Asia’s Many Space Races

Politicians, pundits and headlines have speculated for well over a decade regarding a space race between the United States and China. After a congressional hearing in 2006, Representative Tom DeLay said, “We have a space race going on right now and the American people are totally unaware of all this.” Representative Frank Wolf shared that view, specifically regarding a race to the moon, or back to the moon in the case of the United States. “If China beats us there, we will have lost the space program,” said Wolf. “They are basically, fundamentally in competition with us.”

China space analyst Dean Cheng posited in 2007 that the Chinese were “embarking on a systematic space program the world has not seen since the 1960s and for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States is facing real competition.” TIME ran a headline in 2008 stating, “The New Space Race: China vs US” while others speculated on China taking the competitive lead.

While each statement merits consideration, whatever competition is going on in or regarding space between the United States and China, there are other equally strategic competitive space races going on in Asia as well.

The 1967 Outer Space Treaty, signed by 107 countries including the United States, describes space as a global commons, one open to peaceful use by all countries. But space assets have considerable strategic value in both the civil and military spheres, from the detection of nuclear weapons blasts to the multibillion dollar businesses that rely on positioning and navigation data provided by systems like the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS), making protection of those assets a national interest potentially worth fighting for. Consequently, space is also increasingly described as a warfighting domain – alongside air, land, sea and cyber – especially by the very “space reliant” United States. Those juxtaposed considerations, the rising number of private, commercial space industries, and the largely dual-use nature of space technology, create an environment ripe for multiple competitions.

When the same dual-use technology is of value to both the civil and military communities, as most space technology is, and it is impossible to tell if military technology is for offensive or defensive purposes, ambiguity reigns. But to the military, capability plus intent equals threat, and with intent unclear, capabilities alone can define threats. Additionally, space prowess conveys considerable prestige that transfers into strategic influence. Consequently, government investments in space both increase regional and even global influence and open potential development opportunities through orbital information technology, and provide considerable military advantages (as first demonstrated during the 1990-91 Gulf War, dubbed the first “space war”) and the need to protect the assets providing those advantages. Therefore it is perhaps not surprising that besides the United States and China, India, Pakistan, Japan, and South Korea are all involved in space races of one kind or another. 

China

China issued its first space White Paper in November 2000, and updated it in 2003, 2006, 2011, and 2016. All iterations have stressed the link between the development of space, economic development, and national security. Each paper has reflected growing Chinese confidence in its own capabilities. The 2016 White Paper plainly states the breadth of China’s space “vision.”

To build China into a space power in all respects, with the capabilities to make innovations independently, to make scientific discovery and research at the cutting edge, to promote strong and sustained economic and social development, to effectively and reliably guarantee national security… to provide strong support for the realization of the Chinese Dream of the renewal of the Chinese nation, and make positive contributions to human civilization and progress.

While China is less concerned with launch schedules and short timetables than in Western countries – apparently having more than 4,000 years of continuous history makes a few decades seem unimportant – the tentativeness found in past White Papers about the country’s space ambitions has now disappeared.

The “race” aspects of China’s space program are twofold: A race for strategic influence through prestige that carries with it an assumption of technical prowess, much like the Apollo program did for the United States during the Cold War, and military positioning beyond the reach of perceived U.S. intents to dominate space and Asia. The prestige race, with significant technical spin-offs, is largely being run through exploration and space science programs.

China’s space program took a decidedly more ambitious shape in 2003 with the launch of Yang Liwei, China’s first astronaut, or “taikonaut,” into space. Yang’s Shenzhou 5 mission was part of a program initiated in 1992 named Project 921, consisting of a three-step program to demonstrate human spaceflight capability, then advanced space technology, and culminate with a large, permanently crewed space station. China has completed steps one and two, and is currently expected to begin launching parts of its intended space station sometime after 2020, with all three modules up by 2023, evidencing Chinese comfort with the long-term nature of the program. Like the tortoise in Aesop’s fable, China’s efforts inch ahead slowly but surely, aiming to beat the arrogant hare.

Since 2003, the Chinese space program has expanded in both breadth and depth. Beyond successful human spaceflight efforts, including docking the Tiangong-1 and -2 space laboratories with crewed Shenzhou and Tianzhou automated cargo spacecraft, China debuted its Long March 5 heavy lift launch vehicle in 2016 (capable of lifting 55,000 pounds to low earth orbit, it is necessary for lofting space station components to orbit and launching interplanetary missions), and conducted a robotic lunar exploration program called Chang’e. Once the Shenzhou and Chang’e program goals are independently achieved, with Shenzhou 12,13, 14, and 15 and Chang’e-7, 8, and 9 missions planned, it is likely a crewed mission to the moon will be announced. China also plans a launch of its first independent interplanetary mission to Mars in 2020, confidently combining an orbiter, lander, and rover in one mission.

The relatively fledgling Chinese space science program has had to be creative and look for strategic advantages. Whenever possible, China has “gone for the record books” for the prestige-cum-strategic-influence benefits to be reaped – the Chang’e-3 mission made China only the third country to accomplish a soft lunar landing – and to attract foreign scientists interested in cooperative efforts. Other space science missions have similarly been in areas likely to attract foreign interest.

The Quantum Experiments at Space Scale (QUESS) mission was launched in August 2016 to test a particular phenomenon called entanglement. China sent entangled quantum particles from a satellite to ground stations separated by 1,200 kilometers. In doing so, China broke previous world records and is considered to have achieved a significant stepping stone toward building more secure communication networks and potentially a space-based quantum internet.

China also launched the Dark Matter Particle Explorer (DAMPE) satellite in 2015, its first dedicated to astrophysics. It is considered the most cutting edge technology for detecting high-energy cosmic rays and attracting international attention. David Spergel, an astrophysicist at Princeton University, says China is now “making significant contributions to astrophysics and space science.”

China also began operation of its 500-meter Aperture Spherical Telescope (FAST) in 2016. It is by far the largest radio telescope in the world, nearly twice as large as its closest comparable facility, the U.S.-operated Arecibo telescope in Puerto Rico. Radio telescopes collect radio waves from distant sources in space, potentially even alien civilizations.

On the military side, Chinese actions in 2007 and 2013 evidence its rapidly advancing technical competence, raising anxieties regionally and in the United States. In 2007, China overtly conducted an Anti-Satellite (ASAT) test – destroying a nonoperational Chinese weather satellite with a ballistic missile – drawing international condemnation for the provocative act itself, and for the debris created. Since then, China has been more circumspect. Rather than overtly testing ASAT technology and creating debris, China – like the United States, India, and Russia – conducts politically acceptable missile defense technology tests. The United States has shown that modified missile defense systems are capable of acting as ASAT weapons. China is developing a broad range of ASAT capabilities, including direct ascent missiles, co-orbital systems, and directed energy weapons, as well as ground-based approaches like jamming and cyber techniques.

In 2013 China conducted what it called a space science mission, sending a spacecraft to a high altitude formerly considered a “sanctuary orbit” by the United States because it was believed to be unreachable by others and so the home of its large, valuable, “exquisite” satellites. Chinese ability to potentially reach that orbit demonstrated that even presuming to “claim” any portion of space for exclusive use and protected positioning was technically off the table. This demonstration was important to the United States because it has the most assets in space and is the most dependent on them for military advantage. The creation of a U.S. Space Force, with President Donald Trump proclaiming that its purpose is U.S. domination in space, may well trigger an escalation of Chinese military space efforts as domination – U.S. control of the heavens – is exactly what the Chinese are assiduously working to avoid.

India

The Indian space program proudly began as one purely focused on peaceful purposes, specifically using space technology for development and nation building. It has been an application-focused program, aimed to use technology to solve the bevy of socioeconomic issues facing the country. One of its first space programs, for example, was the Satellite Instructional Television Experiment (SITE) with the United States. It was intended to transmit “how to” programing on agricultural practices to India’s most rural areas.

Like China, though, India quickly realized the advantages that space technology could yield for its military – India has been on a semi-war footing with border countries Pakistan and China since its independence in 1947 – and the importance of prestige to regional strategic influence.

Consequently, like China the “race” aspects of the Indian space program are twofold: A race for strategic influence, especially regionally, through prestige, and military positioning to provide advantage if regional cold wars go hot.

The crown jewel of Indian prestige-garnering space efforts is the 2014 Mars Orbiter Mission (MOMS), named Mangalyaan. With the successful completion of that mission, India became the first Asian country to reach Mars, the first country to orbit Mars on its first attempt, and only the fourth country to orbit Mars, along with such space superstars as the United States, the Soviet Union, and Europe. Not only did India “beat” China – China had attempted a Mars mission in 2011 with its Yinghuo-1 mission and failed – but the technical success of the mission translated into credibility for Antrix, the commercial arm of India’s Space Research Organization (ISRO) that had built the spacecraft. That credibility will be accompanied by potentially substantial economic returns.

Additionally, India achieved its success reaching Mars in record-breaking time and on a comparative shoestring budget. Feasibility studies for Mangalyaan began in 2010. Spacecraft development commenced in 2012 and the satellite was launched 15 months later, in November 2013. It reached Mars in nine months. The mission cost has been given by ISRO as $76 million. It should be noted that while Indian accomplishments with the MOMS mission were significant, the mission couldn’t have been accomplished in the timeframe or manner it was without the help of the United States, which Washington was happy to provide.

Basically, India needed help finding its way to Mars, which the United States provided with its deep space navigation and tracking support operations. India got a win, the United States got an indirect win by handing China a loss, and the long duration Asian space races continued.

India also claimed a spot in the record books in 2017, when ISRO’s Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle broke the previously held Russian record for number of satellites launched in one launch – and by a lot. Russia had held the record with 37 satellites launched at one time. India shattered that record, launching 104 satellites – 103 of them nanosatellites.

One of the latest indications of the continued race involves human spaceflight. In his August 2018 Independence Day address, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced India’s intent to put its first astronaut into space by 2022. Not coincidentally, Pakistan then announced in October that, with China’s help, it would send its first astronaut to orbit… in 2022. While that puts considerable pressure on India to follow through, after the shock of Pakistan’s announcement wore off, New Delhi reminded everyone that India has already sent an astronaut into orbit, as part of a 1984 Soviet mission.

In terms of military space capabilities India, like other countries, has taken full advantage of the dual use nature of space technology, fully embracing ambiguity when it benefits them, and scorning it when it does not. China’s 2007 ASAT test shook India. The test represented considerable technical competency on China’s part, and it also reminded India of having been left out of the “haves” category in the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), with the benefits and standing that status yielded – a status India has been determined not to miss out on again. Consequently, having learned well from the development paths taken by the United States, Russia, and China, India has developed a robust missile defense program that allows it to “hedge” on development of an ASAT. Though India’s space efforts are not as comprehensive as China’s, India has proven itself technically capable and unwilling to be left behind.

Japan and South Korea: The “Also Rans”

Both Japan and South Korea have advanced technical space capabilities. Both have also been committed to space for peaceful purposes, once narrowly defined as “nonmilitary” by Japan. But both have also increasingly redirected their efforts toward countering perceived regional threats, primarily from China and North Korea.

Japan has had an active civilian space program since the mid-1950s, originating through scientists at the University of Tokyo. Initially focused on space science and launcher development through a license from the United States, Japan has over the years developed a full range of satellite capabilities and a series of indigenous launchers. Through the 1990s, it was Japan that led Asia in space technology, though Japan’s cloying bureaucracies, launcher issues, and tight budgets have kept Japan from venturing into human spaceflight. In that respect, Japan that has been embarrassed by China’s very publicized space successes.

As an early space technology leader, Japan has been an active entrant in the NewSpace commercial space race. Billionaire Takafumi Horie owns Interstellar Technologies, founded in 2003. But though the company has tried twice, most recently in July 2018, it has yet to have a successful flight. Besides technical setbacks, the flamboyant owner’s lifestyle has drawn the ire and attention of government regulators, resulting in charges of manipulating stock prices and 21 months in prison. Yet after the last launch failure, Horie said he hopes to continue.

Other Japanese startup space companies are venturing into visionary areas of space travel. Another company, ispace, has raised over $90 million toward development of a modular lunar lander. PD Aerospace is working on a reusable rocket to take tourists on suborbital flights by 2023. With a trillion-dollar space industry forecasted, Japan intends to be an active competitor for the international market.

Japan and the Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) have reason to celebrate a number of other successes and innovations as well. In June 2018 two miniature, hopping robots successfully landed on the asteroid Ryugu, dispatched from JAXA’s Hayabusa2 spacecraft, and soon began sending back photos and data. After a three and a half year journey to catch Ryugu, the Japanese spacecraft became the first to place robot rovers on the surface of an asteroid.

Then in September 2018, JAXA sent a HTV-7 robotic supply ship to dock with the International Space Station (ISS). This is not the first HTV mission, but it is noteworthy because HTV is one of only four robotic cargo ships able to service the ISS, along with the Russian Progress, SpaceX Dragon, and Northrop Grumman’s Cygnus.

Through public and private ventures, Japan has effectively taken the lead in the tackling the problem of space debris mitigation, perhaps the number one real, nonspeculative concern of all space-faring nations. Mitigation technologies, or active debris removal (ADR), are being pursued by a private start up, Astroscale, through JAXA, and by RIKEN, a Japanese research institute. Astroscale is working on a system that would reach out and “catch” space debris; JAXA is pursuing a tether technology to pull debris to the atmosphere; and RIKEN is focused on using laser technology to drag debris into the atmosphere to burn up. Taking the lead on this critical issue presents Japan with the opportunity to lead international efforts.

On the military side, Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, written in accordance with the terms of ending World War II, puts strict prohibitions on Japan regarding the formation and use of military means to solve international disputes, stating: “... land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.” Consequently, “peaceful uses” of space was originally interpreted as nonmilitary. The realities of that limitation, however – and North Korea’s 1998 Taepodong launch over Japan – resulted in reconsideration of that narrow interpretation, initially facilitated by the dual-use ambiguity of space technology.  Beginning with programs like Japan’s Information Gathering Satellite system, the Japanese Self Defense Force (JSDF) began utilizing dual-use remote-sensing systems to serve its purposes, as well as those of the civil sector. Gradually, Japan moved to reinterpret Article 9 from “nonmilitary” to “nonaggressive.”

With the increasingly active and belligerent nature of North Korean launches and Chinese activities in the South China Sea, Japan has expanded its military space efforts.  Perhaps surprisingly, in 2014 Japan announced the creation of a “space force” by 2019, to be run by the Ministry of Science and JAXA. Japan also launched the first of three X-band military communication satellites in 2017. Perhaps not so surprising, Japan has an active missile defense system. Japan is becoming increasingly “normalized” in terms of fully integrating space systems into its overall expanding military activities.

While Japan has dropped behind China and maybe even India in both ambitions and achievements, it’s South Korea that is bringing up the rear of the serious competitors. As North Korea’s geographic counterpart, it clearly recognizes the military need for a development of a missile counterstrike capability, but that requires extensive financial resources and technological knowhow. South Korea also recognizes the economic potential of an expansive international aerospace market, and wants to be part of it. But, as already pointed out, development of space technology is high risk and economically draining.

South Korea got a late start in the space race. It didn’t establish a space agency until 1989 – the Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI) – and didn’t successfully launch its first rocket until 2013. With that first launch though, political support grew and plans for a lunar landing mission and further indigenous rocket development were accelerated. Rhetoric from South Korea had it poised to become a major space player. But for expanded and accelerated plans to be successful they must be accompanied by increased funding, and that has not been forthcoming.

Part of the problem has been that while U.S. aerospace industries have a vested interest in a vigorous space program – Boeing is building the Starliner to transport astronauts to the ISS and SpaceX operates cargo missions to the ISS – that isn’t the case in South Korea. Like Japan, South Korea has advanced technical industries, but they are not an integral part of South Korea’s space program. KARI works primarily with Korean Air, focused on the airplane industry. Private-public cooperation that can push for continuance, expansion, and acceleration of programs is sorely lacking.

Japan and South Korea are not the only Asian countries that consider themselves “space-faring nations.” Australia finally joined the club of 72 nations having a space agency in 2018, with New Zealand and Indonesia already members. Vinasat-1, built by Lockheed Martin and launched in 2008 by Arianespace, was Vietnam’s first national satellite, followed by Vinasat-2 in 2012. Communications satellites intended to improve telecommunications throughout the country, given the availability of transponders on other satellites, the Vinasat program has also been viewed as stoked by a keeping-up-with-the-Joneses desire for the prestige space programs garner. Malaysia boasts Sheikh Muszaphar Shukor as its first astronaut, having visited the ISS in 2007. His visit was part of an initiative intended to boost science and technology development in Malaysia. Russia agreed to transport one Malaysian to the ISS as part of a multibillion dollar purchase of 18 Russian fighter jets by Malaysia, enabling Shukor’s flight.

Everybody wants to be involved in one way or the other, even at a very high cost.

Winner Take All?

While it is highly likely that the next voice transmission coming from the lunar surface will be in Mandarin, that will not mean that China has won the space race. China is repeating what the United States already handily accomplished in 1969. What China has today that the United States does not is political will to stick with a high-cost, high-risk program, because the Chinese are willing to stretch the cost and technical challenges over decades while Americans lose interest in anything that can’t be binge-watched.

The races that are taking place today are much more complex than the space race of the 1960s. These races involve not just doing things and going places, but innovation, efficiencies, and vision. There, the United States still holds a decided edge, though if private sector interest in aerospace in Asia takes hold, that edge could be seriously challenged.

Meanwhile within Asia, establishing places in record books still means a lot, and those races will continue. Prestige that can translate into strategic influence remains a goal worth spending money on, though not without limitations. Because of the dual-use nature of space technology, part of staying in the race is about not letting the gap between the ostensible regional winner – China – and everyone else become such that it gives China an insurmountable edge, militarily or economically.

Another big space race may also be looming, and not in a good – pushing innovation – way. If the United States moves toward the overt weaponization of space, that could well trigger an arms race. There have been mixed messages from the Trump administration in that regard. So far, all countries have carefully avoided the overt crossing of that Rubicon. But if one country goes that direction, others will follow. An arms race in space would be costly and dangerous. It is a race best avoided.