Japan and China Finally Establish a Maritime Communication Mechanism

On May 9, Japan and China finally agreed to implement a maritime and aerial communication mechanism. The communication mechanism is intended to help avert unintended clashes between Japanese and Chinese armed forces in and above nearby waters.

A notice was issued to Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) personnel on the content of the agreement with China on May 29. At a June 7 press conference, Joint Staff Chief of Staff Katsuoshi Kawano stated, “The mechanism is extremely significant for averting any contingencies.” However, due to deliberate legal ambiguity over what the mechanism covers and the explicit focus on military vessels – exempting coast guard vessels from the mechanism’s jurisdiction – such high hopes are still premature.

The communication mechanism, which went into effect on June 8, has three main parts to it. First, it establishes rules for direct communications when SDF and Chinese forces come close to each other. Japanese and Chinese vessels and aircrafts are now expected to use English in their communication, and specific frequencies, signals, and abbreviations based on the Code of Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), the Convention on International Civil Aviation, and other existing rules.

Second, it mandates that the two sides set up a hotline between bilateral defense authorities. The details of the hotline still need to be worked out. On the Japanese side, the hotline is likely to be set up at the Joint Staff Office, which integrates SDF operations, but Beijing still has to decide where to set up the system. It is more complicated on the Chinese side because there are five theater commands that operationally integrate ground, naval, air, and other forces. There may be the need to set up multiple hotlines that can be selected from depending on the specifics of the particular incident.

Another possibility is to set up the hotline at the Chinese Defense Ministry, but this idea would be met with skepticism in Japan. A hotline with the Chinese Defense Ministry, which does not actually operate military units, would be of limited utility, after all. The Japanese side wants the hotline established within the year, but as of this writing, preparations are ongoing.

The third part of this mechanism is that Japan and China will have annual meetings of officials at the director-general and division chief levels. Details of this have also been left underspecified, though Japan wants the first meeting to be held within the year.

This communication mechanism has come a long, slow, and torturous way. The two countries first agreed to create a communication mechanism in 2007, but it has been an on-again, off-again process ever since. Tokyo and Beijing’s first high-level talk on maritime affairs was in May 2012; the dialogue was suspended following Japan’s nationalization of disputed islands in September of that same year, but resumed in September 2014. The seventh such consultation took place last December in Shanghai, where a major breakthrough was achieved when both sides agreed not to specify the geographical scope of the agreement.

During negotiations, Japan had specifically requested that the territorial waters and airspace of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (which Japan controls) not be subject to the mechanism. Japan is concerned that if these areas were explicitly included, China would seek to strengthen its claims by using the new framework to legitimate its approach to the disputed islands. In the final version of the agreement, Japan and China agreed to not specify the geographical scope of the mechanism, and by extension, to not specify whether the disputed islands fall under the scope of this mechanism.

The maritime communication mechanism is undoubtedly an important step forward of great symbolic importance, but has only come to fruition by papering over fundamental differences in the Japanese and Chinese positions regarding the East China Sea’s disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.

The ambiguity of the status of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the agreement, which allowed the agreement to be reached, is also a source of potential future trouble, as Mainichi Shimbun speculates: “If SDF and Chinese military vessels come close to each other near the Senkakus, there are concerns that both parties will accuse the other of intruding into their territorial waters, leading to escalating tensions.” Better communication alone will not solve problems when there is an underlying conflict of interest.

In addition to the legal finagling, which leaves the most pressing matter in Japan-China relations unresolved, questions remain about its practical impact. After all, the communication mechanism can only help avoid accidental or unintended clashes. If either party wants to intentionally initiate or escalate conflict there is nothing in the communication mechanism holding them back. About a month into the implementation of the mechanism, according to the Japanese Defense Ministry, there have been five cases of Chinese naval vessels traveling through waters surrounding Japan.

But the greatest shortcoming of the bilateral communication mechanism is that the Japanese and Chinese coast guards are not subject to it. Government-owned vessels of the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) have repeatedly entered Japanese territorial waters, and it is likely that the Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) vessels will continue to monitor such paramilitary operations – outside of the guidance of the new communication mechanism.

Japan is especially frustrated by the July 1 move to put the CCG under the supervision of the Central Military Commission (CMC) – which also commands the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Specifically, the CCG used to be under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Public Security but will now be a part of the People’s Armed Police Force, falling under the direct control of President Xi Jinping.

While CCG officials have tried explaining to Japan that its role will remain unchanged for the time being, Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera declared at a June 26 news conference that “We will maintain a level-headed response, but we are determined to steadfastly defend our country’s land mass, territorial waters, and airspace.”

This transfer of administrative control from civilian to military authority will likely increase cooperation between the PLAN and CCG, leaving Japan with the tricky “gray area” problem of how to deal with CCG vessels that are operating in tandem with the PLAN. As Asahi Shimbun sums up, this organizational change “could compound the difficulty facing Japan in how to respond in emergency situations if the functions and authority of the China Coast Guard are strengthened with its status remaining ambiguous.”

While the Japanese side tried to conclude the decade-long negotiations in good faith, it appears that Japan has fallen for a classic bait-and-switch: the long-sought after communication mechanism with China has now been rendered even more hollow than it appeared at first blush.

Anything that improves Japan-China relations is good for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific. And optics matter, so concluding this agreement is a positive development on its own. But somber assessments of “breakthroughs” are important to manage expectations and sharpen officials’ focus on areas of growth for future cooperation.