Crisis in Paradise

A major crisis is currently unfolding in the Maldives, a Muslim-majority tropical archipelago of around 1,200 small islands and coral atolls southwest of India, best known for its sandy beaches and tourists.

The country’s increasingly autocratic president, Abdulla Yameen, declared a state of emergency on February 5, after an unanimous ruling by the country’s Supreme Court negated the convictions of nine opposition politicians and ordered the release of those behind bars. The most prominent of the individuals is Mohamed Nasheed, who is currently in exile, splitting his time between London and Sri Lanka. In 2008, Nasheed became the first president of the Maldives elected in free and fair elections, though his fall from power in 2012 was coerced by protesters. He then spent more than a year in prison. After he was temporarily freed in 2016 in order to receive medical treatment in London, he received political asylum in the United Kingdom.

Complicating matters, Yameen, who became president in November 2013 in an election that was likely rigged, is the half-brother of former President Mamoun Abdul Gayoom, who ruled the Maldives from 1978 to 2008. While he was also autocratic, he at least had popular support among the military, civil servants, and a sizable section of the population.

Gayoom gave up power peacefully after he lost the October 2008 election, in which he allowed opposition candidates to run for the first time. He lost to Nasheed – around 54.25 percent to 45.75 percent. Subsequent to his defeat, Gayoom founded the Progressive Party of Maldives (PPM), which fielded Yameen as its candidate in the 2013 election. Although Nasheed obtained nearly double the vote share of Yameen in the first round of the 2013 election, Yameen won a majority in the second round, thereby becoming president. This sudden, drastic doubling of Yameen’s vote share remains unaccounted for, with the opposition claiming that a large number of ineligible voters were registered.

A Crisis Overnight

Instead of obeying the Supreme Court’s early February order to release the jailed opposition figures, Yameen doubled down and ordered the arrest of Chief Justice Abdulla Saeed and another judge, Ali Hameed. Yameen explained himself by saying, “I had to declare a national emergency because there was no other way to investigate these judges.” The other three judges on the court subsequently rescinded the order to free the political prisoners.

Additionally, Yameen ordered the arrest of his half-brother, who broke off from the PPM to start his own faction of the party. Gayoom, despite initially supporting Yameen, opposed many of his half-brother’s policies, including his willingness to sell islands to foreigners. According to some reports, Yameen also bears a childhood grudge against Gayoom because Gayoom’s mother was of higher status and part of the traditional elite, while Yameen’s mother was initially a maid in the same household. Gayoom was treated better by their father than Yameen due to this difference in their mothers’ statuses.

Yameen seeks to run again for the presidency in the upcoming elections set for later this year (if they are held at all); it appears that he wishes to do so unopposed, in a race that he would otherwise have difficulty winning. All major opposition figures, including his half-brother now, oppose him; despite being in exile, Nasheed has indicated that he will run in the upcoming elections. Yameen’s paranoia has alienated many figures in the country who view him as less than trustworthy. He had his own vice president, Ahmed Adeeb, arrested in October 2015 for plotting to assassinate him by way of explosion on a yacht, and for corruption, possibly as a way of deflecting attention from his own corruption.

In addition to his autocratic behavior, and stashing away hundreds of millions of dollars, Yameen has been accused of selling the Maldives out to China, including 16 whole islands. Former President Nasheed, in an interview, recently said: “Without firing a single shot, China has grabbed more land than the East India Company at the height of the 19th century… This land grab exercise hollows out our sovereignty.”

Nasheed has also argued, “We can't pay the $1.5 to 2 billion debt to China, [which owns] nearly 80 percent” of the Maldives' foreign debt. Much of this money is being spent on “roads going to nowhere, airports that [will sit] empty.” Undoubtedly, Chinese money, including some that has found its way into Yameen’s pocket, is propping up the current government. Yameen seems to have banked on using Chinese money and support to stay in power, even at the risk of alienating India, the traditional power in the region. India was particularly miffed when an Indian firm’s $500 million contract to expand the country’s main airport was canceled in 2012. Instead, a Chinese company got an $800 million contract in 2016.

This issue cuts to the core of the Maldivian crisis: in addition to domestic strife, it has the potential to become a major bone of geopolitical contention between India and China, as their rivalry in Asia deepens. The Maldives is particularly important to India because India has always seen the country, which lies just off of its coast, as clearly within its sphere of influence. Due to shallow water between islands, the Maldives form an almost impassable barrier of 750 kilometers in the middle of the Indian Ocean, around which most ships must go. Its location in the middle of the Indian Ocean is ideal as a chokepoint, port, waystation, and monitoring post.

India intervened militarily in 1988 during an mercenary-backed coup attempt aimed at overthrowing then-President Gayoom. Gayoom invited India to help. India’s “Operation Cactus” saw the airlifting of 1,600 troops to Malé, the Maldives’ capital, and the restoration of Gayoom to power.

While it is in India’s interests for Yameen to fall from power, and be replaced by someone less friendly with China, New Delhi feels as though its hands are tied, despite calls from Nasheed for Indian military intervention. While from a military perspective, a successful operation is likely, unlike in 1988, the sitting Maldivian government has not asked for military intervention. There are many factions, and it is unclear what will ensue there if India were to dispose Yameen or enforce the court order.

Furthemore, if India were to intervene to dispose what is technically the legitimate government of a country, it would potentially raise alarm bells in neighboring countries like Nepal and Bangladesh, which are already wary of India playing a “big brother” role in the region. Nonetheless, India would be wise to keep all options on the table, as some jingoistic voices in the country have suggested. By appearing to tolerate Maldivian moves to cultivate China without the possibility of consequences, India risks the use of similar strategies from other small, neighboring countries, which could then dent its regional dominance.

It is risky for India to do nothing too. By doing nothing, and restating its policy of nonintervention in the affairs of other countries, China can retain the goodwill of its ally Yameen (who has also cultivated Pakistan and Saudi Arabia). On the other hand, a similar policy on the part of the Indian government would further allow the Maldives to slip away as an ally. Moreover, India has a much stronger geopolitical stake in the country than China, for whom it would be a minor setback if the situation were to change in the Maldives.

India’s best option would be to use a combination of sanctions, dissatisfaction due to falling tourist revenues (a major driver of the Maldivian economy), and its contacts with various institutions in the country and opposition groups to bring about the fall of the Yameen government domestically, through mass protests, a moderately fair election that would open up the possibility of someone other than Yameen winning, or even a mutiny on the part of security forces, many of whom were undoubtedly uncomfortable with arresting their former boss, Gayoom. (Gayoom was allegedly saluted by the forces sent to place him under house arrest).

While Yameen has taken a hardline position, with the goal of entrenching himself in power, he has indicated a willingness to talk to opposition groups “without preconditions.” He is undoubtedly aware that no foreign power – not China, nor Pakistan – would be willing to intervene militarily to prop him up, while the opposite, intervention by India to dispose his government, is at least in the realm of possibility.

The Maldivian military and police are not powerful forces, and the country has only 400,000 people, many of whom are concentrated in Malé. It would not be difficult for massive popular protests to quickly change the tide of the Yameen government, especially if the military, mostly built by Gayoom, decides to mutiny. As in neighboring Sri Lanka, it is possible that the people may vote against their leader, despite all the intimidation and coercion, because they observed that the glittering new projects built with Chinese money do not translate into better conditions for ordinary folk. Yameen is probably aware of this, and therefore, it is likely that he will make, at least, cosmetic concessions in order to diffuse the crisis before the next election in a bid to attract greater legitimacy.