What’s Behind Growing China-Laos Security Cooperation?

On May 15, China and Laos held what was characterized by state media as their inaugural standalone meeting focused on law enforcement and security. The development marked yet another first in the development of defense ties between the two states, which often receives less attention relative to the much more publicized economic and people-to-people realms.

Though China and Laos established diplomatic relations in 1961, ties really only began to warm in the 1980s following a period of tension when the ruling Lao People’s Revolutionary Party sided with Hanoi instead of Beijing during the Sino-Vietnamese War. State-to-state and party-to-party ties have improved dramatically in the post-Cold War period, with relations elevated to the level of a comprehensive strategic partnership back in 2009.

Despite some lingering differences, the general logic of cooperation is clear. Laos sees a rising China as an important partner to advance its economy, even as it seeks to diversify its relationships to ensure it is not overly dependent on Beijing. Beijing sees Vientiane as a key friend in Southeast Asia to realize its interests, be it in bilateral ties in terms of tackling transnational crimes or regionally by advancing its broader ambitions in the subregion.

The defense side of China-Laos ties had traditionally involved the usual elements of a military-to-military relationship, including visits, exchanges, and cooperation on transnational threats such as infectious diseases and cross-border trafficking and smuggling, as evidenced by the Mekong patrols that China conducts with Laos and other riparian states in one of the world’s longest, largest, and most resource-rich rivers.

But over the past few years, there have also been signs that both sides have been looking to expand on these defense ties. For instance, just last year, the two countries led army delegations for the first-ever iteration of their so-called high-level frontier meetings. The defense realm also factored into general discussions about the relationship last year, including in November when Chinese President Xi Jinping included Laos in his first overseas trip after his re-appointment as Communist Party general secretary. That was the first trip to Laos by a top Chinese leader in more than a decade.

The focus on expanding ties in the security realm has continued on into 2018, with ongoing efforts to further deepen their comprehensive strategic partnership and operationalize the notion of a China-Laos community of shared future. China-Laos defense ties were once again in the headlines in mid-May when both sides held their first-ever standalone meeting on law enforcement and security cooperation.

According to the state media of the two countries, Chinese State Councilor and Minister of Public Security Zhao Kezhi visited Laos and held talks with several officials, including Lao Defense Minister Chansamone Chanyalath, Lao Minister of Public Security Somkeo Silavong, President Bounnhang Vorachit, and Prime Minister Thongloun Sisoulith.

As is often the case with security-related engagements in the bilateral relationship, few specifics were publicly disclosed about the meeting. But Chinese state media said Zhao emphasized that China was willing to work with Laos to boost cooperation in a range of areas in the bilateral relationship, including “anti-terrorism, fighting drug-related crimes, hunt[ing] for fled suspects and recovering ill-gotten gains, and fighting against internet gambling, telecom fraud and illegal immigration, among others.” Though some of the areas can be considered “traditional,” internet gambling and telecom fraud are areas that have been receiving even greater attention in recent years in China’s security interactions with Southeast Asian states.

Beyond that, interestingly, though it was a bilateral meeting focused on security issues, Zhao also highlighted regional and nonsecurity matters as well. For instance, he noted that China was willing to deepen law enforcement and security cooperation along the Mekong River. Though Zhao did not elaborate, this is part of a broader trend where China has been trying to expand the scope of its Mekong patrols with mainland Southeast Asian states and also boost collaboration under its new Lancang Mekong Cooperation (LMC) initiative for the subregion.

Zhao also brought up China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in a security context. State media characterized the focus on this as meant to “strengthen security cooperation in major projects of the Belt and Road Initiative” and “cooperate to solidly safeguard the Belt and Road Initiative projects, to ensure the safety of institutions and personnel in each other’s countries, and to maintain the security and stability of the two countries and the region.” The statement was yet another clear sign that despite continued debates in some scholarly circles about the extent to which BRI is an economic or geopolitical project, China itself is not distinguishing between the economic and security aspects of the BRI even in its official rhetoric with Southeast Asian states.

To be sure, the relationship between China and Laos still has its share of challenges, and the security side of the relationship is not immune from them. For Laos, there is uncertainty among the government and people about China’s growing assertiveness, even as Vientiane continues to engage Beijing across realms. And for China, despite the rhetoric about a shared community, Beijing sees Laos as a site of growing competition for influence between not just itself and other Western states that Vientiane is looking to engage more with, but also other powers such as Japan and Vietnam. But at least for now, those challenges have not prevented the two sides from moving forward on defense cooperation.