Has Duterte Really Changed His Approach to the Communists in the Philippines?

Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s order on April 4 to resume the peace process with communist rebels baffled many, particularly since the government has a pending court petition that seeks to declare the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing as terrorists. In reality, this is just another one of a series of reversals in government policy that speaks more to Duterte’s broader political position and the dynamics of the peace process itself rather than an abrupt change in his approach toward the issue.

Since coming to office, we have witnessed wild swings in Duterte’s approach to dealing with the communist rebels in the country. Duterte first boasted of having good relations with the rebels, especially during the two decades when he was mayor of Davao City, and with initial talks of peace, there were high expectations about what could potentially be accomplished.

But predictably, those hopes were quickly dashed with a collapse in the peace process. Within the past year, Duterte has consistently denounced the communists as terrorists and criminals who are stunting the growth of the countryside, even citing the activities of communist rebels as one of his reasons for extending Martial Law in Mindanao. He ordered state troops to wage an all-out war against the communist movement, which has been fighting the government since 1969. Aside from declaring the CPP as terrorists, the government has also listed more than 600 persons who are accused of being communist leaders.

Duterte’s order on April 4 to resume the peace process thus represents yet another flip-flop. So, what could be Duterte’s reasons for changing his mind again about restarting the peace process?

As with many things related to Duterte, explanations abound. Some speculated that perhaps he learned about the petition of more than 60 lawmakers calling for the resumption of the peace talks. Others suggested that maybe Duterte was informed by his peace panel about the agreements, which were reportedly almost ready for signing before the president scrapped the talks last year.

Yet these explanations alone appear insufficient to explain the change. To reverse the all-out war policy against the CPP is an important decision involving broader national security. That in turn suggests that there could be more important reasons as to why Duterte suddenly wanted to go back to the negotiating table to talk about peace instead of issuing his usual diatribes against the armed Left.

A more plausible explanation is that Duterte’s renewed interest in the peace process is the product of his broader political position and how the dynamics of the peace process feed into that. While Duterte may appear to be like his usual self in 2018, projecting strength amid a weakened opposition, the truth is that he is facing several challenges that are undermining the credibility and stability of his government and could affect domestic and foreign policy decisions like the peace process.

First, Duterte’s “war on drugs” has failed to end the drug menace, which was a key campaign promise that he made. Though the war on drugs itself has continued, the combination of the lack of effectiveness in terms of law and order gains and the continued surfacing of democracy and human rights concerns have resulted in rising popular opposition. As an indicator of this, the government has been softening its position in several ways, even deciding recently to drop charges against several prominent alleged drug lords because the complaints against them reportedly contain weak evidence.

Second, and on a related note, the International Criminal Court (ICC) announced that it will investigate the drug-related extrajudicial killings under the Duterte administration. The move itself will likely not amount to much: Duterte subsequently declared the withdrawal of the Philippines from the ICC and claimed that the latter no longer has jurisdiction to probe the country’s human rights situation. But domestically, Duterte’s opponents were able to paint the picture of a leader who initially took a hard line by questioning the power of multilateral institutions and then quickly ran scared once these global bodies actually exercised the power that they supposedly did not have.

Third, the Duterte government is also being criticized for doing nothing – or at least not doing nearly enough – to stop China’s military buildup in the South China Sea, which the Philippines calls the West Philippine Sea. While Duterte can insulate himself from international outrage over the Philippines’ weak defense of its claims vis-à-vis Beijing by questioning the benefits of international law and an over-reliance on the United States, he cannot escape his vulnerability domestically to the charge that he is not doing enough to protect the country’s sovereignty. The pressure is building for Duterte to take a tougher position on the issue.

Fourth, the charges of “creeping authoritarianism” in the Duterte era have not only continued but been exacerbated. By pursuing things like changes to the constitution and support for the impeachment of the chief justice, the Duterte government is only playing into the charges of critics that it is trying to reverse the gains that democracy in the Philippines has made over decades since the overthrow of Ferdinand Marcos.

In short, less than halfway into his single, six-year term, and just as he was about to launch several more controversial policy proposals, even Duterte’s supporters admit that the administration has too many enemies on too many fronts and too few domestic and foreign policy successes to be confident that it is on firm ground.

Viewed this way, the planned resumption of the peace talks offers Duterte a way to quickly reverse or at least distract from these series of setbacks by turning to a perceived area of strength where he could make some cosmetic inroads. The peace process can ease the conflict in the country, especially in Mindanao, and the government can use this opportunity to partially deflect the mounting international condemnation against the spate of extrajudicial killings across the country.

Yet if this is the rationale for the return to peace talks, it is unlikely to bear fruit. Distracting from broader concerns around Duterte will not be easy when the peace process includes precisely those concerns as well. Take human rights. One of the agenda items in the peace talks is human rights protection. Regardless of the preconditions that will guide the talks, the Duterte government will still be held accountable for and will have to address the widespread human rights abuses committed by state forces.

Beyond this, Duterte’s advisers also appear to once again be underestimating the capacity of the broad peace constituency in demanding a review of the government’s social and economic policies. This will open a Pandora’s Box around the administration’s approach to governance, which is at the heart of the concerns about Duterte and his term in power.

To be sure, news of the revival of the peace process should still be welcomed as a positive development in asserting the implementation of reforms necessary to address the root causes of the long-running insurgency. Duterte may have his own self-serving agenda in pursuing peace, but this should not stop peace advocates from campaigning for justice, protection of civil liberties, and the strengthening of democracy while the talks are ongoing.

Yet at the same time, we should have no illusions that for a populist like Duterte, changing approaches to issues like the peace process will be more tied to concerns about his broader political position rather than a true idealistic desire for peace or the intricacies of the process itself. Given that, we would do well to pay more attention to the substance of the government’s evolving position rather than the position changes themselves.