J. Michael Cole

Donald Trump and Shinzo Abe are not the only leaders talking about a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen has also been using the phrase, signaling her government’s interest in the nascent concept. To understand Taiwan’s potential role in (and reservations about) FOIP, The Diplomat spoke with J. Michael Cole, editor in chief of Taiwan Sentinel as well as a Taipei-based Senior Fellow with the China Policy Institute/Taiwan Studies Programme at the University of Nottingham, UK and associate researcher with the French Centre for Research on Contemporary China (CEFC).

Since late last year, Tsai Ing-wen has taken to using the phrase “free and open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) (most recently in April remarks before a delegation from the American Enterprise Institute). Should we take this to mean that Taiwan is explicitly aligning its regional strategy with the Trump administration’s?

Since the beginning of her administration, President Tsai has been consistent in her government’s support for global standards such as UNCLOS. She, like other leaders, has also adopted the “Indo-Pacific” designation, first used by the Australian government around 2013, that describes a concept rather than an actual, fixed region. The notion of FOIP therefore isn’t anything particularly new, or even a direct product of President Trump’s regional strategy. It’s a longstanding concept, and as a country that seeks to abide by international norms and which seeks to play a constructive role as a responsible stakeholder, it is only natural that Taiwan would express support for FOIP.

There were some doubts as to Taipei’s commitment to such concepts when it, like Beijing, refused in July 2016 to recognize the validity of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in its ruling on the South China Sea. However, unlike Beijing, which categorically refused to abide by the ruling and maintains its wide-ranging claims over the region, Taipei did so for different reasons — chief among them the fact that Taiwan, one of the claimants in the South China Sea, was excluded from all talks and the ruling’s categorizing Itu Aba (Taiping Island), which Taiwan controls, as a mere “rock” rather than a feature which can sustain human habitation. Excluding that response, Taiwan has always been committed to UNCLOS, freedom of navigation, and so on, and now this concept has been extended to the entire Indo-Pacific, such as it is.

We’ve also seen quite a bit of recent outreach from the U.S. to Taiwan, including the passage of the Taiwan Travel Act and approval for licenses allowing U.S. companies to export submarine technology to Taiwan. Do you think Taiwan is set to play a greater role in the United States’ new Indo-Pacific strategy?

All of this is contingent on the context in which U.S.-Taiwan ties evolve. As long as Beijing maintains a conflictual approach to the U.S. role in the Asia-Pacific — or Indo-Pacific, I should rather say — there will be momentum in Washington, DC, to adopt a more permissive stance on allies and partners in the region, like Taiwan. Under President Trump, there also seems to be more willingness than under some of his predecessors to empower U.S. partners, which likely stems from the realization that in the face of an assertive and increasingly powerful China, the U.S. cannot do everything on its own. It’s only logical that Taiwan, a longstanding partner of the U.S. and a vibrant democracy, would be able to do more in terms of maintaining peace and stability in the region, and that it be given the “permission” by the rules-makers to do so. The Taiwan Travel Act, meanwhile, is long in the making, has bipartisan support in U.S. Congress, and in no way contravenes Washington’s “one China” policy. At most, it’s a course correction and an effort to better represent the current status in the bilateral relationship.

FOIP is strongly associated with “the Quad,” the nascent security dialogue involving the U.S., Australia, India, and Japan. Given Taiwan’s complicated international situation, how open would the other three members be to expanded cooperation with Taipei?

In its current status, much mythology surrounds the “Quad,” but in essence it is little more than an agreement by participants to consult each other rather than an actual body or organization. It consists of low-level meetings among senior officials, an emerging concept that is still trying to decide what its substance is to look like.

Recently a Taiwanese delegation was invited to participate in a Quad meeting in Tokyo, and their presence there was leaked to Taiwanese media. As a newcomer, Taiwan’s role in all this is more aspirational at the moment; it doesn’t commit to anything but allows Taiwan to get a better sense of what is being discussed among the four key partners. As to a future role for Taiwan in the Quad, my sense is that as long as it remains a loose alliance for consultations and discussions, it will be easier for the “founding members” to allow other regional countries, like Taiwan, to participate. However, should the Quad at some point become more institutionalized — some have even hinted that it could serve as a basis for a NATO-styled regional organization — then it would probably become more difficult for Taiwan to join it, largely due to pressure from Beijing, which claims sovereignty over Taiwan and resents any indication that Taipei can engage in bi- or multilateral interactions with other states, or other regional partners.

That being said, even if the Quad were to take on more substance as a regional body, constituent states could become more amenable to a role for Taiwan if Beijing intensifies its belligerence and reinforces, by military means, its territorial claims within the region and in the Indo-Pacific. If at some point an assertive China becomes such a threat to regional stability that a countervailing security-oriented body, developed along the Indo-Japanese axis, is necessary, then it would be difficult to exclude Taiwan altogether given its position as a key point in the “first island chain” and a major corridor for PLA force expansion into the West Pacific.

Other countries in the region, including South Korea and Southeast Asian states, have some reservations about FOIP, particularly concerns that it will hasten confrontations between the U.S. and China. From Taiwan’s perspective, are there questions or concerns about FOIP as a strategy?

While Taiwan certainly seeks a strong U.S. presence in the region as well as a loose alliance of democracies to keep China from overreaching, it is also aware that Sino-American tensions are not in the interest of Taiwan’s 23.5 million people. In fact, it has been proven that on many occasions, Beijing has retaliated against U.S. actions by clamping down on Taiwan. The case can also be made that Taiwan would be in a better position to engage the region — and the U.S. — if the relationship between China and the U.S. is on a firm footing. Japanese diplomats have also made a similar case to me, explaining that Tokyo believes better ties with Beijing would permit a closer relationship with Taiwan.

Therefore, while FOIP as a concept is a necessary tool for the times, in application it must be careful not to turn into justification for Beijing to feel it is being surrounded. Efforts must consequently be calibrated, firm in its defense of international law and democracy when the situation calls for firmness, but flexible enough to give China the breathing space it needs as a regional power. Taiwan itself, its government and its people, seeks a cordial and mutually beneficial relationship with China, under the condition that Beijing respects the liberal-democratic way of life that the Taiwanese have chosen for themselves. As long as China refuses to acknowledge this reality by further isolating Taiwan internationally and conducting increasingly aggressive — and intrusive — military maneuvers around it, Taiwan will be more inclined to welcome multilateral groups whose principal raison d’être is the containment of China and the collective defense of states that are threatened by Chinese behavior.

According to the U.S. State Department, the “free” in FOIP refers, in part, to being “free from coercion” – with coercion from China the main (albeit unspoken) concern. Taiwan has a long history of facing Chinese coercion, whether political, military, or economic. What could other countries learn from Taiwan’s experiences?

There tends to be overemphasis on the military aspects of Chinese coercion, which is perfectly understandable given that threats of PLA action are overt and receive much publicity. As the world awakens to the other elements of Chinese coercion, what has recently been termed “sharp power,” there is, in my opinion, a pressing need for the democracies of this world to sit down together to first share notes on China’s modus operandi on the subject of influence operations, political warfare and so on, and then to flesh out strategies to counter the impact of such activities, which often aren’t illegal, on democratic institutions worldwide.

Given its decades of dealing with attempts by the CCP’s United Front apparatus, PLA political warfare units, and the intelligence service to penetrate, co-opt, and corrode Taiwanese society, Taiwan has a lot to offer to the international community. It has, moreover, the advantage of sharing a language, and many cultural elements, with the principal antagonist in all this, not to mention its geographical proximity and access to Chinese society though travel, educational exchanges, and business ties. Taiwan faces a unique challenge in that it faces an existential threat from a large neighbor that also is an indispensable economic partner, and as such some of the threats are probably poor analogues for other nations as they seek to establish a balance between interactions with China, national security, and the freedoms that characterize our way of life in much of the West. For one thing, the threat of annexation, and of internal groups collaborating with the CCP to achieve unification, is something that does not apply to any other country and therefore presents Taiwan with idiosyncratic challenges.

However, how to balance economic ties and the need to preserve a way of life is something that, what with recent developments in countries such as Australia and New Zealand, is now a problem that other states must deal with. And on that front, as with counterintelligence and defending institutions against cyber warfare, Taiwan can be a wonderful partner to the international community. The first step in inoculating the community of democracies against activities by autocratic regimes that seek to weaken our institutions is education: knowing who the actors are, how they operate, and how they exploit the weaknesses and the “grey zones” in our legal system to achieve their objectives. Among other things, Taiwan serves as a testing ground for all kinds of activities conducted by a variety or organizations, some state-linked and others only loosely connected, that, while not illegal, certainly raise ethical questions. Taiwan has a long history of tracking those organizations, identifying the players, and countering them in a way that remains aligned with its democracy. The international community, from governments to academics to the private sector, would benefit tremendously from exchanges on the subject with their Taiwanese counterparts.