India’s Push for ATGM Capability Highlights Inability to Execute Cold Start Doctrine

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s first visit to India in January was overshadowed by the Indian government’s purported decision to scrap a $500 million deal with Israeli defense contractor Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Ltd. for Spike anti-tank guided missile systems (ATGM).

The Indian Army, following an extensive evaluation and field trials, had selected the Spike ATGM over the U.S.-made Javelin ATGM system in October 2014. The Indian Army’s tentative procurement plan foresaw the purchase of 321 Spike ATGM systems and 8,356 missiles as part of the service’s plan to equip all of its infantry and mechanized infantry units with a new ATGM system.

India publicly announced its decision to cancel the deal in early January only a few days prior to the Israeli prime minister’s visit, stating the desire to opt for an indigenously designed, developed, and manufactured ATGM under Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s “Make in India” initiative instead.

Israel is one of India’s largest arms suppliers, with annual sales worth over $1 billion.

However, according to various Indian defense experts, the probable induction date into the Indian Army of a new indigenous ATGM system would likely be in the early to middle 2020s. At the same time, the Indian military has repeatedly expressed the immediate need for a fourth-generation shoulder-fired “fire and forget” ATGM system to prop up its capability for large-scale offensive actions on the ground.

It came then as surprise to astute observers of Indian military procurement that later in January, while still in India, Netanyahu announced that he had been informed by the Indian government that it had decided to press ahead with Spike ATGM deal after all. India is now set to fill the immediate ATGM requirement of the Indian Army with a government-to-government purchase.

India’s Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) has also been working on the third-generation ATGM Nag fired from the Nag Missile Carrier (NAMICA), an Indian license-produced variant of the Soviet-era BMP-II armored infantry fighting vehicle. The Indian Army intends to procure up to 8,000 Nags with an immediate requirement of 2,000 ATGMs.

The government is also set to continue the development of an indigenous shoulder-fired ATGM as 321 Spike ATGM systems will not fulfill the Army’s total requirement. The Indian military’s rush to field better ATGM systems is a consequence of the introduction of more advanced and longer-range ATGM systems in the Pakistan Army and People’s Liberation Army over the last years.

Indian military planners are especially worried that its mechanized infantry, supporting offensive operations spearheaded by the Indian Army’s main battle tank (MBT) force, will be outgunned by Pakistan’s infantry and consequently unable to protect the flanks of Indian armored units. This is particularly problematic as Indian military plans against Pakistan under the military’s alleged Pro-Active Doctrine, otherwise known as Cold Start Doctrine (CSD), call for deep armored thrusts into Pakistani territory in the event of conflict.

As I wrote last year in these pages:

CSD was developed by the Indian Army in 2004 to enable smaller scale, rapid and decisive conventional offensive operations into Pakistani territory in the event of Pakistani-sponsored asymmetrically attacks on Indian soil before the international community can actively intervene, and before Pakistan would feel compelled to launch nuclear retaliatory strikes to repel an Indian invasion.

The basic concept is to hold on to Pakistani territory as a bargaining chip in negotiations over Pakistani support for militant operations on Indian soil without crossing Islamabad’s nuclear redlines.

The Indian military has remained deliberately ambiguous about specific plans and objectives of CSD and how and under what circumstances it would be executed. The basic contours of any conventional offensive incursion spearheaded by armored forces are nevertheless discernable, as I noted in 2017:

[I]n its purported classical (and most ambitious) conception, India’s limited war strategy under CSD, calls for armored thrusts into Pakistani territory supported by mechanized infantry formations and air power within 48-72 hours at the outset of a military confrontation with Islamabad. These Blitzkrieg-style operations would heavily depend on close coordination between the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force given the pivotal role close air-support and overwhelming conventional firepower would play in such a campaign.

Infantry armed with ATGM systems would play an important role in any such operations engaging both enemy mechanized infantry and its armored support vehicles, as well as enemy MBTs.

Pakistan is in the process of modernizing its tank force. The Pakistan Army intends to procure hundreds of new MBTs in the coming years including an upgraded variant of its most modern MBT al-Khalid MBT, dubbed al-Khalid II. Shoulder-carried ATGM systems can also be used to engage hardened stationary defense positions including bunkers.

However, according to various analyses of Indian military capabilities, CSD remains a pipe dream. The current lack of an ATGM capability is just the latest indication that it will take many more years for the Indian military to be actually capable of executing large-scale conventional offensive operations against Pakistan centered around armored units.

Just a cursory look at current Indian military hardware reveals major deficiencies and capability gaps preventing any meaningful execution of CSD-type operational plans. First, the Indian Army still lacks a sufficient number of operational modern MBTs as well as self-propelled tracked howitzers for close artillery support. Additionally, the entire Indian military has been suffering from a chronic ammunition shortage for the past 17 years. The Indian Air Force, for its part, lacks the close-air support capability necessary for swift armored thrusts into Pakistani territory and the Indian military lacks a network-centric warfare capability necessary for coordinating offensive operations by dispersed forces. Furthermore, the Indian military lacks adequate reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition capabilities.

As I explained last year, “next to the low operational readiness rate of most Indian military hardware and the lack of modern equipment, the perhaps most glaring deficiency is the lack of thousands of trained military officers.”

Consequently, the current publicity surrounding the possible $500 million Spike ATGM deal vicariously highlights, on a small scale, glaring capability gaps of the Indian military that likely would prevent the execution of offensive operations in the spirit of CSD.

That might not be such bad news.

Some analysts believe that CSD is dangerously escalatory and could, despite India’s aim to the contrary, trigger a nuclear exchange. Others, especially Indian defense analysts, continue to believe that CSD will deter Pakistan-sponsored attacks on Indian territory by irregular forces without triggering nuclear retaliation, as long as India’s intent to keep its operations on Pakistan territory limited is adequately conveyed.

Either way, as of now, this discussion is primarily academic as it does not appear that the Indian military, lacking crucial equipment, has the capability to execute CSD operations. The procurement of modern ATGM systems would close one such capability gap, at least. However, knowing the history of Indian defense procurement, this is not likely to happen in the immediate future.