Estimating Taiwanese Military Power

As tensions continue to rise across the Taiwan Strait, it becomes increasingly important to analyze the state of Taiwan’s defense readiness. What would happen if China attacked? Could Taiwan’s military prevail? In what areas are the island nation’s defense capabilities the strongest? Where are they the weakest? And what can Taiwan’s government do to bolster its military power?

Known Unknowns

Any estimate of military power will necessarily rely on guesswork. Even the most cursory review of history shows that war is far too complex to predict with any certainty. Surprise and chance are the most enduring features of human conflict. Moreover, in this case, the fighting qualities of the Taiwanese armed forces are unknown because they have never been put to the test.

The same is true of their adversary, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Both sides have been locked in a bloodless stalemate since the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958. Neither has conducted the type of modern military operation that might give analysts meaningful insights into their likely performance when pitted against each other in some intriguing future scenario.

The truth is that analysts do not really know how well-trained, motivated, and tough the Taiwanese are. We know neither how many potential turncoats inhabit their ranks, nor how many hardcore warriors. To be sure, impressionistic evidence abounds, but the anecdotes available to us are often contradictory, and always a poor substitute for actual facts.

Authoritative information is available regarding some categories of Taiwanese equipment, including the probable numbers of fighter jets, missile defense batteries, ships, and tanks. These numbers look impressive, especially in light of Taiwan’s modest size. But we cannot be sure how well-maintained Taiwan’s weapons are, and can only guess how many would survive the PLA’s opening salvoes of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones.

Making any analysis more challenging, the details of Taiwan’s most interesting weapons programs are classified. How many land-attack cruise missiles does Taiwan have? How many does it intend to build? How many will it actually be able to deploy in the near future? We don’t know. We are also not sure how far the Taiwanese could fly into the Chinese mainland, what they would target, and what lethal effects they might have on those targets once they reached them.

Do Taiwanese cyber warriors have backdoor access to Chinese military or industrial systems? In the supreme emergency, could they turn off the lights in Beijing? Could they wreak havoc in the PLA’s internal communications systems by sending out fake orders? Could they overpower the Great Firewall of China?

Just how “smart” are Taiwan’s smart mines? Could they be used to blockade China’s main naval ports at Qingdao, Ningbo, and Zhanjiang?

It is equally unclear as to how capable the PLA might be in a war against Taiwan. What toll has corruption taken on its fighting ability? How many spies does Taiwan have within PLA ranks? What bitter internal rivalries exist inside the PLA? How bad is morale in light of the drastic purges that have occurred in recent years?

What is the effect of having political officers and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) committees monitoring every unit to ensure their absolute loyalty to the regime? Given the highly politicized environment, how realistic are the PLA’s doctrine and war plans for Taiwan? How useful are their related drills and exercises? How large and well-coordinated could their various operations be? How long could they sustain high-intensity warfare with their logistical capabilities?

What is China’s actual defense budget? What is Taiwan’s? Neither honestly reports their total defense spending. And, even if we hypothetically knew the aggregate number, we still wouldn’t know what that money buys them in terms of raw military power. What does it cost each of them to recruit, train, equip, and maintain a war-ready fighter squadron, destroyer flotilla, or special forces battalion? Good luck trying to find out.

When it comes to estimating Taiwanese military power, we have more questions than answers. Yet that should not hinder us from making educated guesses. Nor should uncertainty prevent analysts from debating and testing the ideas that emerge from their guesswork.

The Taiwan Strait is one of the world’s most dangerous flashpoints. Getting it wrong could result in a catastrophic superpower war and millions of lives ruined and lost. The stakes at play demand we work with whatever tools we can. Partial knowledge is a whole lot better than none at all, much in the way that driving a car in the fog with your lights on is better than driving blindfolded.

Setting the Scene

It’s useful to start with the basic facts of history. In October 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established in Beijing by the CCP. Two months later, Chiang Kai-shek moved the seat of his Republic of China (ROC) government to Taipei. The Chinese Civil War was not over. Mao Zedong ordered attacks on ROC-occupied islands directly off the coast of the Chinese mainland. This sparked numerous skirmishes and major battles in 1954, 1955, and 1958. Eventually, both sides settled into an uneasy stalemate. The PRC was distracted by mounting tensions with India and the former Soviet Union, and the ROC was discouraged by the United States from launching a military campaign to invade the mainland and topple Mao.

Taiwan’s authoritarian government was diplomatically recognized by the U.S. for 30 years and protected by a mutual defense treaty. Then, in 1979, Washington felt compelled by unfavorable Cold War developments to switch recognition from the ROC to the PRC as a hedge against the Soviet Union. Taiwan nonetheless prospered, first economically and then politically, becoming a fledgling democracy in the 1990s. Today, Taiwan (the ROC) is ranked one of the freest countries in the world. China (the PRC) remains a communist state. From the CCP’s perspective, the Chinese Civil War has not yet been satisfactorily concluded.

Since his ascendance to power in 2012, CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping has repeatedly signaled that the PRC is not satisfied with the status quo and does not seek continued peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. In spite of Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen’s attempts to maintain stable cross-Strait relations, it appears that Xi intends to intimidate, isolate, weaken, subvert, and ultimately annex the island. War could be coming.

Pick Your Poison

In the event of conflict, China has several options available for attacking Taiwan. Beijing could launch a series of island-seizure operations against Taiwanese atolls in the South China Sea and along the PRC seaboard. Taiwan controls over 100 small islands, many of which are located near Chinese military facilities. Several of Taiwan’s outer islands are heavily fortified, but the majority of them are sitting ducks. By knocking these rocks off one by one, China could gain valuable amphibious experience, and test the political resolve of Taipei and Washington, while keeping casualties relatively low.

If China were willing to accept even greater risk, it could blockade Taiwan’s home island using a combination of submarines, surface warships, aircraft, and, of course, missiles, mines, and cyber attacks. It seems likely that Beijing would seek to unfold such operations slowly, and in a way designed to minimize a U.S.-led international backlash. Attacks on Taiwan would thus be prolonged, but intermittent and low intensity. Casualties might be heavy, but they would occur mostly out on the open ocean, far away from the prying eyes of CNN camera crews.

China’s most extreme military option is to launch an all-out invasion of Taiwan. This scenario animates the PLA’s military buildup to a significant degree. In late 2012, the CCP Politburo reportedly told China’s generals and admirals they must be ready for such a scenario by 2020. It seems unlikely that the PLA could achieve such an ambitious goal, and it’s improbable that Xi will put them to the test that soon. But the timetable matters less than the strategic intent. China’s policy is to conquer the island at some point, unless Taiwan surrenders without giving a knockout fight.

Taipei is signaling that it will not be intimidated into submission. Taiwan is as nationalistic and proud as any other country in the world, and strong enough to take a hit or two from China if it must. Since limited conflict operations are unlikely to settle the cross-Strait dispute once and for all, it makes sense to focus on the invasion scenario.

What Would Invasion Look Like?

Any invasion of Taiwan would have three basic component parts. First, China would soften the island up for assault using high-intensity bombing and a blockade. These operations would turn the entire Western Pacific area into a warzone. They would involve digital battles in outer space and cyberspace, and lethal engagements in the air, on the seas, and below the waves. Both military and civilian targets in Taiwan would be demolished by missiles, bombs, and saboteurs.

Next, China would cross the Strait and begin landing troops on Taiwan and its offshore islands. To do this, the PLA would have to pull off a masterful deception operation and get the timing perfect. If it worked, Chinese combat engineers could clear Taiwanese minefields and obstacles, first at sea and then ashore, allowing PLA troops to storm beaches, airstrips, and port facilities along the coast. This phase of the invasion would be particularly bloody.

Finally, China would reinforce its toeholds across the Taiwan Strait and make the plunge into the island’s hostile interior. Urban warfare would ensue, with all the horrors that entails. If Taipei and the other major population centers collapsed, fighting would continue in the mountains. Approximately 70 percent of Taiwan’s surface is mountainous. A long and brutal pacification campaign would be launched. If China won, Taiwan’s fate would be that of an Orwellian “autonomous region,” a garrison state similar to Tibet and Xinjiang. In the end, Taiwan would be used by the PLA to threaten Okinawa, Japan, the Philippines, the Marianas Islands, and Guam.

Assessing Odds

Could Taiwan’s military prevail in a total war with the world’s second most powerful nation? The short answer is yes, but it depends on the circumstances. There is an excellent chance that Taiwan could weather the storm if the United States intervened on its side as soon as China’s battle plan became clear. In theory, even better odds could be had if Washington signaled its ironclad commitment to Taiwan’s defense before the outbreak of conflict. That might stress U.S.-PRC relations, but it would likely avert crisis and war in the first place.

Taiwan has considerably reduced odds of winning if American assistance arrives late, in piecemeal fashion, or not at all. Even without direct U.S. support, Taiwan could still mount a powerful independent self-defense, but only if it successfully mobilizes its massive reserve force early and can maintain a unified civil-military government. Neither of these conditions is assured.

Leadership is critical too. Taiwan has only a slim chance of surviving Chinese invasion if its president and her war cabinet are assassinated. Taiwan might be able to survive a few strategic setbacks, but only a miracle could save the island if a shock of that magnitude were to occur.

Timing also matters. Thanks to its military reforms and armaments programs, the PLA is growing stronger. Taiwan and its quasi-alliance partner, the United States, are becoming weaker in comparison. All else being equal, a war today would be easier to win than a war in 2028, when the correlation of forces will look better for China.

Timing matters in another sense. Due to local weather patterns, Taiwanese forces would have a fairly easy time repelling Chinese invasion during the winter squall season or summer typhoon season. Things become sportier in April and October, when PLA studies assert that the ocean conditions most favor amphibious operations against Taiwan.

Taiwan’s Military Strengths

In what areas are Taiwan’s defense capabilities the strongest? Although much is uncertain when it comes to Taiwanese military power, we can probably assess with confidence that Taiwan enjoys significant and enduring advantages over China in terms of intelligence, terrain, and local numbers. Let’s briefly assess each.

In the intelligence realm, Taiwan has invested significant resources into building early-warning capabilities for averting a cross-Strait “Pearl Harbor.” The island’s military now oversees some of the best surveillance radars and listening posts on the planet. Taiwan’s close and collegial relationship with U.S. intelligence agencies further ensures that it would have ample warning of an impending invasion. This is vital, as it would allow Taiwan’s president to order the activation of national emergency plans.

As for terrain, Taiwan is a rugged island surrounded by what amounts to a giant moat. Winds, waves, currents, tides, and seabed conditions all conspire to make Taiwan’s approaches poorly suited to amphibious operations. Compounding the effect, civil engineering projects have transformed the coastline, making the island’s most vulnerable beaches disappear. Taiwan’s shores are also protected by submerged gas pipelines that can create something PLA analysts call “seawalls of fire.” Taiwanese army construction teams have built interlocking networks of underground strongholds around those areas most likely to be attacked. War reserve equipment is stored in secret tunnels all over the island, and tanks and planes can be bunkered down ahead of enemy missile attacks.

And finally, local numbers. Taiwan has approximately 180,000 men and woman at arms and another 1.5 million reservists. This is a very large military for a country of only 23 million people. Even though its population is only a fraction of the size of China’s, Taiwan would enjoy numerical superiority on its homeland battlefields, especially in the early days of an invasion when the PLA would be bottled up inside narrow lodgments. Indeed, Taiwan’s military can conduct a layered defense, fighting first along the PRC coast, then across the Taiwan Strait, and finally in its cities and mountains, with all the military advantages that brings.

Taiwan’s Military Weaknesses

Where is Taiwan weaker than China? We can probably assess with confidence that Taiwan’s military suffers significant and enduring disadvantages when it comes to technology, overall numbers, and initiative.

When it comes to force modernization with regard to technology, Taiwan has equipment shortfalls across the board. All of its warplanes, destroyers, frigates, submarines, and tanks are old. Although the majority could still pack a punch, some, like the “Sea Lion” submarines and F-5 fighter jets, are becoming so ancient they can be dangerous to operate. This situation has resulted from freezes of U.S. arms sales over the past decade and Taipei’s attendant underinvestment in defense, which has created a yawning military technology gap between the ROC military and the PLA.

With regard to overall numbers, no matter how much Taiwan spends on defense, there is no way it can keep up with China in terms of armaments production. The PLA has the world’s largest standing army and largest inventory of theater missiles. It has even surpassed the U.S. Navy in number of warships (although not in terms of tonnage or combat capability). One aspect of China’s military strategy is to apply swarms of expendable combatants to overwhelm Taiwan’s navy and air force. This creates an imbalance that is growing more serious.

Lastly, let’s consider initiative. In any conceivable scenario, the PLA will be on the offensive and Taiwan’s defenders will be reacting to events. China’s political-military leaders will have the luxury of deciding the time, place, and manner of attack. Taiwan’s military will therefore lack the initiative and could be caught by surprise. In theory, Taiwan could strike first once it became clear that Beijing was about launch a potentially mortal attack. However, Taipei is unlikely to choose this route since that would result in Taiwan being blamed for starting the war and perhaps thus hampering international support.

Improving Taiwan’s Chances

What can Taiwan’s government do to bolster its military power? One option it could consider would be to focus less on the ROC military’s enduring strengths and weakness, which by their very nature are unlikely to become “game changers.” Instead, Taiwanese leaders could work harder on critical variables, those things that could be meaningfully improved in a reasonable timeframe, or could rapidly atrophy if neglected.

For Taiwan, critical variables include human capital (leadership, training, and morale), internal security (countering Chinese espionage and subversion), and U.S.-Taiwan relations (arms sales, exercises, and military exchanges).

Competition for limited defense dollars should involve thoughtful assessments of future scenarios, tradeoffs, and alternative options. The aim should be to decisively tip the scales without going bankrupt. After all, the PLA has far more money and zero legislative oversight to worry about.

Ensuring Taiwan’s national security requires more than simply investing in military power. Taiwan’s continued existence as a free and independent country hinges upon its government’s ability to advance strategic objectives across the interlocking spheres of politics, economics, information, and defense. More than anything else, building stronger ties with the United States will be imperative.

Taiwan is moving into a different and more dangerous future. Will its military be ready in time? Will others help?