What Does China Want in the Pacific Islands?

Chinese President Xi Jinping spent four days in Papua New Guinea (PNG) in mid-November, a striking show of Beijing’s interest in the Pacific Island country. Even given that PNG was hosting 2018’s edition of the annual APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting, Xi’s lengthy stay stood out. For comparison, U.S. President Donald Trump did not attend the APEC summit, and even his designated representative, Vice President Mike Pence, didn’t stay in PNG – instead, he spent the night in Cairns, Australia and travelled to Port Moresby from there.

So why did China pay PNG such lavish attention?

For one thing, Beijing has a keen sense of how to get the most bang for its diplomatic buck when it comes to Xi’s travels. By traveling to PNG, Xi not only rewarded that country with its first-ever state visit from a Chinese president, but simultaneously wooed seven other Pacific Island leaders, who were in PNG as guests for the APEC meeting. Xi held a similar group gathering during his last trip to the Pacific Islands, a 2014 stopover in Fiji. Then, as in November 2018, Xi met with leaders from the eight Pacific Island countries that recognize China: the Cook Islands, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, the Federated States of Micronesia, Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu.

In other words, the sheer number of Pacific Island leaders Xi could hobnob with on this one trip made PNG a stop well worth making. The Pacific Island states may be small players in international geopolitics, but they do have numbers. And in the arena of public opinion, China loves to play the numbers game, often merely citing the count of supporters on a given issue without providing a list of who those supporters are. Xi, in a letter published in Papua New Guinea’s Post Courier, nodded to this aspect of the relationship, writing: “Pacific island countries have, for decades, lent valuable support to China on issues involving China’s core interests and major concerns.”

In perhaps the most notable example, Vanuatu was one of the few countries (along with Pakistan and Russia) to explicitly back China in denouncing the 2016 international arbitration ruling on Beijing’s South China Sea conduct and claims.

Another area where China keeps an obsessive tally of supporters is Xi’s signature foreign policy plan, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). By the time Xi gathered with the Pacific Island leaders in Port Moresby, China had successfully convinced all eight states to sign memorandums of understanding agreeing to cooperate on the BRI – after offering Tonga the added incentive of delaying debt repayments. That was a major goal achieved for Xi; selling the BRI to the Pacific Islands helps bolster the initiative’s support as criticisms and concerns start to mount. And Xi was selling it hard even before his arrival. As he put it in his letter in the Post Courier, “I am convinced that the BRI will open up new pathways for Pacific island countries to enhance business ties and connectivity with China, among themselves and with the rest of the world, and for the island countries to take a greater part in economic globalization.”

However, those convinced that the BRI doubles as a security initiative have the same concerns about China’s investments in the Pacific Islands. Earlier this summer, Australian media reported that China was pursuing a military base in Vanuatu – rumors swiftly denied by both Beijing and Port Vila. Soon after, Australian commentators also sounded the alarm over reported Chinese interest in developing ports on Papua New Guinea. That concern may have motivated the decision by Canberra and Washington to team up to build a naval base on PNG’s Manus Island. A Chinese base in the Pacific Islands – which remains very much a hypothetical – would help Beijing control access to the western Pacific, including the South China Sea, in the event of a contingency.

Finally, China’s interest in the region remains very much driven by the Taiwan factor. China is eager to entice Pacific Islands away from recognizing Taiwan, continuing its “diplomatic war” that has pried away five Taiwanese partners since 2016. Of Taiwan’s 17 remaining diplomatic allies, six are Pacific Island nations (Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, the Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu). The Pacific Islands thus represent one of largest blocs of support for Taiwan’s Republic of China government – and the one China has had least luck undermining. Of the six Taiwanese diplomatic allies most recently “stolen” by Beijing, three were in Africa (Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe, and Burkina Faso) and three were in Latin America and the Caribbean (Panama, the Dominican Republic, and El Salvador). So far the Pacific Island states have remained steadfast in their support of Taipei. High-profile shows of camaraderie between China and its Pacific Island allies might help in Beijing’s ongoing quest to bring Taiwan’s count of allies down to zero.

With all these interests converging – diplomatic support, security interests, and the unique cross-strait factor – it’s no wonder that China moved to upgrade its ties to the Pacific Islands to a “comprehensive strategic partnership” during the collective meeting with Xi. In doing so, Xi recommended that China and the Pacific Islands “deepen political mutual trust” and “take care of and support one another” on core interests. He also called for China and the Pacific Islands to “stick to the mutually beneficial cooperation for common prosperity” – namely, by pursuing the Belt and Road together.

The ultimate outcome of China’s diplomacy will hinge on whether or not the Pacific Island states feel they can believe Xi’s repeated promises to treat them like equals and partners, rather than client states. Accusations of Chinese “bullying,” which marred both the APEC summit and the September Pacific Islands Forum in Nauru, will need to be dealt with if Beijing truly wants to forge lasting partnerships. China may see the Pacific as a useful region for expanding its interests, but it must not make the mistake of overlooking the agency of its would-be partners.