The Solomon Cable

The Australian government will cover most of the costs of a new undersea, high-speed, internet cable that will be laid from Sydney to the Solomon Islands, with a further link to Papua New Guinea (PNG). The Turnbull government’s decision to take over the funding of the US$78 million project comes after Australia’s security agencies warned of the risk associated with allowing Chinese firm Huawei to undertake the project. A delegation was sent to Honiara in mid-April to confirm the details of Canberra taking over the funding for the project. An Australian company, Vocus, was awarded the tender for the project.

Huawei had initially been awarded the contract to lay the cable from Honiara to Sydney during the prime ministership of Manasseh Sogavare. However, upon Rick Houenipwela’s ascension to the prime ministership in November last year the project came up for review. Houenipwela had been critical of the contract with Huawei, and therefore didn’t require a great deal of pressure from Canberra in order to shift his position. Subsequently, the Solomon Islands parliamentary accounts committee has called for a police inquiry into the US$5 million donation allegedly paid by Huawei to Sogavare’s party. Both Sogavare and Huawei strongly deny the allegations.

While Pacific leaders have defended China as a legitimate development partner in the region, and there is undoubtedly a positive role China can play in offering regional assistance, the opaque nature of the Chinese system, and unknowns around its goals, instinctively leads Canberra to be suspicious of Chinese activity in the Pacific. It remains unclear what links Huawei has to the Chinese Communist Party and how this may influence its operations. An investigation by the United States House of Representatives in 2012 concluded that Chinese companies like Huawei “cannot be trusted to be free of foreign state influence and thus pose a security threat to the United States and to our systems.” Concurring with the U.S assessment, Huawei was blocked from tendering for Australia’s National Broadband Network in 2012.

From Canberra’s perspective, ownership of the undersea cable system as well as controlling its installation and maintenance would have presented significant strategic opportunities for China, potentially allowing Beijing to disrupt communications to the Solomons in order to gain leverage over the country. This would pose a serious challenge to the most fundamental concept within Australian strategic doctrine – the exclusion of any unaligned military powers from the South Pacific.

Australia's funding of the underwater internet cable to both the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea will come out of the government's official development assistance program, forming part of Canberra’s attempt to enhance its engagement in the Pacific. However, aid groups have expressed concern that the funding for the project may affect provisions for regional education and health programs. The funds for the project could come from either the existing bilateral aid agreements with the Solomon Islands and PNG, or could come from money dedicated to multilateral agencies such as the Asian Development Bank. However, the cable has been cited by defense strategists as an example of the type of projects Canberra should be pursuing to advance its foreign policy interests, rather than further cutting the aid budget.

Due to the geographic isolation of Pacific Island states, with their small and dispersed populations, the delivery of essential services can be difficult and expensive for governments to provide. Australia’s role as the dominant regional actor should be focused on assisting Pacific states to overcome these hurdles and increase their national capacities. Presently, the Solomons is wholly reliant on expensive satellite technology to access the internet. With more accessible connectivity, the cable should provide the country with more avenues for economic growth, and provide greater access to global opportunity, providing some assistance to help transcend the country’s geographic realities.

For Australia, this is a continuation of its grappling with a new strategic competitor in the South Pacific. Despite its strategic vision to maintain primacy in the region, Canberra has for some time treated the Pacific as a second-order issue, displaying a certain complacency toward its regional influence. This has provided the space for a rising power such as China to rapidly increase its influence within the Pacific. This is a reality that Canberra is now beginning to internalize.

For Australia to realize both its regional responsibility and it security interests, its South Pacific engagement will need to produce impactful results – results that can negate Chinese influence, and earn Canberra the respect of Pacific leaders. Projects like this undersea cable that will hopefully significantly increase the Solomons’ capacities should become a primary focus. The circumstances of this project, with the direct threat from Chinese interests, may just be the trigger for Canberra to transform its recent rhetoric on Pacific engagement into solid outcomes.