US INF Withdrawal: Another Foreign Policy Dilemma for Japan

On October 20, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that his administration intends to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Although the decision should not come as a surprise – the Trump administration had made it clear to Russia earlier this year that if Moscow continued to augment its nuclear forces in violation of the INF Treaty, Washington would withdraw from it – the development still presents a foreign policy dilemma for Japan.

The INF Treaty, when it was signed between then-U.S. President Ronald Reagan and then-Soviet Union Communist Party General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987, symbolized the end of the Cold War between the two superpowers. Moreover, it was also a powerful endorsement of nuclear disarmament. Should the United States and Russia no longer be bound by mutually agreed restrictions on their nuclear and missile development, it will have a profoundly adverse impact on the nuclear disarmament effort.

This recent move by the Trump administration is consistent with the singling out of China and Russia as the United States’ “geostrategic competitors” in both the December 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) and the January 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS). Although there is some truth to the Trump administration’s assertion that it is withdrawing from the treaty due to Russian noncompliance, the administration’s decision is believed to be partly driven by concern over China. While the United States has been restricted in its ability to develop nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities by the arms control treaties it signed with the Soviet Union/Russia, China has been steadily developing its nuclear and missile force free of such restrictions.

The collapse of the INF Treaty has big implications for Japan as well. First, it runs directly against the movement toward nuclear disarmament. Even though Japan has been protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, Tokyo has consistently championed nuclear disarmament as one of its key foreign policy goals. Japan, after all, is the only country that has been the victim of nuclear weapons. In that context, Japan was strongly encouraged when then-U.S. President Barack Obama delivered a speech in Prague in April 2009, advocating for a nuclear weapon-free world as an ultimate goal of the international community. Japan also considered the Obama administration’s efforts to craft the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to constrain Iran’s nuclear activities as an important step to reduce the nuclear threat, though JPCOA was criticized by many as an imperfect agreement. However, the Trump administration scrapped JPCOA earlier this year, and now the U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty could put Japan in an awkward position: at odds with its only ally as Tokyo continues to strongly advocate nuclear disarmament.      

Second, the U.S withdrawal could further deteriorate the strategic environment in East Asia. For one, it will likely lead not only to the heightening of tensions between the United States and Russia, but also to further deterioration in U.S.-China relations, given the already rising tensions between Washington and Beijing over trade. With Washington’s nuclear and missile programs no longer constrained by the INF Treaty, it could trigger an arms race between the United States and China.

Furthermore, worsening U.S.-China and U.S.-Russia relations could facilitate even closer cooperation between Moscow and Beijing. The two countries have already enhanced their bilateral security relationship, as demonstrated by more frequent bilateral joint military exercises at locations that are sensitive in their relationships with the West, a trend that became particularly noticeable in the last several years. Closer China-Russia security relations will complicate Japan’s strategic calculations in Northeast Asia, changing the assumptions Tokyo uses to shape its approaches toward China and Russia.

Finally, coming after U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, and JCPOA, alongside the surprise U.S.-North Korea summit, the recent announcement on the INF Treaty is yet another example of a Trump administration foreign policy decision that potentially undermines Japan’s interests. Abe has invested an enormous amount of energy in cultivating a personal relationship with Trump since the latter’s election in November 2016. The INF withdrawal will spark further questions over whether Abe’s approach indeed benefitted Japan.

The Trump administration’s decision comes at a time when Tokyo is about to finalize two key documents for its defense policy – the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) and Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP).  Although Abe’s government now has a limited time to incorporate its assessment of the potential impact of the decision, his successor will certainly have to deal with the fall out of the decision, whatever that may be.