What’s Behind Indonesia’s ‘Third Generation Terrorism’ Threat Warning?

In mid-July, at a defense conference in Jakarta, Indonesian Defense Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu issued yet another stern warning about the rise of what he has termed “third generation terrorism” and its challenges for the international community. While there are no doubt changes in the way that terrorist groups are operating that have been acknowledged by other Southeast Asian officials as well, Ryacudu’s suggestion deserves closer examination given the implications it has for not only an analysis of the threat but the response needed to address it.

Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim-majority nation, long known for its more moderate brand of Islam, is also no stranger to terrorism and Islamic militancy. The last wave of terrorism, which occurred following the 9/11 attacks, saw Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) – loosely referred to as the Southeast Asian offshoot of al-Qaeda – carry out a series of attacks, including the deadly Bali bombings in 2002 and twin bombings in 2009 targeting the J.W. Marriott and Ritz Carlton hotels. In recent years, attention has turned to the Islamic State (ISIS) and related groups, with hundreds of Indonesians believed to have gone abroad to join the group in the Middle East. There have been a series of successful and foiled attacks, including most recently in May with attacks hitting three churches in Surabaya, Indonesia’s second-largest city.

In recent months, and following the Surabaya attacks, Ryacudu has been warning about ongoing evolutions in the nature of the terrorist threat, and potentially even the rise of an entirely new wave. Most prominently, in his keynote remarks at the 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Asia’s premier security summit, in June, Ryacudu warned about the rise of a “third generation threat” of terrorism and radicalism, following what he characterized as the post-al-Qaeda generation and the post-Islamic State (or Daesh) generation. He has repeated this idea of a “third generation threat” on several occasions since, including in mid-July at this year’s iteration of the Indonesia International Defense Science Seminar (IIDSS) organized by the Indonesian Defense University in Jakarta.

In Ryacudu’s reading, some of the features of this recent wave of terrorism – including the increasingly decentralized nature of groups, with sleeper cells and lone wolf attacks; the increasing use of social media and other forms of advanced technology; and new and more sophisticated methods of recruitment and operation – constitute a wholly new wave or generation of terrorism. And while the manifestations thus far have included isolated attacks, there may be more as additional combatants return from the Middle East. According to official Indonesian data, out of 31,500 ISIS foreign fighters who are in Syria, 400 are from Indonesia, constituting about a half of all fighters from Asia.

Evolution in the nature of a terrorist threat is far from a new phenomenon and has been a longstanding and ongoing challenge for policymakers and experts alike. Ryacudu is also not alone in recognizing that there have been some changes in the way terrorist groups are operating in Southeast Asia as well as the challenge of returning fighters. Officials from neighboring states, including the Philippines and Singapore, have also been pointing to these trends, and these are conversations Southeast Asian states are having with their partner countries as well.

But whether or not this is a wholly new wave or “generation,” as Ryacudu puts it, is less clear. Terrorism experts have long debated the characteristics that ought to factor into the division of groups into waves or generations, be it their ideological orientations or their methods. But several of the features that Ryacudu highlighted – such as decentralization or the use of social media – were evident to various degrees with respect to the two previous waves as well, with contemporary groups like JI and ISIS. It is also difficult to evaluate the definitiveness and endurance of these features given that their manifestations, including the return of foreign fighters, have not really fully played out yet.

The extent to which this is a new wave or not is not just an academic debate – it has implications for how states respond. For instance, in the Indonesian case, for Ryacudu the changing nature of the threat means that greater measures need to be taken to address it. These include not just fairly standard measures such as increasing intelligence cooperation with neighboring states and advancing joint patrols and exercises, but also more controversial steps, including revising anti-terrorism laws to increase the involvement of the military and promoting a greater sense of nationalism in the spirit of what is termed bela negara. Such measures have once again raised questions about growing militarization in Indonesia and the implications for the country’s democracy.

To be sure, Indonesia is not the only country to consider tougher measures to respond to the terrorism threat in Southeast Asia. And, to be fair, actions by other neighboring states, including Malaysia and the Philippines, with respect to terrorism and insurgency have raised similar questions about the impact on civil-military relations and democracy.

But Ryacudu’s comments point to a broader issue embodied in his “third generation threat” assessment that animates such worries: how do Southeast Asian states in general, and Indonesia in particular, calibrate their threat perceptions with respect to terrorism so that they are neither overestimating it – which could lead to overreaction and exacerbate the problem – or underestimating it, which could lead to greater vulnerability to attacks and criticism for allowing them to occur? The need of countries to walk a careful balance between overestimation and underestimation will likely continue to be a struggle as debates play out, and Ryacudu’s characterization fits into that broader picture.