The Diplomat
Overview
The Afghanistan Conundrum: Russia’s Peace Plays and India’s Room for Maneuver
Flickr, Prachatai
South Asia

The Afghanistan Conundrum: Russia’s Peace Plays and India’s Room for Maneuver

Realities are changing in Afghanistan, and New Delhi must be nimble.

By Harsh V. Pant

Two months after its initial attempt at peacemaking was rebuffed by various parties, Russia was at it again – trying to bring parties to the conflict in Afghanistan around a table to kick-start a peace process that has been directionless for years. This was an attempt by Russia to showcase its regional power and to deftly take centerstage away from the United States in a country where, almost 30 years ago, Moscow had to end its own occupation in sheer humiliation.

The early November conference in Moscow was attended by delegations from 12 countries as well as the Afghan Taliban. For Russia, it was an attempt to “make a conducive environment to promote a direct dialogue between the government, the Taliban, and wider representatives of other social and political circles of the country.” Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov underlined that the participation of both Afghan leaders and the Taliban was an “important contribution” aimed at creating “favorable conditions for the start of direct talks.” He was also categorical about Russian interests when he highlighted the threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as ISIS) in Afghanistan, saying that it has relied on foreign sponsors in a bid to “turn Afghanistan into a springboard for its expansion in Central Asia.”

A previous attempt by Moscow to host Afghan peace talks had failed in September after the Afghan government objected, arguing that any such move should be Afghan-led. Washington had also declined to attend and even India had made its objections known to Russia. This time, however, Kabul’s stand was less vociferous and the United States embassy in Moscow sent a representative to observe the discussions. India also decided to participate at an unofficial level. While the Afghan government was not represented at the diplomatic level, members of the government-appointed High Peace Council (HPC) participated in the conference.

There has been a flurry of activity on the Afghan front in recent weeks, with the newly appointed U.S. special envoy for peace in Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, holding talks with the Taliban in Qatar in mid-October. He has been engaged with a range of key players including Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar ever since, trying to assess the feasibility of some kind of a political resolution to the 17-year long war in Afghanistan. Reports of nascent Russia-U.S. coordination in this regard have also been floating around.

Though Moscow can claim that holding the conference itself is an achievement, nothing substantive came out of the conference, as was widely expected. Fundamental differences continue to mar the process. Though there were some suggestions that Afghan President Ashraf Ghani was sending a delegation of the High Peace Council to the meeting, an Afghan foreign office statement underscored that the government has “not sent any representative to the Moscow meeting.” The High Peace Council, according to the Afghan foreign office, was participating “in its own capacity as a National but non-government institution.”

The Taliban, for its part, made it clear that its representatives would not negotiate with the Afghan delegation. It used the invite to the conference to showcase its widening global acceptance. As per the statement that was issued by the Taliban: “With participation in the meeting, the international status of the Islamic Emirate will be strengthened even further.” They also repeated their central demand of speaking directly to the U.S. government in line with their lack of recognition of the government in Kabul as legitimate. The Taliban’s envoy, Mohammad Abbas Stanekzai, reinforced the central challenge in such talks when he suggested that “considering our main demand is the withdrawal of foreign troops, we will discuss peaceful settlement with the Americans.”

Given these fundamental divergences and the rapidly evolving ground realities in Afghanistan, it is imperative for India to be diplomatically nimble in its approach. New Delhi’s standard policy so far has been that any peace talks should be Afghan-led, Afghan-owned, Afghan-controlled, and with participation of the government of Afghanistan. But this policy will have to be recalibrated in accordance with the changing regional and global power dynamic. It is part of this reassessment that saw India participating in the multilateral conference in Moscow despite its aversion to any engagement with the Taliban. This was the first time India was seated at the same table with the Taliban in a multilateral forum since 1999, although participation from New Delhi was at the “nonofficial” level, comprising two retired diplomats.

In opening remarks at the conference, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said, “No one should think in terms of geopolitical games that may result in another transformation of Afghanistan into a field for competition between external players with drastic consequences both for the Afghans and their neighbors.” This is easier said than done as it is precisely this geopolitical mindset that continues to make it difficult for regional powers to give space to Afghanistan to emerge as a stable and secure nation-state.

Want to read more?
Subscribe for full access.

Subscribe
Already a subscriber?

The Authors

Harsh V. Pant writes for The Diplomat’s South Asia section.

South Asia
Pakistan’s Dark History of Student Extremists
South Asia
Managed Instability: Iran, the Taliban, and Afghanistan
;