How Did a Domestic By-Election Upset Australia-Indonesian Relations?

In Australian politics, foreign policy has traditionally been above the conventional politicking of parties. Understanding that the country required a consistency of policy and action with its external relations, the parties of government have forged a solid consensus over most issues of international relations, and tended to keep these positions outside the day-to-day squabbling of partisan politics. This has worked well for the country both in terms of its relationships with other states, and in providing the public with a general sense of trust that whoever is in power, the government will act in a responsible manner internationally.

So the idea of using a significant shift in foreign policy in order to win a by-election (known as a special election in the United States) would be a major development in Australian political culture. But these are unusual times, and Australia’s governing Liberal Party is becoming an increasingly unusual party.

After the internal party coup that ousted Malcolm Turnbull from the prime ministership, Turnbull decided to vacate his seat in parliament immediately. This triggered a by-election for his seat in the electoral division of Wentworth, mostly comprised of Sydney’s eastern suburbs. As election day came closer, and polling indicated that the Liberal candidate would struggle to win in one of the safest Liberal seats in the country, the party had what they believed was a brilliant idea.

The Liberal Party remains in thrall to a number of highly partisan and combative commentators in the Australian press, and within modern conservative identity politics moving a country’s embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem has become a prominent meme (reinforced by U.S President Donald Trump’s decision to do just that). With 12 percent of the Wentworth electorate being of Jewish background, the party decided that announcing the government was considering relocating the Australian embassy in Israel was a masterstroke that would both placate the conservative commentariat and have a positive electoral effect.

However, not only did this treat all Jewish voters as a bloc – patronizingly assuming all would be focused solely on issues in Israel or indeed have the same views on those issues – the government did not calculate that there would be international consequences for its announcement. Indonesia, for example, became immediately concerned with the proposal.

When Scott Morrison replaced Turnbull as prime minister in August, his first major job was to travel to Jakarta to conclude a free trade agreement with Indonesia. Just as Australia’s relationship with Indonesia seemed to be taking a step forward, it (again) took two steps back. It was reported by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) that there was a text message exchange between Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi and her Australian counterpart, Marise Payne, in which Payne was informed that shifting the embassy “will slap Indonesia’s face” and “affect bilateral relations.” Australia’s ambassador to Jakarta was also summoned twice in three days by Marsudi’s office.

Subsequently, a spokesman for Indonesia’s Ministry of Defense, Brigadier General Totok Sugiharto, stated that military cooperation between Indonesia and Australia “will be a subject for review in the future [as to] whether or not this cooperation is beneficial to both parties.” Such diplomatic language expressed how seriously Jakarta was taking this issue, despite the fact that Morrison’s visit to Jakarta back in August had also involved the signing of a new Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the two countries that enhanced their defence cooperation.

Australia’s 2009 Defense White Paper noted that “Australia’s relationship with Indonesia remains our most important defense relationship in the immediate region.” It is the conception of Indonesia as either a security threat or security bulwark that drives this determination of importance. Few neighbors are more culturally distinct than Australia and Indonesia and this creates an inherent suspicion that forms the initial assumption, but the ability to find common security interests and to forge a strong, respectful and cooperative relationship to overcome this hurdle drives the second.

However, abruptly seeking to change a policy that is of keen interest to Indonesians (Jakarta has been a strong supporter of Palestinian rights since 1948) – especially a policy that would make Australia an outlier country – is the kind of bumbling error that cements the cultural distinctions between the two countries, and prevents greater trust and understanding from forming. Creating such a policy as a quick-fire solution to the self-inflicted wound of an avoidable internal party schism would also have generated a perplexed perception in Jakarta of Australia as an unreliable partner.

Yet this perception of the Liberal Party as increasingly unreliable was held not only in Jakarta, but also by the voters in the seat of Wentworth. The Liberal candidate was defeated by an independent that saw a dramatic swing of almost 20 percent against the party, and the government lost its one seat majority in the parliament. The result is a stark indication of a public sentiment that sees the Liberal Party as so internally confused, and their decision-making so messy, that their behavior is starting to infect its ability to be a responsible actor. In particular this is now having an affect on foreign policy decisions that were previously above domestic politicking.