Japan’s Diplomacy Hit the Ground Running in 2018

In the first month of the new year, Japan was busy in its diplomatic outreach. Foreign Minister Taro Kono has already visited six countries in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East as well as participating in the Vancouver Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on Security and Stability on the Korean Peninsula. The French foreign minister is also scheduled to visit Tokyo at the end of January.

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has also been active as Japan’s diplomat-in-chief. He visited six countries in Central and Eastern Europe, and hosted Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull upon his return. Abe and Indonesian President Joko Widodo also exchanged congratulatory messages to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and Indonesia.

Abe dispatched his special assistant, Kentaro Sonoura, to India, where he attended the third Raisina Dialogue and also observed maritime security joint training. At the Raisina Dialogue in New Dehli, where Australian, Indian, Japanese, and U.S. top naval admirals all spoke, Sonoura reiterated Abe’s commitment to support buttressing a rule-based international order under the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” strategy.

Such robust diplomatic activities less than a month into a new year suggest Abe’s determination to sustain the momentum in his government’s diplomatic outreach. However, looking down the road, there are already factors that could hinder Abe’s efforts.

First, the less-than-desirable state of Japan’s relationship with South Korea can complicate Japan’s need to continue to work closely with the United States and South Korea to respond Tokyo’s most immediate and urgent security concern — North Korea’s nuclear and missile activities. Diplomatic tension has risen considerably since South Korean President Moon Jae-in and Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-hwa both called for Tokyo to make “additional efforts” to resolve the “comfort women” issue, even though the bilateral agreement struck between the two countries in December 2015 stated that the implementation of the agreement would represent a “final and irreversible” settlement of the issue.

Prior to the Vancouver Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, North and South Korea met for direct bilateral talks, agreeing to form a unified Korea team for February’s Winter Olympics in PyeongChang, South Korea. Though the discussion was confined to North Korea’s participation in the Winter Olympics, and Moon publicly praised the Trump administration’s policy for possibly incentivizing North Korea to agree to meet with South Korea, concerns persist that North Korea might try to utilize the North-South dialogue channel as a way to drive a wedge between South Korea on the one hand and the United States and Japan on the other. Japan’s already tense diplomatic relations with South Korea will only increase such risks.

Second, while the Trump administration’s hard stance vis-à-vis China may be reassuring, it also may put Abe’s government in an awkward position. On one hand, Japan will continue to leverage Abe’s close personal relationship with U.S. President Donald Trump to promote its own foreign policy goals; on the other hand, Tokyo is also aiming to improve its relationship with Beijing this year as the two countries celebrate the 40th anniversary of their bilateral friendship treaty. Indeed, between the U.S. National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, Washington has unambiguously identified China as a “strategic competitor.” While these documents both emphasize that the United States does not seek military confrontation with Beijing, they also call out Chinese behavior that Washington deems problematic, from a “predatory economic policy” to militarization of man-made islands in South China Sea. By contrast, in his policy address to the Diet on January 22, Abe emphasized his intention to pursue a positive Japan-China relationship. The gap between the Trump administration’s sobering assessment of China — much of which Abe shares — and Tokyo’s desire to improve Japan-China relations this year will likely require skillful diplomatic maneuvering on Abe’s part.

Abe cannot be complacent on bilateral U.S.-Japan relations, either. While the political-military relations between the two countries are as close as they have been in recent history (arguably surpassing the close relationship Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi enjoyed with President George W. Bush), bilateral trade and economic relations are not as cozy. In fact, the U.S.-Japan Economic Dialogue, headed by Vice President Mike Pence and Vice Premier Taro Aso, has already been held twice, but there has been very little to show for it. As the dialogue continues, the Trump administration’s push for more equitable trade could lead to tension between the two allies.

Finally, as Abe continues to pursue his global diplomatic outreach under the banner of making a “proactive contribution to peace,” his government’s efforts can be greatly affected, if not undercut, by U.S. foreign policy decisions outside the Indo-Pacific region. Beyond the U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Paris Accord on climate change at the beginning of last year, the Trump administration’s other foreign policy positions, such as its reluctance toward the nuclear deal with Iran, the decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, and suspension of U.S. assistance to Palestine, can complicate foreign policy goals that Abe’s government has been pursuing.

Last year, Abe was one of the few world leaders who successfully navigated through the turmoil and confusion caused by the inauguration of the Trump administration in the United States. This year, his diplomatic skills will most likely be put to the test in balancing between his desire to continue to leverage his close personal relationship with Trump and fulfilling his own foreign policy goals.