How the U.S.-North Korea Joint Statement Measures Up to History

Pyongyang played its card brilliantly, forcing one of the world’s richest and most powerful nations to undertake direct negotiations and to make concessions to one of the world’s least-successful nations. The nuclear threat proved, up to a point, to be Pyongyang’s great equalizer. 

So the late Don Oberdorfer, longtime diplomatic correspondent for the Washington Post, described events leading up to the 1994 Agreed Framework. The framework emerged out of the first North Korean nuclear crisis and aimed to freeze and roll back Pyongyang’s program in exchange for tangible economic, energy, and political concessions, to achieve future peace and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and to eventually establish normal diplomatic relations between Washington and Pyongyang.

Ironically, nearly a quarter century later, Oberdorfer’s description might just as easily apply to the unprecedented summit meeting between North Korea’s Kim Jong Un and U.S. President Donald Trump and the related Trump-Kim Joint Statement. In both cases, Pyongyang leveraged its most compelling currency (i.e. its nuclear weapons program) to secure international recognition and a legitimating audience with Washington.

One key criticism of the recent 2018 U.S.-North Korea Joint Statement is that it merely restates well-worn commitments in overly generalized language. The commitments listed, such as the “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” the intent to improve U.S.-DPRK relations, and the goal of a peace regime on the peninsula, were previously expressed in both the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework and the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks (which involved China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Russia, and the United States). However, the earlier cases contained more details, specific if rough timelines, and concrete tradeoffs or mechanisms by which the general principles could be actualized.

The 1994 framework called for North Korea to freeze its plutonium production program, allow for international inspections, and eventually come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and remain a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It would do so in exchange for two proliferation-resistant light-water reactors (LWRs), the provision of heavy fuel oil while the LWRs were being built, formal assurances from the United States against the threat or use of nuclear weapons, and, as progress was made in these other areas, reduced barriers to trade and investment and the upgrading of bilateral relations, with the ultimate normalization of relations between Pyongyang and Washington. Pyongyang also affirmed it would consistently take steps to implement the 1992 North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

The 2005 Joint Statement, while not as detailed in its provisions as the 1994 framework, once again outlined relatively concrete steps toward denuclearization “in a phased manner in line with the principle of “commitment for commitment, action for action.” Pyongyang committed itself to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and return, at an early date, to the NPT and allow IAEA inspections. In exchange, the other parties expressed respect for North Korea’s asserted right to peaceful use of nuclear energy and agreed to the provision of LWRs “at an appropriate time.” Additionally, the United States and South Korea reaffirmed they would not deploy nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula in accordance with the 1992 North-South Joint Declaration, affirmed (along with the other parties) they would provide energy assistance to the North, and the United States and Japan committed themselves to eventual normalization of relations with Pyongyang.

Contributing to the more detailed content of the previous agreements are two other factors which provide yet another contrast to recent events. First, the 1994 framework and 2005 statement both emerged out of a relatively lengthy process of in-depth negotiations, whereby the details noted above where hashed out and agreed to by both sides. Negotiations preceding the Kim-Trump summit were notably brief and inconclusive, resulting in the mostly boilerplate repetition of past principles.

Second, and related, in earlier cases there was a well-defined U.S. negotiating team. This is not to say there were no inter-agency or inter-departmental disputes. For example, it is well known that U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney’s office as well as the Treasury Department’s action against Banco Delta Asia helped undermine the 2005 statement almost immediately upon its release. Nevertheless, contrary to the situation under Trump, in previous talks with North Korea those tasked with representing the U.S. side and their authority to do so were well established. The Trump administration has prided itself on evading (and demoralizing) traditional diplomatic institutions and expertise, and this has led to a lack of clarity regarding who exactly crafts U.S. policy toward North Korea. Lately, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has taken the lead and the pieces of a more coherent negotiating team are coming into place, yet this only occurred shortly before the summit itself.

Both the 1994 framework and 2005 statement failed to achieve their stated goals due to a combination of delay and contestation over implementation, ongoing North Korean evasion and missile tests, concern over Pyongyang’s uranium enrichment program, and an aggressive and unilateral U.S. policy toward Pyongyang and others. Due to the failure of earlier negotiations and the lack of progress since, conditions have dramatically changed.

In both earlier instances, North Korea had yet to actually test a nuclear weapon and thus demonstrate its capability. By the 2018 summit, Pyongyang had conducted six nuclear tests, successively demonstrating advancements in explosive yield and miniaturization. It also made notable progress in its ballistic missile program, culminating with the test of the new Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in November 2017, which in theory places Washington D.C. and Manhattan within range. In sum, what already had been an immensely complex and difficult issue to resolve had become even more so by the time Trump entered office.

For further insight about the similarities and differences between previous agreements and the present moment, I spoke with Dr. Christopher Lawrence, a physicist and a nuclear security scholar who has closely studied the history of engagement with North Korea. He is currently a research fellow at Harvard University's Program on Science, Technology and Society. His answers to my several questions not only point to the persistent intractability of the North Korean nuclear issue but also indicate some potential for future progress.

The Diplomat: The lack of detail as well as the repetition of well-worn but as-yet unachieved “commitments” has been one of the criticisms of the Joint Statement released following the Kim-Trump summit. As someone who has closely studied the history of engagement with North Korea, what do you see as the most notable difference between the recent summit and Joint Statement and the earlier 1994 Agreed Framework and the 2005 Statement of Principles? Relatedly, what similarities do you see between the earlier agreements and statements, and the current state of U.S.-DPRK negotiations?

Dr. Lawrence: It is true that the Joint Statement is vague, and only a starting point for a much more complicated and drawn out diplomatic process. Also, as you point out, the statement’s main element is the repetition of previous “commitments” articulated in the 1994 Agreed Framework and the 2005 Statement of Principles. But I believe the new statement is relevant and positive precisely because of this similarity. Let me explain:

In the negotiations leading up to both the 1994 framework and the 2005 statement, both sides appeared to agree on the end goals of normalization and “denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.” Both sides would point to the 1991 North–South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (1991 JNSD) as the definition of “denuclearization,” and the 1991 JNSD in turn points to the comprehensiveness and verifiability of its vision of denuclearization. What was contested throughout the negotiations was the path toward that end goal. Initially the U.S. would demand denuclearization up front, promising rewards after, while the North would demand a “step-by-step” or “phased approach.”

Now while the phrase “comprehensive, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization” (CVID) appears to point to an end goal, in actual practice it points to a time-sequence of the path toward goal. The Bush II administration used the phrase CVID when demanding North Korea disarm up front and promising they would subsequently then receive rewards. After four years of little or no progress, the second Bush II administration, with Condoleezza Rice as Secretary of State, accepted a “phased approach,” at which time the phrase CVID was dropped.

Fast forward to today: in recent years, we have come to believe that the regime in North Korea had taken denuclearization off the table. When it began hinting early this year that it would consider denuclearization, the next major roadblock to progress appeared to be the U.S. renewed demand of up-front denuclearization before any change in the relationship (expressed in the term CVID, but also in the “Libya Model”). This would almost certainly have killed the prospect for further engagement. Fortunately, the demand was dropped.

The two key (positive and unexpected in 2017) features of the new Joint Statement are the presence of the phrase “denuclearization of the Korean peninsula” and absence of the phrase CVID. These are exactly the same features that made the framework and 2005 statement promising as early steps in a process toward denuclearization.

In sum: it is important for me to be clear about where I differ from the mainstream. The mainstream view is that the framework and 2005 statement represented promising attempts at diplomacy that were tried and failed. Hence, if there is nothing new in the current approach, it is expected to fail just as the previous ones did. In contrast, I regard the framework and 2005 statements as promising approaches to diplomacy that were never fully tried and hence I take key resemblances between the new and old approach as an encouraging sign.

Now, one possible difference we might point to is that the new statement does not explicitly refer to the 1991 JNSD, although the phrase “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” strongly implies a connection to that old document. If I were Secretary of State Pompeo, I would try to build on that implied reference by trying to secure an explicit reference to 1991 JNSD in a future statement soon. The 1991 JNSD does a lot to constrain the definition of denuclearization, and the framework and 2005 statements are strong precedents for referring to this definition. Thus, explicit reference to 1991 JNSD could help us to begin negotiating and then implementing the path (which, as you suggest, will be the major drawn out challenge) with some confidence that everyone is on the same page about the destination.

The second, and probably more significant, difference between the recent statement and the old ones is contextual: North Korea has mastered almost all aspects of nuclear weapons that relate to targeting the U.S. homeland. No deal or verification steps will destroy that knowledge. But, paradoxically, this may make a deal “cheaper” for the U.S., since North Korea will always have a credible hedge, and may need less U.S. “skin in the game” for a deal to hold together. (More on this point below.)

The main similarities between the recent Trump-Kim statement and those of framework and 2005 statement are the presence of the phrase “denuclearization of the Korean peninsula” and the absence of the phrase “CVID.” I regard these as positive aspects of the Trump-Kim statement.

The Diplomat: One key element of previous agreements was the acceptance by the United States and international community of a civilian nuclear energy program and capability within North Korea community (predicated, of course, on various other trade offs, reciprocal steps, and inspections). In your work, you frame this not only as a concrete “carrot” to be provided as a part of a large negotiating process, but also one which offers a concrete signal and mechanism for political normalization by embedding North Korea, the United States, and other relevant actors (South Korea, Japan, the IAEA, UN, and other nuclear technology suppliers) “in a cooperative infrastructure project for a larger duration.” In short, despite the fact that it is more expensive and inefficient compared to other more conventional energy projects, it provides a more effective long-term framework within which “the political relationships associated with its operation tend to stick longer than those associated with other technologies.” Do you see any evidence that such an arrangement is possible today? Like much else, the Kim-Trump Joint Statement was short on concrete details, and made no mention of civilian nuclear technology in the North.

Dr. Lawrence: So first off, while I think resuming the LWR project (it appears the foundation has been maintained by the North Koreans) may be sound policy on its merits, I believe it would be politically dead on arrival in Washington. So rather than propose large LWRs, I suggest we learn from the role they played in previous diplomatic campaigns, which was to create the physical embodiment of an improved political relationship between North Korea and the United States (and U.S. regional allies).

There is, however, a non-nuclear infrastructure project on the table that could play a similar role as the LWRs did in the framework. Behind the scenes, a centerpiece of Moon’s North-South diplomatic plan is a shared transportation infrastructure that would link South Korea, through North Korea, to the mainland of Asia. As a nuclear scientist (and not a civil engineer or development investor), I am not qualified to comment on the economic viability of such a project, but if South Korea (a main U.S. ally in region) eventually has a major economic stake maintaining this infrastructure (and in turn in North Korea’s economic and political future), then that starts to play a similar role as the LWRs.

Interestingly enough, we now find that the U.S.-N.K. diplomatic channel that led to the summit was forged by frontier investors. I regard this as a strong indication that, like in the framework era, the backbone of current diplomacy will be infrastructure development.

Back on the nuclear front, a post-denuclearization vision for North Korea’s civil nuclear program will be a major challenge to iron out, but it may also present opportunities to strengthen the verification end. I think some form of nuclear collaboration may be the best way to really verify denuclearization, because it could potentially give us much deeper insight into their nuclear program than inspections alone could give (no matter how stringent those inspections may be). The Nautilus Foundation did some interesting work on this a while back, and I expect Dr. Siegfried Hecker to be writing on this soon.

The Diplomat: Trump appears to believe that by flipping the normal script and having the high-level summit upfront, before any agreement has been reached, it will create the necessary momentum toward a final settlement down the road. At least, that is how he packaged it. Although it is clearly too soon to say with any certainty, do you believe the Kim-Trump Summit will offer such a springboard to more detailed negotiations and a more comprehensive deal?

Dr. Lawrence: I believe that there is more reason to be optimistic than there was in 2017, but the Trump-Kim statement only has value as a modest first step in the direction of something more defined. As you point out, nothing concrete has been achieved in the statement itself, but by not demanding CVID (which, again, really only refers to the time-sequence), I think Trump succeeded in “not screwing up” the prospect of future steps.

In the future, we should be looking for more defined articulation of three areas (as you suggest):

1) What is the duration and sequence of a phased process? (Two years? Probably not. Five or 10 years? Maybe.) When do major steps, like facility dismantlement and peace treaty occur?

2) What does North Korea’s civilian nuclear program look like after a deal is implemented, and what does the verification process look like (inspections, possible collaboration, etc.)? What form will the physical manifestation of political changes take (transportation infrastructure development, frontier investment, altered military deployments, etc)?

3) As for Trump’s flipping the script, while statements like “There is no longer a Nuclear Threat from North Korea” clearly do not reflect the current reality, they may play a role in nudging reality in a more benign direction over time.