Joshua Kurlantzick

Although the countries of Southeast Asia are at various stages of democratic development, one thing seems clear: the overall trend is one of regression. It’s part of a global trend that is manifesting in unique ways in the region. Even in relative brights spots, like Indonesia, there are causes for concern; while countries like Thailand and Cambodia continue to retreat from democratic norms.

Illiberal, strongman populism has proven attractive in recent years in Southeast Asia, Joshua Kurlantzick, senior fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations, tells The Diplomat. And that is dangerous for the region’s democracies, given Southeast Asia’s history of authoritarianism.

You have written over the years about a trend of regression in the state of democracy in Southeast Asia. How would you assess the current state of democracy in the region today?

Definitely not good, and getting worse overall.

There really aren’t many bright spots, other than Indonesia and to some extent Singapore and Timor-Leste in terms of the trend of regression.

The political climate is deteriorating rapidly in Cambodia and the Philippines, and in Thailand there has been a dramatic deterioration since 2014, although the coup came in the wake of years of backsliding. Whatever type of political system emerges in Thailand next year – presuming there are elections – it will be a long road back simply to return to the level of political freedom there was in 2013, and that was hardly an ideal situation.

In Myanmar you have had free elections, but the political culture and institutions have not really changed much from the years of authoritarian rule, and you are seeing the results of that lack of transition now. The most authoritarian states in the region, like Laos, have changed little politically despite a degree of economic opening.

I do not see a lot of reason for optimism any time in the near future. Maybe in Indonesia there will be more gains, perhaps after the 2019 presidential election. I think Jokowi is a democrat – a small “d” democrat – but as president his record on rights and freedoms is mediocre, at best, and he has surrounded himself with army officers, probably partly as a way to pacify the armed forces. I can understand the desire to surround himself with army officers as a kind of way to protect himself from the army, but it’s a disturbing trend for civilian democracy. And then, there is also the growing influence of Islamist groups in Indonesia, which have so far mostly stayed within democratic frameworks and democratic institutions, but could threaten democracy in the longer-term.

What, in your view, are the key factors that have given rise to the trend of democratic regression in Southeast Asia?

I think there are systemic factors and individual factors – country-specific factors. Certainly, in the Philippines, for instance, Rodrigo Duterte’s rise was abetted by a weak party system and a presidential election with multiple candidates splitting the vote, for instance. In Thailand you have what Nicholas Farrelly has called a “coup culture” that certainly exists in some other states, but is quite severe in Thailand.In Myanmar you have the legacy of decades of totalitarian/authoritarian rule.

But I think there are systemic factors at play too. Middle classes in the region – Thailand is a particular example – have often proven themselves uninterested in electoral democracy when that electoral democracy results in potentially redistributive economic policies, or simply policies that might erode the power of traditional elites. In countries like the Philippines, democratic leaders failed to effectively address deep-seated economic problems, like high inequality, and some voters grew so frustrated that they turned to illiberal leaders for new economic prescriptions.

Illiberal, strongman populism has proven attractive in recent years in Southeast Asia, just as it has in North America and Europe, with populists in Southeast Asia or those embracing populist themes stigmatizing outsiders in similar ways as populists in Europe, although sometimes the actual “outsiders” targeted are different from Europe, where much of the targeting has been at migrants.Duterte has relied on stigmatizing drug users as outsiders and Prabowo Subianto in Indonesia has stigmatized ethnic minorities, for instance. The increasing regional influence of China, and the reticence of major democracies to advocate for democracy, certainly plays an important role as well.

There are several cases of democratic regression across Southeast Asian countries, as you’ve noted. To what extent are we seeing similarities in some of the manifestations of this trend, including the tactics being employed?

I think, as I mentioned, that there are similarities in democratic regression within Southeast Asia, and also similarities between what is going on in Southeast Asia and the situation for democracy globally, as democracy falters in many regions of the world and you have a new rise of illiberal, strongman populism in many states.

You have illiberal populists in Southeast Asia who accept (at least to some extent) the idea of free and fair elections but then use their elected office to undermine democratic institutions and destroy democratic culture. You have armies, in Thailand, Myanmar, Indonesia, to some extent the Philippines, that still want to or actually do operate well beyond the bounds of civilian rule. You have the use of social media and propaganda by leaders and their acolytes to confuse the public and undermine independent reporting and stoke tribal anger. You have illiberal leaders stoking anger at out-groups/minorities to boost their appeal. You have, at least in Indonesia and Malaysia, the increasing power of Islamist groups, which have played important roles in local elections in Indonesia and could play a major role in the 2019 Indonesian presidential election.

As you noted, the trend of democratic regression in Southeast Asia is happening amidst a rising China that is both more authoritarian at home and also more assertive abroad. How does this trend play into Beijing’s evolving role in the region and its ties with Southeast Asian states?

I think that the democratic regression definitely plays into China’s hands, and is to some extent facilitated by China’s rise. Xi Jinping is the first Chinese leader to openly tout China’s developmental model, to seem to be promoting China’s governance model.

For instance, in Cambodia, the increasing influence of China has given Hun Sen enormous leverage over democratic donor states, and allowed him to thumb his nose at them more, and to proceed with the biggest crackdown on dissent since the late 1990s.

But at the same time, I don’t think Beijing necessarily wants to promote political environments in which authoritarian states are unstable. I don’t think it necessarily plays into Beijing’s long-term hands if Myanmar remains highly unstable for a long period of time, for instance.

How would you assess the Trump administration’s approach to the current state of democracy in Southeast Asia? What are some recommendations that you would have for the U.S. approach to human rights and democracy promotion in the Trump era given current realities?

I think that, from the president, you have pretty much a disinterest in democracy promotion or a downright disdain for it, except in a few unusual cases globally like Venezuela or Cuba which are legacies of past policies of the Republican Party or are unique cases in other ways. He has embraced Southeast Asian leaders like Duterte, no matter their record on rights. The president’s negative rhetoric about fundamental parts of a democratic system and a democratic culture, including an independent judiciary and a free press, makes any sort of presidential-level democracy promotion challenging at best.

That said, at staff levels there are certainly actors in the Trump administration who have pushed for tough policies designed to support rights and democracy in a number of Southeast Asian states, including Myanmar, Cambodia, and to a lesser extent other states in the region. In addition, as I’ve written about on several occasions, for decades Congress has played an outsized role in U.S. policymaking regarding Southeast Asia, and it continues to do so, and Southeast Asian democrats still have important champions on Capitol Hill. In fact, the Trump administration’s general disinterest in democracy promotion, at least at the highest levels, has actually made the Hill even more important in democracy and rights promotion in Southeast Asia.

While the overall trend of democratic regression might suggest bleak prospects on this front, are there reasons to be optimistic now or in the future regarding how things will play out, including the response from opposition parties and the youth in Southeast Asian states?

I don’t see a lot of reasons for optimism for the near term, but there is some. In May, the last truly independent newspaper in Cambodia was essentially destroyed, and yet Malaysia has had its first transition of power in its independent history. The situation overall, though, still seems quite bleak.