Previewing Pakistan’s General Elections

On July 25, Pakistan will hold general elections for the National Assembly in order to select a new government for the country. If everything goes according to plan, these elections will mark the second time in Pakistan’s history, after 2013, that democracy has ensured a peaceful transfer of power from one government to another.

Yet it remains to be seen how meaningful this is in practical terms, due to the continuing influence of Pakistan’s military in domestic affairs. Whereas in the past the military resorted to outright coups, it is now seen by many Pakistanis as setting up a system of “tutelary democracy,” a system described in The New York Times as one in which the “military disempowers politicians who stray from its positions on foreign policy and national security, supports a new king’s party [whichever party is more closely aligned with its goals] and punishes the press for providing fair coverage to its perceived opponents.” Quartz described such as system as one “of diarchy [resembling the period] between 1919 and 1947 when the British Raj acknowledged the impossibility of ruling without some form of democratic consent, but remained equally convinced that politicians could not be trusted to direct the defense of the realm.” However, as the division is not institutionalized, and in theory, the military is subordinate to the civilian establishment, it is inevitable that military interference in politics ruffles the feathers of every elected government.

Civilian leaders do not necessarily help their cases with their reputations for graft. But while civilian leaders such as former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of the Pakistani Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), and the erstwhile president, Asif Ali Zardari of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), have indeed been involved in scams and corruption deals, they also possess a more business-minded vision for Pakistan, one that involves less state support for militant groups in Afghanistan and India, and better economic and political relations with their neighbors. This, however, is unacceptable to large parts of Pakistan’s military establishment. The raison d’etre for such a powerful military establishment is the perceived threat posed by India, as well as India’s potential allies in Afghanistan, so the resolution of disputes with Pakistan’s neighbors is not necessarily in the military’s interests. It is notable that whenever relations between Pakistan and India seem to be improving, terrorist attacks often occur in India that than derail the process of rapprochement.

In this light, the events that led to former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s downfall last year are not too surprising. Sharif and his PML-N spoke of reining in militants, pursuing a more conciliatory foreign policy, and exercising tighter control of the military. These undoubtedly incurred the military establishment’s wrath. Pakistan’s judiciary, most probably at the behest of figures in the military, forced Sharif from power last July and barred him for life from the post of prime minister, ostensibly for not being honest and truthful in declaring ownership of properties the family had acquired in London (regardless of whether such properties were acquired legally or were the proceeds of bribes). Yet, the PML-N retained power under another another prime minister, Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, and has designated Nawaz’s brother, Punjab’s Chief Minister Shehbaz Sharif, as its choice for the position should they win the upcoming elections. And it has a good shot of doing so. Nawaz Sharif remains popular, and recent polling by Gallup has indicated that his PML-N is set to win around 34-38 percent of the vote. Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), led by by former cricket star Imran Khan, is the closest rival, estimated to be on track to win around 25 percent of the vote.

The continued popularity of the PML-N, despite court rulings and military pressure, including a military pushed media blackout, is due to many factors. In some ways, the attempt to ostracize the Sharifs has backfired. If Nawaz Sharif failed to be honest, so did many other politicians, who are still allowed to wield power.

Despite some personal indiscretion on the part of Sharif and his family, his government pursued numerous successful policies: the economy has improved, infrastructure investment from China was brought in, and rampant militancy was reduced drastically. Given that the alternatives are an untested Imran Khan or the PPP – which has been languishing under the lackluster leadership of Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, son of the late Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto – it is no surprise that Pakistanis would select the most successful of their country’s major parties, relative to the others.

The PML-N’s strength also is a function of the fact that the major parties in Pakistan have each managed to consolidate a province on the basis of ethnicity, despite officially being non-ethnic parties. Sharif’s party is based in Punjab, Pakistan’s most populous and industrialized state, led by Shehbaz Sharif. It can win a majority of seats just by sweeping Punjab, where about half the population of Pakistan lives. Its former major rival, the PPP is based in Sindh, and is strong in rural areas of the province, but weak in big cities, especially Karachi, both Sindh and Pakistan’s largest city. PPP has a poor record of governance and infrastructure in Sindh, which is miles behind Punjab in developmental terms.

The major upset to watch for is Imran Khan. He has run Khyber Pakhtunkhwa well, and moreover, has consolidated the ethnic Pashtun vote of that province. Pakistani Pashtuns have recently been more vocal and active in protesting their country’s policies in their region, the stronghold of the Pakistani Taliban. Khan also enjoys the tacit support of the military, largely due to his opposition of American drone strikes on Pakistan. Khan is both a vulture and a visionary. A bit of a political chameleon, his party’s platform often seems to be more about him than an actual program for the country.

Khan’s cozy ties with the military may help him overcome polls that show the PML-N winning, and finally bring his PTI to power, a scenario that many Pakistanis would welcome, especially younger people less tied to traditional, feudal politics and hankering for a change. Khan has tried to court both the poor, rural voters, and the big landlords in Punjab. Some of these landlords serve in the national assembly on PML-N tickets. In order for Khan to win, he would have to flip some of these individuals to his party; allegedly under the influence of the military, some have already done so. But Khan’s strong personality all but ensures that even if he attains the post of prime minister due to military patronage, it is only a matter of time before he begins to act independently. After all, he has been waiting in the wings with many big ideas for a score of years, and is not known for tolerating alternative viewpoints within his party.

While Pakistan’s politics seem as messy as ever, in many ways, Pakistan has improved in the last few years. Ten years ago, it was unclear if the Pakistani state would remain stable, or collapse, but now a certain vibrancy has returned to the country. It still has a long way to go, both in terms of development, and in how it manages its relations with foreign powers. But a coup is unlikely, and the next government will be formed by whichever party wins the election, which despite pressures, will likely to be fair enough that it may bring a party to power that has been under sustained attack by the military for a year.