What’s Next for Indonesia-Philippines Counterterrorism Cooperation?

On August 10, the defense ministers of Indonesia and the Philippines, both key states in Southeast Asia’s security landscape, held a meeting in the Philippine capital of Manila. While both sides discussed a range of issues in their interactions, terrorism was a top agenda item, and the focus on that aspect of ties revealed both the opportunities and challenges for the two countries in this respect.

Defense ties are part of a wider bilateral relationship between Indonesia and the Philippines, two maritime Southeast Asian countries. Within this particular aspect of the relationship, counterterrorism has been a key focus. A major driver of this has been the rising threat posed by terrorist groups, including those linked to the Islamic State. The threat has been made clear to both countries over the past few years, with the months-long siege by Islamic State-backed militants in the southern Philippine city of Marawi in 2017 and the May 2018 Surabaya church bombings in Indonesia being cases in point.

Despite lingering challenges, both sides have nonetheless been looking for opportunities to broaden collaboration on this front. The main headline item has been trilateral patrols that both countries are conducting with Malaysia in the Sulu Sea, which has long been an area rife with a range of transnational crimes. There have been other equally important aspects too, such as countering terrorism financing and money laundering as well as discussing strategies for countering extremist messaging.

In mid-August, the counterterrorism issue was in the spotlight again when Indonesian Defense Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu paid a visit to the Philippines. Ryacudu’s visit included a meeting with his Philippine counterpart Delfin Lorenzana on August 10, and though the two ministers discussed other matters as well, terrorism was a key focus.

During their meeting, the two ministers acknowledged the inroads that had been made thus far, including on trilateral patrols and intelligence sharing, but in a further testament to the work that lies ahead, they also noted the immense scale of the challenge of countering the threat of extremism, particularly given the porousness of their borders and the capabilities of militant groups.

The ministers also discussed areas of future collaboration. For instance, according to Indonesian media reports, Ryacudu noted that while cooperation had been successful by sea and air, there was a need for further intensification of collaboration on land as well. One of the ways in which this could be accomplished, according to the Indonesian defense minister, was through the holding of regular exercises to facilitate familiarity with operating areas and to increase interoperability.

Ryacudu’s mention of land operations comes as no surprise. Discussions about expanding the land component of trilateral cooperation have been going on for several months now. In fact, in a meeting with Malaysia’s Defense Minister Mohamad Sabu on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD) in Singapore back in June, Ryacudu reinforced the importance of land training exercises between the three countries, focused on areas such as urban warfare and developing skills such as countering snipers.

Lorenzana, for his part, noted the importance of collaboration between the two countries and also flagged some areas where cooperation could be advanced even further. These included improving border security, increasing intelligence sharing, and facilitating greater dialogue and communication between security forces on both sides as well as with other concerned countries given the transnational nature of the threat.

These comments were consistent with previous developments. Indeed, both sides have already been promoting some initiatives aimed at these areas, with an example being Indonesia’s “Our Eyes” initiative (OEI). OEI, which derives its name from the “Five Eyes” intelligence network that the United States has with its four Western allies, was officially proposed by Ryacudu late last year as an information-sharing platform for member countries designed to facilitate the exchange of intelligence on terrorism, radicalism, and violent extremism. It has since gotten support from several Southeast Asian states.

Challenges remain, however. Border security has been difficult to enforce in some areas, a point Ryacudu has reinforced several times publicly over the past few years, and that Philippine officials have acknowledged privately as well, particularly with regards to the southern part of the country. And while intelligence cooperation has been agreed upon in theory, there are still issues with it in practice, including mutual suspicion and distrust among some actors about state complicity in particular instances of militant activity. Lorenzana’s comments about the need for additional steps were a polite acknowledgement of that reality.

Few additional specifics were publicly disclosed about how Indonesia and the Philippines plan on moving ahead with concrete collaboration. Unsurprisingly, there was little mention of the significant constraints to ongoing cooperation that remain, whether it be issues of coordination among security agencies or capacity issues when it comes to enforcement. Several of these constraints have less to do with confronting the threat itself than they do with structural issues that exist within the security forces of both countries that can hamper progress.

As we continue to see headlines about fresh initiatives in the coming months and years, it is important to keep in mind the enduring reality that the true test of how Indonesia and the Philippines will fare with respect to collaboration on counterterrorism will rest on their ability to both seize new opportunities as well as overcome old challenges. Doing so will not be easy amid the evolving nature of the terrorist threat, competing governmental priorities, and limited resources. But a robust counterterrorism effort requires nothing less than that.