Nukes Down Under?

It is fairly obvious to state that the presidency of Donald Trump in the United States has been disruptive: Trump’s suspicion (or lack of understanding) of the prevailing international order and the “costly” alliances the United States has, both in Europe and East Asia; the trade wars he has launched against both allies and strategic competitors; and the administration’s chaotic and unpredictable decision-making processes.

For a country like Australia, these approaches to foreign policy are of significant concern, even if they are not (yet) directly involving the country. One of the interesting consequences of this is there has been renewed discussion among Australian strategic and security analysts about whether Australia should acquire a nuclear deterrent. And this contemplation is not just local, according to the Australian Financial Review. Professor Simon Jackman, head of the United States Study Center at Sydney University, was told by a senior member of the U.S. foreign policy establishment that “It wouldn't be crazy for Australia to think about the nuclear option.”

Since an early altercation between Trump and Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, Australia has subsequently tried to fly underneath Trump’s radar. The thinking behind the strategy is that if Australia is not in Trump’s line of sight, then cooperation between the two countries (both at state level and between civil societies) can continue undisturbed. If Trump knows the country exists, he will be tempted to induce change to the relationship.

This is all well and good on a day-to-day level, but it doesn’t solve the greater strategic anxiety that the Trump presidency creates for Australia. This is what the former director-general of Australia’s Office of National Assessments, Allan Gyngell, has called the “Fear of Abandonment”; the Australian disposition that sees itself in need of a great and powerful friend. During World War II, when the United Kingdom was no longer able to fulfil this role, the United States provided the (more geographically appropriate) substitute. Australia’s foreign policy has been constructed around this pole ever since.

However, if the U.S. leadership is now unconcerned, ignorant, or confused about its own post-war alliance building strategy, then Australia’s perceived vulnerability is enhanced. This vulnerability is further exacerbated by the current lack of reliability of other powerful like-minded states. Japan has its obvious defense constraints; the potential for a post-Brexit Jeremy Corbyn-led government could dramatically alter the UK’s foreign policy (including commitment to its own nuclear deterrence); and depending on continuing trends within continental Europe, France may not have seen the last of Marine Le Pen (which could dramatically alter France’s foreign policy as well). And all this is brought into focus by the rise of a new great power in China, which does not share Australia’s fundamental values, and is rapidly gaining capabilities and influence in the Pacific. 

At present, although Australia has some some significant defense capabilities, the country relies on the United States as the major pole of its deterrence strategy. However, when it comes to the U.S. nuclear umbrella, this deterrence is not as clear cut as it seems. Australia believes that it is under the U.S. nuclear umbrella; however, this is not codified into any written document, but is instead an implied understanding. The presence of major U.S. intelligence gathering facilities at Pine Gap and Northwest Cape probably gives Canberra some sense of security with this understanding, as these facilities would be deemed significant enough assets to warrant U.S. defense. However, in the case of a major war this would rely on of-the-moment U.S. calculations, and the unique calculations of the current commander-in-chief would probably not inspire confidence in Australian policymakers.

While these factors create a scenario where Australia may contemplate the creation of an indigenous nuclear deterrent, it remains highly unlikely that the country would move in this direction. Any Australian moves toward nuclear weapons would also create counter-responses within its neighborhood, and undermine Australia’s commitment to the both Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty. These treaties are close to the heart of many of its Pacific Island neighbors, which had previously been used as nuclear testing grounds.

Nuclear weapons also require a highly advanced delivery system capable of hitting critical targets, and Australia currently has nothing suitable, and would be reluctant to invest in the development of a such a system. However, the fact that this idea could even be discussed demonstrates that Australia is now having to reassess some of the fundamental tenets of its security strategy.

The 2016 Defense White Paper envisaged an even closer security relationship between Australia and the United States. If there is a “Plan B” within the Australian government there is no desire to acknowledge it (although to be fair it would be best to keep such things quiet).  However, the current geopolitical uncertainty should prompt policymakers to ask some basic questions about Australia’s position: Does Australia face any threats that would require a security guarantor like the United States (or a nuclear weapon)? Are Australia’s current conventional defense capabilities sufficient to sustain a credible deterrence? And blessed by its geographic isolation, is Australia’s perceived vulnerability more psychological than substantive?