The Rise of Nepal’s Left Alliance

From May through December 2017, Nepal held elections in five separate stages for all three levels of government: local, provincial, and national. Voter turnout was high – roughly three-quarters of eligible voters voted in the local elections, and about two-thirds voted in the provincial and national polls. Despite rapid urbanization, most voters must cast their ballots in their place of birth, so millions traveled long distances over rough terrain to their home villages, braving muddy roads during the early stages held during monsoon season, and freezing temperatures during the later stages held in winter.

Because the elections were held over several months, political alliances shifted between the initial local and final national and provincial elections, generating some surprises. Most significantly, a new Left Alliance emerged in October, comprised of Nepal’s two largest communist parties, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Center) and the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) (CPN-UML). Though the Maoists and CPN-UML had been bitter rivals, they announced plans to run together for the provincial and national polls and merge into a single, unified party following the elections. Unity would enable them to win a majority, their leaders claimed, and to bring “prosperity through stability” – the latter being somewhat of a novelty in Kathmandu, where unstable coalition governments have been the norm since multi-party democracy was established in 1990.

In the end, the Left Alliance came out ahead in the elections at all three levels of government. In the national parliament, the Left Alliance holds a majority, though just under the two-thirds majority needed to make any changes to the country’s fledgling constitution, which was promulgated in 2015. Their main rival, the center-right Nepali Congress, was trounced, securing less than a quarter of seats in parliament.

Whether the Left Alliance will make good on its election promises remains to be seen; they have yet to form a government. Before the coalition can do so, elections for the National Assembly – the upper house of parliament, which is selected by provincial- and local-level officials – must be held. Despite initial disagreements over how to conduct these elections, they have been scheduled for February 8. If ongoing protests over the naming of provincial capitals do not throw a wrench in the works, the new government could be formed as early as mid-February.

A Shift Toward China?

Much of the international media coverage of the elections took a narrow view, focusing on the geopolitical implications for Nepal’s two giant neighbors, India and China, whose relations have been under special strain since the Doklam standoff from June through August last year. While the Left Alliance enjoyed the tacit backing of China, India’s clear favorite in the race was the Nepali Congress.

“One reason these elections were projected as a geopolitical contest between India and China is that this story-line sells abroad,” wrote Biswas Baral, a Nepali journalist for the national daily Republica. “Otherwise, who would be interested in elections in a smallish and seemingly insignificant country like Nepal?”

That Nepal’s relations with its neighbors would become an important topic in the elections was a given. Nepal’s relationship with India has been at a nadir ever since India imposed a blockade on Nepal in the winter of 2015-16 (though this is officially denied by the Indian government). At the time, Nepal had just promulgated its new constitution, despite the objections of Madhesis – Nepali communities who live in the Terai plains near the southern border and share linguistic and cultural ties with Indians. In a country where the state has been historically controlled by high-caste men from the hills, plains-dwelling Madhesis are one among many marginalized minority groups. Madhesi activists sought (and still seek) a constitutional amendment to redraw Nepal’s electoral map under the newly minted federal system, so as to create two provinces in the Terai where Madhesi populations are greatest (under the current setup, besides one province in the eastern Terai, the plains are divided up into provinces that contain hilly as well as plains areas). In support of Madhesi protesters, India imposed an unofficial blockade, squeezing the supply of essential goods, especially petrol, to Kathmandu and hill communities still reeling from the April and May 2015 earthquakes. The major effect of the blockade was to turn public opinion outside the Terai strongly against India; it was called off after four-and-a-half months without any major concessions on behalf of the Madhesis.

Though the blockade was certainly the freshest grievance against India in the minds of many hill Nepalis as they headed to the ballot box, India has a long history of interference in Nepal’s domestic politics. It played a major role in shaping several pro-democratic upheavals since 1950, during which it built close – though sometimes fraught – relations with Nepal’s oldest democratic party and Left Alliance rival, the Nepali Congress. India has primarily viewed Nepal through a security lens, seeking to maintain a friendly buffer state with China, and has intervened to hasten the downfall of governments that have made too strong overtures toward Nepal’s northern neighbor.

For example, in 1989-90, after then-King Birendra’s government sought to purchase weapons from China, India imposed a blockade and supported a home-grown movement for multi-party democracy. In 2006, after Birendra’s successor, King Gyanendra, sought closer ties with China and recommended its admission into the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) group of nations, India supported a rapprochement between the then-rebel Maoists and other democratic parties, setting in motion a peace process that brought an end to the monarchy. In the post-war, post-monarchy era, India supported the breakup of a coalition government headed by the Maoists in 2009 after their prime minister, Pushpa Kamal Dahal, was seen as cozying up to Beijing. And during the blockade, India encouraged defections from a CPN-UML-led coalition government that refused to cow to Madhesi demands, leading to its breakup.

In its 2017 campaign, the Left Alliance played upon popular resentment of India. It promised to renegotiate the countries’ 1950 Peace and Friendship Treaty, which allows citizens of Nepal to live and work in India and vice versa. Opponents argue that the arrangement hurts Nepal’s economy. The Left Alliance also said it would return a major infrastructure project, the Budhi Gandaki hydroelectric dam, to a Chinese firm after the incumbent Nepali Congress government scrapped the agreement. Many voters saw the CPN-UML in particular as a strong bulwark against Indian influence, since its president, Khadga Prasad Oli, had been prime minister during much of the 2015-16 blockade, when he vociferously criticized India and even signed a trade and transit treaty with China. (This remains a mostly symbolic gesture at this stage, since Nepal still has only one functioning road with China and the port designated for Nepali trade with third countries, Tianjin, lies more than 3,000 km from the Nepali border.)

For its part, China has played a more hands-off role in Nepal than India. Historically, relations were mostly superficial due to Kathmandu’s distance from China’s power centers and Himalayan peaks forming a natural barrier along Nepal’s northern border. Although the Maoists as rebels drew inspiration from their northern comrades, the Chinese government provided no support to the insurgency, which lasted from 1996-2006. China has, however, sought Nepali government support for crackdowns against Tibetan activists, such as during anti-Olympics protests in 2008 (Nepal hosts between 15,000 and 20,000 Tibetan refugees).

However, since the launch of Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative, which Nepal signed on to in May 2017, China has proposed to drastically increase funding to Nepal. The 1200 MW Budhi Gandaki dam would more than double Nepal’s electrical capacity, and, if the project were returned to China, be funded through the BRI. Likewise, China has proposed an $8 billion rail link with Nepal through the BRI. As other examples in South Asia like Sri Lanka demonstrate, China seeks to turn a profit through BRI loans, but could also potentially seek to leverage debt for political concessions.

Following the election results, The Nikkei Asian Review went so far as to liken Nepal to a piece on an Othello board, which had been flipped in China’s favor as part of a modern “Great Game” to encircle its mega South Asian rival. While it is true that the election results were viewed much more favorably by China than by India, most domestic observers would dismiss the Othello metaphor as too black-and-white.

Indeed, Nepal’s long and intimate history with its southern neighbor is unlikely to be negated with a single election. For centuries, Nepalis have worked and lived in India and vice versa, facilitated by the two countries’ open border. The vast majority of Nepal’s trade has always been with India. Even in 2016, despite the blockade, 66 percent of Nepal’s imports came from India and 57 percent of its exports went to India, as compared to just 14 percent and 3 percent from and to China. Nepalis have served in the Gurkha Regiments of the Indian Army since the 19th century, and were actually among those deployed against China in the 1962 Indo-Sino border war. People-to-people ties are also reinforced by the fact that both countries are primarily Hindu, and the Nepali language, the lingua franca, is closely related to Hindi. (Although a number of indigenous languages in Nepal belong to the Tibeto-Burman language group, no languages are closely related to Chinese). Bollywood, rather than Chinese cinema, is a staple of pop culture in Nepal.

Some have called into question the Left Alliance’s commitment to following through on its election rhetoric. Indeed, standing up to India is a useful populist tool for winning elections. But once elected, the new Left Alliance may find it expedient to mend ties with India while pursuing projects with both its neighbors.

A Victory for Socialism?

Some leftist international observers quickly welcomed the Left Alliance’s victory as a win for Marxism. An article by Vijay Prashad, the historian and commentator from India, opened with the celebratory lines: “You might as well imagine a large red flag fluttering from the summit of Mount Everest. That’s what the outcome of the parliamentary and provincial elections in Nepal suggests.”

The Left Alliance did win in a landslide. But if the Left Alliance is taken to represent Nepal’s left, what does it mean to be leftist in Nepal these days?

During the insurgency, the Maoists advocated a revolutionary platform that included drafting a new constitution by elected representatives, land reforms, secularism, more inclusion of ethnic minorities and low-caste groups in politics and state organs, and federalism so as to create autonomous states for marginalized ethnic groups (like the Madhesis and others). Since joining mainstream politics in 2006, some of these goals have been accomplished, while others have been abandoned.

A constituent assembly was elected in 2008, which promptly affirmed Nepal’s secular status and ended the monarchy. It eventually drafted a new constitution by 2015, institutionalizing federalism; the 2017 provincial elections filled seats in new Provincial Assemblies.

At the same time, other important aspects of the revolutionary agenda were abandoned, including radical economic reforms such as land reform. The Maoists’ economic moderation is exemplified by their proposed merger with the CPN-UML, a much more centrist party. Although some CPN-UML leaders cut their teeth with an agrarian insurgency in the 1970s, the party has amassed a large following among middle-class traders and bureaucrats since joining mainstream politics in the 1990s. The Maoist-UML joint election manifesto called for, among other things, “Participation of the private sector in all organs of the national economy,” and an “investment-friendly environment, labor-friendly relations and security of investment and profit… Public-private partnership will also be given utmost priority.”

“Despite the Left Alliance’s victory… and despite its name—there is effectively no sizeable national political party with discernible leftist politics [in Nepal],” wrote journalist Shubhanga Pandey in a recent article in World Politics Review.

Perhaps most surprising of all, the proposed alignment between the Maoists and CPN-UML signals a potential end to the left’s serious engagement on issues of ethnic autonomy and continued affirmative-action type programs for marginalized groups. While some laws have been passed since 2006 to ensure inclusion of marginalized groups in the government bureaucracy and politics (for example, parliament must be one-third female and other seats are reserved for members of disadvantaged groups), most parties’ leadership (including the Maoists’) is still dominated by high-caste men. And while the Maoists paid lip service to the Madhesis’ proposed constitutional amendment, the party’s merger with the CPN-UML – the party most staunchly opposed to the amendment – would likely ensure that it abandons this issue. Some commentators have suggested that ethnic-based autonomy and inclusion will now be relegated to “niche” issues.

Still, these “niches” are likely to remain of considerable size and importance, at least in certain areas of the country, for some time to come. For example, an alliance of two major Madhesi parties – the Rastriya Janata Party-Nepal (RJPN) and Sanghiya Samajwadi Forum – won a majority in the Provincial Assembly of Province 2, where Madhesis comprise approximately three-fourths of the population. And in Province 7, voters from the indigenous Tharu ethnic group demonstrated their continued discontent by electing Resham Chaudhary, an RJPN ethnic activist, in a landslide victory even though he is a fugitive on the run for alleged involvement in a protest that turned violent in August 2015, leaving eight police officers and one infant dead.

A Lasting Stability?

Perhaps most appealing to voters was the Left Alliance’s slogan of “prosperity through stability.”

Nepal is the second-poorest country in Asia. Large parts of the country devastated by the 2015 earthquakes are still struggling to rebuild houses, government buildings, and water systems. Throughout the country, building roads and increasing hydro-electric capacity (the country has chronic electricity shortages) are priorities. Dismal economic opportunities lead millions of Nepalis to seek work abroad in India, the Middle East, Malaysia, and South Korea every year.

Meanwhile, instability has been a defining feature of modern Nepali politics. Since 1990, no government has won an outright majority, leading to unstable coalition governments. None have lasted more than three years, and there have been 13 prime ministers over the course of 23 tenures. Political instability was exacerbated during the Maoist insurgency and the contentious peace process that followed. Constant political infighting has led many to believe economic development can only be achieved with stability in government.

The Left Alliance’s campaign appealed to this sentiment directly. They said they would roughly double per capita income to $5,000 within five years, and graduate Nepal to a middle-income country. They argued this could be achieved because the CPN-UML and Maoists together could win a majority – negating the need for coalition partners, and allowing the government to serve out its full five-year term without political drama.

Whether the stability can last remains to be seen. The CPN-UML and Maoists have yet to merge, and whether they will actually do so remains an uncertainty until the details of power-sharing under the new unified party are worked out. Stability will also depend upon India refraining from meddling to split the alliance, even if the new government seems to shift closer to China. Nepal scholar and former Indian diplomat S.D. Muni warned in a recent article against Indian intervention, noting that “there are strategic planners in the Prime Minister’s Office, the external affairs ministry and other parts of the establishment to whom the option of breaking the Left Alliance would come easily.”

And even if political stability is achieved, others argue economic development will remain elusive without a parallel increase in government transparency. Nepal scores 29 out of 100 in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, making it one of the most corrupt countries in Asia, just ahead of Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, and Bangladesh. A recent investigation by Nepal’s Center for Investigative Journalism showed how a corrupt nexus between political parties and construction contractors allows major infrastructure projects like roads to go unfinished or be poorly constructed. And because political office can be so profitable, politicians across party lines spent massive sums on election campaigns, ignoring official caps on financing.

One small party, the Viveksil Sajha Party, campaigned on an explicitly anti-corruption platform. Though it garnered several hundred thousand votes across the country, it failed to win a single seat in parliament. Whether the new Left Alliance will take a tough stance on corruption seems doubtful. Yet this may be an essential ingredient for its promised prosperity.