Quad Goals

Anyone that cares about the future of Asia should get acquainted with the so-called quadrilateral: a group of four democratic states with stakes in the status quo regional architecture. Comprising Japan, India, Australia, and the United States, the “Quad” is an old idea. It was first mooted seriously by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe during his first term in office from 2006 to 2007. The theory was sound: as an illiberal China continued to rise at meteoric pace, Asia's richest democracy (Japan), its largest democracy by population (India), and its largest democracy by area (Australia) would come together with the region's democratic hegemon (the United States) for consultations. China, however, didn't appreciate what appeared to be a transparent attempt at forging a coalition of like-minded states to contain its rise. After a first trial-balloon of a meeting, Beijing issued démarches to each of the four countries. Australia and India — their priorities somewhat divergent from Abe's enthusiasm and U.S. willingness at the time — decided the trouble wasn't worth it and folded. The Quad was shelved away and mostly forgotten, until October 2017.

In October, with a fresh mandate from the Japanese people after a snap election, Abe's new foreign minister, Taro Kono, raised the idea again. Much had changed between 2007 and 2017, of course. China is no longer rising; it has risen fully and is less hesitant about articulating its ambitions than ever before. Chinese President Xi Jinping's 19th Party Congress work report made it clear that Beijing will leave its mark on Asia's order, forging what has long been China's vision: Asia for Asians, free of undue U.S. influence. India, too, since 2007, has seen incredible rapprochement with especially Japan and the United States on security matters. The Indian Navy conducts bilateral and, since 2015, an annual trilateral naval exercise with its Japanese and U.S. counterparts. Australia, meanwhile, has maintained its steady relationship with both Tokyo and Washington, even while a complex debate rages on domestically about the appropriate relationship between Canberra and Beijing in the 21st century. Above all, with new questions about U.S. strategy in Asia in the era of Donald Trump colliding with a more-confident-than-ever China implementing its massive Belt and Road Initiative, there is appetite in Tokyo, New Delhi, and Canberra for a reconvened Quad. In Washington, Trump's National Security Council and State Department staff see the value — even if the president himself may be aloof to these broader factors.

While all of the above sounds grand and is suggestive of the Quad emerging as a major geopolitical force in Asian affairs, the reality as of December 2017 is considerably more mundane. In Manila, in early November, senior officials from each of the four countries met on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations-related summits. “Senior officials” in this context means little more than experienced career diplomats and bureaucrats. The Quad is still well away from a ministerial-level meeting, let alone a leaders’ level summit. The outcome of the first meeting was modest too. Each delegation put out a statement emphasizing a purely exploratory mission. The objective for each participant was to discuss the future of the Indo-Pacific region. The “Indo-Pacific” appellation for the wider Asian region has been fully adopted by each of the countries separately this year. For the United States, it marks a break with the Obama administration's preferred Asia-Pacific. It emphasizes a common maritime vision, bringing the Indian and Pacific Oceans together — mirroring what Abe had described in 2007 in a speech to the Indian parliament on the “confluence of the two seas” in Asia.

Apart from their shared stakes in the Indo-Pacific, the participants in the reconvened Quad identified seven core areas of common interest. According to the Australian and U.S. readouts released after the meeting, these include the rules-based order in Asia, freedom of navigation and overflight, respect for international law, enhancing connectivity, maritime security, North Korea and proliferation, and countering terrorism. The Indian statement omitted any mention of freedom of navigation and overflight, respect for international law, and maritime security, even though New Delhi has enthusiastically backed these concepts in multiple bilateral and trilateral statements recently. India's emphasis, however, was on connectivity — a bid, presumably, to counter China's Belt and Road Initiative, which New Delhi publicly rebuked in May 2017. Japan's readout made no mention of connectivity, even though Tokyo is a leader in foreign aid and is collaborating on strategic infrastructure initiatives with India in Africa, for example. The omissions in the Japanese and Indian statements shouldn't be taken necessarily as a sign of disinterest.

The question now is what the Quad will do next, if anything. To be sure, there is some low-hanging fruit for the grouping to immediately seize in the coming year. For example, the trilateral U.S.-Japan-India Malabar naval exercises can easily be quadrilateralized either formally or informally next year to include the Royal Australian Navy. Similarly, with the India-U.S. Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) in effect, a concluded Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) could supercharge military interoperability between the armed forces of these four countries.

But for the Quad to truly succeed, it must be more than just about security. A security focus would not only confirm Chinese fears of an attempt at containment, but do little to win confidence from small and medium-sized states in the Indo-Pacific. To truly compete, the Quad must be clear about what it stands for in Asia: the rules-based order. In underwriting that order, these four states must champion high-standard infrastructure lending, in a bid to shore up the existing status quo against Beijing's easy-go-lucky approach to checkbook diplomacy. The task here is more challenging for the pro-status quo powers. The truth is that Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative represents the optimization of a wicked supply-and-demand problem: Asia has massive demand for infrastructure financing and Beijing has massive financial and capital overcapacity. The Quad simply lacks the ability to outlay billions in capital.

Even without answering these questions, however, the Quad can be effective. First, though, it will have to overcome an important obstacle, which is the seeming disinterest of the U.S. president in the rules-based order and robust, liberalized, multilateral trade in the region. At the recent Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Da Nang, Vietnam, Trump offered an explicit rejection of the long-standing economic norms the United States has championed in the region. India, too, doesn't have the greatest record as an unabashed supporter of free and liberalized trade in Asia.

Ultimately, whatever the Quad is destined to become with its reconvening in late 2017 remains unclear. Finding an answer won't be easy.