Bridget Welsh

The results of Malaysia’s May 9 election shocked the world. For the first time since the country’s independence, an opposition coalition unseated the Barisan Nasional (BN), ending over 60 years of uninterrupted governing by the nation’s ruling party. The Diplomat interviewed Bridget Welsh, Associate Professor of Political Science at John Cabot University and an expert on Southeast Asian politics, about the factors behind this unlikely opposition victory, and what it means for Malaysia in the long term.

How would you frame the significance of this unprecedented election outcome – not just for the opposition and for Malaysia, but for the wider region and for outside observers more generally?

Malaysia’s stunning result reminds the world that organized hard work on the part of the opposition can overcome the odds, and publics and elites within the system can not only defend democracy but can serve as a moral compass against the abuse of power. Malaysia’s election is the story of the year (so far), bucking global trends of authoritarianism, intolerance, and turpitude. Ordinary Malaysians chose to be on the right side of history to save the future of their country, largely putting aside ethnic differences.

What do you think were the key factors that led to the opposition Pakatan Harapan coalition finally being able to triumph over the ruling Barisan Nasional coalition?

There are three narratives that explain the GE14 [General Election 14] overall pro-Pakatan Harapan result. The first is the role of individuals – Najib (and his wife Rosmah Mansor) as liabilities or the push factor; Mahathir Mohamad as the pull factor for a safe landing of those in the system and game changer engendering distance from the system; and Anwar Ibrahim, the rock promoting reform. The symbolic sacrifice of Mahathir, his personal story at the age of 92, was inspirational for many Malaysians. On his part, Najib’s perceived use of office for personal aggrandizement and his scandal-ridden administration – with 1MDB as only one of many – fostered deep alienation.

The second narrative has to do with broader social forces in society. Bread and butter issues tied to a higher cost of living were epitomized by anger at the Goods and Service Tax (GST). Najib’s neoliberal introduction of this measure provoked a tax revolt. Keep in mind that of the 15 million voters, only 2.1 million paid income tax before the sweeping GST taxation on consumption introduced in 2015.

Similarly, the power of nationalism, the spirit of Malaysians coming together, underscored the support for Pakatan Harapan. Reactions were not only triggered by resentment against Chinese encroachment on geostrategic areas through investment, but also against the perceived shaming of Malaysia as a result of the 1MDB scandal.

Coupled with this is the decline of the institutions within UMNO, as the party became a personal vehicle for Najib and undercut its roots in society and role as a mantle to protect the interests of the nation.

Finally, the rise of the reform movement – steered by Bersih [a campaign for free and fair elections] – and the hard work of the opposition to set in place support for change highlight the second set of explanations, sociopolitical change.

A third narrative involves the dynamic of the campaign itself. What made the Malaysian election a surprise for many is how momentum built during the short campaign period, belying polling and earlier studies. Keep in mind here that many Malaysians tune out “politics.” Lots of citizens engaged in the campaign and this advantaged the opposition.

The reasons were simple – Pakatan Harapan controlled the political narrative of the campaign, and although the BN spent more money on social media and dominated that space with bots and other analytical tools, ordinary citizens passed on messages – especially on WhatsApp – and made the Pakatan Harapan campaign viral. Record multiethnic crowds gathered across the country, reinforcing the opposition’s momentum. The presence of former Finance Minister Daim Zainuddin and former Minister of Trade and Industry Rafidah Aziz on the campaign podium served to convince many with doubts about Pakatan’s economic management to support the opposition, especially those who have been part of the patronage inside the system.

Najib’s campaign on its part was nothing new – it focused on vote buying and his leadership, which as noted above was a liability. In this campaign the vote buying was seen as a return of their own tax money. The racialized anti-Chinese discourse (notably rhetoric against the Democratic Action Party) had been present since 2013 and was neutralized by Mahathir’s dominant presence in Pakatan. The draconian reactions on the part of the Election Commission – to cut out Mahathir’s photo, to disqualify candidates, to change the campaign regulations, and more – all backfired against the BN. They showed weakness, not strength. The last minute appeal of more goodies the night before the election fell flat.

Leadership, sociopolitical forces, and campaign dynamics combined to yield this outpouring of support. The results must be understood to involve large shifts: For example, a 10.8 percent swing in voting, in some cases and areas up to 30 percent. The numbers themselves, 124 seats with Pakatan allies out of 222, show a modest majority, speaking to the obstacles in the electoral system tied to malapportionment and gerrymandering. The gains were made for Pakatan across the system as a whole, importantly with 26 seats from Sabah and Sarawak, notably in rural areas.

UMNO was politically decimated, having its seats cut in half to 54, a mere 24 percent of the seats. The victory for Pakatan Harapan was sweeping at the state level, involving nine states. The BN was left with two – Pahang and Sarawak – with the Islamic party PAS picking up Terengganu and retaining Kelantan along with 18 seats nationally. PAS also won many traditional UMNO votes.

What changes can we expect under an opposition-led government in terms of Malaysian domestic and foreign policy?

Najib, his wife, and his immediate allies, are likely to face the rule of law and are likely to go to jail. Economically, there will be a review of controversial projects, the end of GST and an overview and overhaul of investments and the management of government-linked companies. Expect a curbing of corruption inside the system, although this is likely not to be as deep as many would like. Politically, beyond the 1MDB oversight task force and institutional reform task council, I expect more technocratic expertise and a prominent role of civil society activists pushing political reform. There will be a combination of economic and political reform, with the economy getting the main priority.

What are the key concerns and challenges for the opposition coalition as they seek to transition from campaigning to governing in the coming months? What are some of the key next steps observers should look for as part of this transition process?

There are internal points of contention: over personality (and power ambitions), party jockeying, differences over scope of political reform, economic policy (neoliberal versus more social democratic/populist alternatives), the role of religion, race, and racial policies (affirmative action). Beyond looking at the immediate composition of the Cabinet, the developments in the first 100 days will be crucial. Here it is expected that there will be some significant announcements on the economy.

Key will be the space Mahathir will have to engage in reform. I expect resistance to reform within the bureaucracy and from opposition forces, PAS and UMNO, despite the latter’s political decimation.

What’s next for Barisan Nasional and for UMNO after Najib?

The Barisan Nasional as a functional coalition is dead. It lacks multiethnic composition. Ironically, the son of the man who formed the coalition in the 1970s killed it. Parties such as MCA, Gerakan, and MIC representing the Chinese and Indians and politically decimated in GE14 will have to resolve the issue of party assets and opt for a new relationship in the system. The East Malaysian parties in the BN in Sabah and Sarawak are also likely to find new partners.

UMNO on its part is not dead, but Najib has done considerable damage to the party, as he made the party about himself rather than the protector of the nation and the Malay community. Ironically, UMNO proved not to be any protection to himself as well. It is striking to note how quickly he is being abandoned as he no longer controls the levers of power and the party, illustrating that Najib’s power was not about himself but the position he held. UMNO will have an inevitable leadership contestation, but the real battle will not be personalities but the soul and direction of the party – between “old” politics tied to race and religion, likely represented by former deputy prime minister Zahid Hamidi, and “new” politics with more institutional clean-up tied to a focus on “governance,” likely led by Khairy Jamaluddin. This contention over whether to focus on the Malays or on the nation will play out with a potential generational shift in the party. Party infighting will emerge over the leadership, as there will be blame for the party’s devastating loss.

UMNO also faces the shadow of being declared illegal given that Najib did not call the party’s elections. This will affect the party’s trajectory, with it possibly facing further elections.

Whether UMNO can be a responsible opposition is a difficult task. This was not the case in the states of Penang and Selangor where the party experienced losses from 2008, as the party did not regroup. Given that many joined UMNO for access to power and resources, the task for the party to evolve as an opposition force will involve some recalibration inside and refocusing by its members. This will test party loyalties. The grassroots have already punished the party for its misplaced loyalty to Najib and financial self-interest or its divisional elites. Its current leaders need to take responsibility for the party’s poor performance.

Short term, given the inward looking orientation for the party UMNO will be a weak political force, and the decisions it makes will determine whether it re-emerges as a viable political force. It will take hard work and an embrace of “new politics” with a considerable clean up inside to make it a stronger alternative.

The past few years have seen a resurgence in the role of ethnicity, race, and religion in Malaysian politics, relatively speaking. How do you see this trend evolving over the next few years under opposition rule?

Navigating race and religion will be the dominant opposition narrative against the newly formed Pakatan Harapan government. PAS will push a conservative religious agenda, as it has been empowered by this agenda in the GE14 campaign. Many in the party are interpreting their electoral gains as an endorsement of a pure “religious” agenda. This interpretation is a mistake – as these gains were more a product of UMNO weakness than PAS strength. Those not comfortable with the more secular and less racialized Pakatan opted for PAS, especially in areas of the east coast where PAS has long-standing roots. There are also tensions within PAS over its party leadership’s relationship with Najib and allegations of money given to the party. This is likely to be an issue within the party in its own assessment and party elections. There are also tensions within the party between those that would like the base of the party to be in Terengganu and those that would like it to remain in Kelantan. The party has however retreated to the east coast and is no longer a “national” party, despite becoming more of a mantle of support for the Malay community than in the past due to its racialized and ethnic religious agenda.

Pakatan Harapan faces the difficult task of navigating policies over religion, which will be watched carefully by PAS, UMNO, the large religious bureaucracy and politicized civil society organizations, many of which adopt more conservative orientations. Focus in the short term will be on appointments in this area. At the same time, Pakatan Harapan will need to articulate a clearer narrative on race and religion, an alternative narrative than the past. This will not be easy, in part due to the fact that many in Pakatan Harapan hold onto Malay nationalist sentiments, notably Mahathir himself. This will involve debates over affirmative action, as well as funding for religion and education politics. These areas will divide the government as race and religion continue to shape Malaysian politics.