What Does Abe’s Latest Victory Mean for Japanese Politics?

In the general election held on October 22, the Japanese ruling coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Komeito enjoyed a resounding victory, winning 313 seats out of 465 in Japan’s lower house.

There is no question that the LDP-Komeito coalition was the biggest winner of the election. The fact that the ruling coalition now occupies 313 seats is significant, as this means that the LDP and Komeito together now have a two-thirds majority in the lower house.

But the campaign for this election did not start out suggesting this outcome. In fact, when Prime Minister Shinzo Abe dissolved the Lower House on September 28, there were some who speculated that the new Kibou no Tou (Party of Hope), launched by Tokyo Governor Yuriko Koike around the slogan of kanyou na hoshu (tolerant conservatism), might win disenchanted voters’ hearts and minds at the expense of the ruling coalition. However, the political tide rapidly turned against the Party of Hope when Koike fumbled on the potential absorption of former members of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). Ironically, the tide against the Party of Hope directly translated to the ascent of the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP), a left-of-center party let by Yukio Edano, who served as chief cabinet secretary under Naoto Kan during DPJ rule. After the votes had been counted, it was the CDP, not the Party of Hope, that emerged as the opposition party with the greatest number of seats (55), whereas the Party of Hope only won 50 seats.

What does the result of the October 22 election really mean for Japanese politics?

First, it means that the Japanese public — those who chose to vote, anyway — prioritized stability over change. A few days after the election, Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso commented that the ruling coalition’s big win was “thanks to North Korea.” While the way he described it may have not been politically appropriate, his comment certainly has some truth to it: with tension on the Korean Peninsula rising, there was a clear desire among Japan’s voters to see a steady hand in government.

Moreover, the election results demonstrate that the opposition once again failed to counter the ruling coalition with a set of credible policy alternatives and clear message. In fact, as the members of the DPJ essentially broke up into three groups — those who joined the Party of Hope, those who joined the CDP, and those who ran as unaffiliated candidates — they ended up splitting the anti-LDP/Komeito vote. Although the breakup of the DPJ may have the long-term benefit of streamlining opposition groupings, it still benefited the ruling coalition in this election.

In fact, the continuing failure of the opposition parties to effectively counter the LDP-Komeito coalition points to the enduring challenge that the opposition faces in today’s Japanese politics.  While most post-election analyses are quick to criticize Koike’s mismanagement of her discussion with the DPJ on how to join forces (particularly her using the world “exclusion” to describe her unwillingness to join forces with DPJ members who do not share her party’s view on policy issues), the quick descent of the popularity of the Party of Hope and the ascent of the CDP crystallizes the dilemma that opposition parties face. Simply put, in today’s Japan, it is extremely difficult for the opposition parties to present a united front against the LDP/Komeito coalition without forming a coalition among themselves. And the opposition parties’ only point of agreement is that they are against the LDP/Komeito ruling coalition — hardly a position that can offer a credible alternative to Japanese voters.

Thus, the LDP/Komeito’s “big win” in the October snap election was not necessarily a reflection of voter support for their policy platform. Rather, the result was due to yet another implosion among the opposition. In other words, the support for the LDP/ruling coalition among the electorate is more precarious than meets the eye.

In the days immediately following the election, media attention focused on how Abe will choose to take advantage of the ruling coalition’s newly won supermajority. Given Abe’s known interest in constitutional revision, a great deal of attention has been paid to whether he would now prioritize this over other agenda items, including economic reform. However, given the nature of his coalition’s win, it is unlikely that Abe will try to push his constitutional agenda through hastily.  Rather, by first trying to deliver on his domestic agenda, including the structural reform of the economy, he would seek to solidify voters’ support before moving onto the more ambitious agenda, including constitutional reform.