s stance.

In Central Asia, China is catching up with Russia. In two decades China broke Russia’s omnipotence there, testifying to China’s extraordinary success starting from a very low base. At the same time, however, Beijing has been trying to appease Moscow and avoid confrontation. So far Moscow has been able to tolerate this new situation, mainly because China’s entry to the region has unintentionally fulfilled Moscow’s strategic goal of keeping the West away from Central Asia. That is why Russia accepted that it must share Central Asia and designed zones of influence: security (Russia) and economy (China). This made Central Asia their joint condominium – not a New Great Game area – and effectively lowered the possibility of Central Asian countries balancing/hedging and playing Russia and China off against one another.