Amid US-China Conflict, What Should Taiwan Do?

On December 15, Taiwan’s Fair Winds Foundation held an event on the subject of “The Beginning of a New Cold War? The Inevitable Confrontation between China and the U.S.” in Taipei.

In an attempt to answer the fundamental question – “How can Taiwan protect itself with wisdom amid U.S.-China conflict?” as the Fair Winds Foundation said in its introduction – Douglas H. Paal, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, was invited to deliver a keynote speech.

Based on his observation of 40 years of U.S.-China relations, Paal noted that “Taiwan often finds itself paying the price for confrontations between the two great powers.” He thus suggested that Taiwan “keep a low profile” while striving to secure a bilateral trade deal with the United States, according to Taiwan’s press.

Taiwan should lie low, buy more time, focus on its economy, and carry out all necessary reforms, Paal said.

Paal urged Taiwan not to seek high-profile political breakthroughs under current circumstances. Rather than cooperating with Washington against Beijing, Taiwan’s leaders should have the capacity and willingness to decline some of Washington’s demands, Paal added.

Paal’s comments came across as concern about the current diplomacy of Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen and her ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).

Since Tsai came into office in May 2016, cross-strait relations have been going downhill dramatically. Blaming Tsai for her refusal to overtly embrace the “1992 consensus” – under which both Beijing and Taipei agree that there is only one China (while maintaining different interpretations over which is the rightful government of that China) – Beijing has consistently increased pressure on Tsai’s administration.

To be fair, faced with Beijing’s squeeze,Tsai did try to “lie low,” as Paal suggested. In October 2017, days after the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) revealed its new lineup of top leaders at the 19th Party Congress, Tsai extended an olive branch to Beijing, calling for a breakthrough in cross-strait relations.

Although still refusing to publicly acknowledge the “1992 consensus,” Tsai, in a very diplomatic way, declared that “the DPP government respects not only the historical facts, but all the agreements that have been signed by the two sides and that have completed the legislative process.”

This should be seen as the “lowest” profile the DPP could adopt.

But unsurprisingly, Beijing was still not satisfied. Beijing responded that the “one China principle” is the political basis for cross-strait relations and its squeeze continued.

As her low-profile strategy failed, in August, Tsai made an unusually high-profile stopover in the United States ahead of a nine-day state visit to Taiwan’s diplomatic allies Paraguay and Belize. During her stopover, she urged the international community – particularly the United States – to protect Taiwan and the island’s freedom and future.

However, her high-profile stopover led Beijing to take even fiercer action. Days after Tsai wrapped up her U.S. stopover, Taipei lost another ally – the Republic of El Salvador, a small Central American nation – to Beijing. Taipei is left with only 17 diplomatic allies.

It seems that Taiwan under Tsai’s administration has reached a dilemma: no matter what policy Tsai adopts, Beijing will respond with an iron fist.

To make matters worse, the United States under Trump’s administration is turning increasingly bellicose against Beijing – and in the meantime increasingly sympathetic toward Taipei. As is often the case, Beijing is retaliating for Washington’s decisions by taking an even more aggressive stance against Taipei.

The masterpieces of Lu Xun, the father of Chinese modern literature, help us understand this intertwined triangular relationship. In the 1920s, Lu explained the Chinese national character with his novels and essays. As Lu Xun pointed out, one typical national characteristic of China is “flattering those who are more powerful, and at the same time, bullying those who are weaker.” 

Ah Q, a character created by Lu Xun, epitomizes this tendency. The character bullies a weak nun after he himself was bullied by stronger men. Ah Q was too afraid to stand up to his own bullies, but by harassing a nun he convinced himself he had achieved a “spiritual victory” and got rid of the shame of his own mistreatment.

Unfortunately, nearly a hundred years later, such a tendency can still be detected in both Chinese people and the state. The relationship between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei can be seen as the modern version of the strong man, Ah Q, and the weak nun.

Against that backdrop, the rise of Han Kuo-yu, aged 61, may provide an alternative solution for Taiwan.

In the 2018 midterm elections, Han, the Kuomintang (KMT) candidate for mayor of Kaohsiung city, won an overwhelming victory in the traditional heart of DPP territory.

No one – not even the KMT – had expected his victory in the very beginning. Originally treated like an outcast, Han received neither money nor resources, not even a blessing, from his own party.

Yet Han gained surprising popularity in Kaohsiung in just six months thanks to his unusually outspoken and maverick personality. In sharp contrast with other Taiwanese politicians, who are always careful with their language, Han speaks with little or no artifice, and sometimes he even mixes some rough words in his rhetoric.

Han has described himself as a bald guy who fears nothing. He also dismissed Kaohsiung, the city he was hoping to run, as “both old and poor.” One of his most catchy campaign slogans was a pledge that “Kaohsiung will earn good money (fa da cai).”

Han’s rival attacked him by digging out his “hidden past.” Han was revealed to have slapped former disgraced President Chen Shui-bian when they were both legislators. A video showed that he had challenged another outspoken legislator during a Legislative Council question session when Han himself worked as general manager of Taipei Agricultural Products Marketing Corporation.

But none of these messy incidents ruined his reputation. Instead, Han’s “fearless style” won him more loyal followers.

During the final TV debate between Han and his DPP rival Chen Chi-mai, Han announced to the public that he embraces the “1992 consensus,” without being asked about it.

“Yes, I embrace the ‘1992 consensus.’ That’s why I dare say I can sell Kaohsiung’s goods abroad and make Kaohsiung earn good money. I dare say I welcome each and every person to Kaohsiung. Do you dare to say that?” Han challenged Chen in front of the cameras. Chen shied away from the question.

In a cunning way, Han turned his disadvantage in some Kaohsiung people’s eyes – embracing the “1992 consensus” – into an advantage. In his rhetoric, embracing the “1992 consensus” is no longer an ideology issue but an expedient tool that could allow Taiwan continue its business with mainland China.

The final result of Han’s stunning victory showed that most voters in Kaohsiung accepted his pragmatic way of handling the hot potato – the sensitive “1992 consensus.” 

Many observers described Han as a political lao you tiao. Lao you tiao, literally referring to a repeatedly deep-fried twisted dough stick, is used as a metaphor to describe a person who is sophisticated, cunning, and crafty, just like a wily old fox.

The sudden rise of Han Kuo-yu in the 2018 midterm elections showed that most Taiwanese people now believe that a political “lao you tiao” is better than a political “weak nun” given Taiwan’s uncertain future amid the U.S.-China conflict.

The latest poll done by a website ETtoday found that 74.2 percent of the participants support Han to run for the presidency in 2020.

In response, Han said: “When I was a child, I could make no more than 60 points on my exams. 74 points are way too high for me!” It was another typical example of his lao you tiao style.