The Diplomat
Overview
Imran Khan’s Misplaced Priorities
Associated Press, Shakil Adil, File
South Asia

Imran Khan’s Misplaced Priorities

Only major, institutional change can reset Pakistan. But is Khan willing to confront the military to achieve it?

By Akhilesh Pillalamarri

After decades in opposition, Imran Khan, a cricket hero-turned-politician, finally succeeded in his lifelong goal of attaining political power in Pakistan when he became prime minister on August 18. His Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) came to power promising a different type of politics than those practiced by the country’s mainstream parties, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), both of which have been popular, but have been tainted by misgovernance, corruption, and falling out with the military. Instead Khan, like many populists the world over, promised a new start, power to the people, and a move away from elite-linked policies.

The military factor was probably the most influential in helping Imran Khan come to power, given the military’s efforts to chip away at the previously ruling PML-N’s power. But there was nevertheless a real readiness in Pakistan to give Khan a chance. Ultimately, his party may have come to power in any case, which is why opposition parties, despite questioning the election process, have not delegitimized Khan’s election as prime minister. Most Pakistanis, including politicians from other parties, have opted to wait and see what the PTI government can deliver, before deciding what to do next.

Unfortunately, it remains dubious if Imran Khan and his government are up to the task of governing Pakistan. Prior to the election, Khan vowed to create an “Islamic welfare state” in the country, though it was unclear how this would actually be made manifest in a country that is all but bankrupt. In order to pay the bills, Khan’s government must soon decide whether or not to accept a bailout from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), a proposition opposed by the United States, because it fears that Pakistan would use the funds to pay off Chinese loans. This message was reinforced by U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who visited Islamabad for about two hours on September 5, before proceeding on to India.

While Pakistan has deepened ties with China in recent years, it still cannot afford to totally alienate the United States. Khan’s government has done little to shore up relations with the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump, who has long criticized Pakistan for not doing enough to fight terrorism. Khan himself has long been a critic of U.S. drone strikes against militants in Pakistan’s border regions with Afghanistan. Continuing Pakistani ambivalence toward terrorism led to the suspension of $300 million in U.S. aid to Pakistan before Khan’s election, and there is nothing to indicate that the Khan government, or the military, which directs the country’s security and foreign policies, is likely to suddenly change tracks on India and Afghanistan. Yet, in light of Pakistan’s economic problems the $300 million will be sorely missed, particularly since the country is only likely to be granted a bailout by the IMF under stringent conditions.

While the United States grows apart from Pakistan, its relations with India continue to grow stronger, as demonstrated by the recent “two-plus-two” dialogue between Pompeo, Secretary of Defense James Mattis, and their Indian counterparts. Despite India’s increasingly strong geopolitical position vis-a-vis Pakistan, Khan’s government doesn’t seem to have any new thinking on how to improve relations with its neighbor, other than the usual platitudes. India’s government seems to believe as much, with Union Minister for External Affairs V.K. Singh stating: “Did you all expect a change? If a person is propped up by the army, army still rules.”

Normally, Pakistan would expect the full backing of China to cushion geopolitical and economic tensions, but even relations with China have taken a step back under the Khan government. Wary of becoming ensnared in the debt created by Chinese infrastructure projects, as has happened in Sri Lanka and Malaysia, Pakistan Commerce Minister Abdul Razak Dawood suggested in an interview that some of the Chinese infrastructure contracts in Pakistan, worth about $60 billion, had been unfairly negotiated by the previous government. Moreover, according to Reuters, he “suggested suspending for a year projects in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the Pakistan leg of China’s Belt and Road Initiative that includes recreating the old Silk Road trading route.” This has undoubtedly ruffled feathers in China, though it remains to be seen if Khan’s government really is in a position to negotiate with China, given its increasing dependence on it. In a worst-case scenario, Pakistan could face enormous austerity, with little assistance from either China or the United States.

As a result of Pakistan’s shaky economic and geopolitical situation, Imran Khan, true to style, has resorted to bravado. This can most clearly be seen through his appeal to Pakistanis living abroad to send donations in order to construct the Diamer-Bhasha Dam, and increase the foreign reserves of the country. That’s not a plan, it’s a gesture; one that that cannot fix the country’s problems.

Instead of thinking up ways to improve his country’s economic situation – a course of action that must inevitably take away some of the military’s budget, which is something that Khan cannot accomplish without risking his own position – Khan’s government has instead focused on utilizing political Islam to stir up popular opinion in its favor and to ward off any challenge from Islamist parties to its right. One of his government’s first actions was to protest a Prophet Muhammad cartoon contest in the Netherlands, which was eventually canceled due to safety fears. Pakistan took credit for the cancellation, which came after Khan vowed to raise the issue at the United Nations; it didn’t matter at all that the United Nations has no jurisdiction over cartoon competitions in its member countries, since Khan’s actions were for domestic consumption.

However, the most shameful exercise in religious populism came when the government dismissed Princeton University economist Atif Mian from the country’s Economic Advisory Council (EAC) because of his Ahmadi faith. Members of the Ahmadiyya community are persecuted because mainstream Muslims believe that they reject the finality of the prophethood of Muhammad. Rather, they accept Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, a 19th century religious reformer in British India as their messiah, and are thus seen as blasphemers and heretics. In 1974 Pakistan’s government, then ruled by the PPP, modified the constitution to deny Ahmadis the right to call themselves Muslim. Since then, the community has faced severe persecution and violence, often at the behest of extremist clerics.

It would be assumed that any government that wants to move Pakistan forward would take steps to alleviate hostility toward Ahmadis. So it seemed with the PTI government, at first. But although the government had initially appointed and then defended Mian, saying his faith was irrelevant to his ability to serve as an economist, it eventually caved into pressure exerted by a radical Islamist party, Tehreek-i-Labbaik Ya Rasool Allah (TLY), and asked Mian to resign. That the PTI did is a disturbing sign of its lack of resolve.

The future of the Khan government does not look rosy: It does not have a plan. Beholden to the military as it is, it can undertake few reforms, nor can it change the country’s policy toward Afghanistan or India. Unable to accomplish much, and given the state’s economic troubles, despite Khan’s grandiose promises of a “new (naya) Pakistan,” it remains to be seen what the PTI government will actually accomplish. Pakistan is lucky only in that the militant crisis was largely beaten back by the previous government and that there is no global financial crisis at the moment. This gives the government some space to get its bearings.

Although Khan may be more of a showman than a politician, he may prove to be smart and savvy enough to know that in order to endear himself to the people, and to try to change things, he  may eventually need to take on the military, or risk being seen as an impotent puppet. At that point anything could happen: Khan could successfully clip the military’s wings a bit, or like all other democratically elected politicians in his country’s history, try and fail. In all likelihood, Imran Khan’s dream of a new and different Pakistan will be proven to be implausible as his dreams collide with reality. Only major, institutional change can reset Pakistan.

Want to read more?
Subscribe for full access.

Subscribe
Already a subscriber?

The Authors

Akhilesh Pillalamarri writes for The Diplomat’s South Asia section.
Northeast Asia
Japan Eyes Sri Lanka’s Deep Water Port of Trincomalee
South Asia
Pride Trumps Prejudice: India's Gay Sex Ban Is No More
;