Unpacking Japan’s New National Defense Program Guidelines

The Japanese government released its National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) and Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP) on December 18, 2018. These two documents – which effectively overwrite the 2013 NDPG and MTDP, respectively – will guide Japan’s defense planning for the next few years.

Every NDPG has a coined phrase to describe the defense posture that it considers most appropriate for Japan. The phrase for the 2013 NDPT, for example, was a “Joint Mobile Defense Force.” The 2018 NDPG argues that it strives to further deepen this concept to develop it into a “Multi-Dimension, Joint Defense Force” as a “truly effective defense force.”  

Since its release, the media reports have focused almost exclusively on Tokyo’s decision to acquire a long-range missile capability and to take a concrete step forward to essentially acquire an aircraft carrier through modification of the current Izumo-class destroyers, which will enable it to be equipped with short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL)-capable fighter aircraft. These acquisition decisions certainly deserve great attention, as they signal Japan’s unwavering determination to maintain credible deterrence. As significant as they are, thought, they are only parts of a larger intent that the 2018 NDPG as a whole represents.

In fact, a few key words that emerge from the 2018 NDPG – sustainability and resiliency, jointness, comprehensive, and optimization – speak to other noteworthy aspects of this important defense planning document.

First is its emphasis on space, cyber, and electromagnetic waves as new areas that require investment. Although the 2013 NDPG acknowledged the potential significance of cyber and space as emerging battle domains that could have significant impact on the operation of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), investment in these areas was relatively low-priority. The 2018 NDPG identified JSDF capabilities in these area as critical enablers to strengthen the JSDF capacity to conduct cross-domain operations. It even acknowledges that the Japan Ministry of Defense (JMOD) needs to facilitate interagency cooperation with non-defense agencies such as the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) and leverage technologies that already exist in the private sector. The designation of the forces to engage in cyberdefense as a “joint” asset is particularly noteworthy in this regard, and consistent with the continued emphasis on improving jointness among the three JSDF services.

Second is an explicit acknowledgment that Japan’s defense posture – particularly its land force – will have to transform from one that was organized to counter a large-scale invasion attempt by land into one that is more mobile and flexible. During the Cold War, Japan’s defense posture focused on countering a large-scale, land-based invasion attempt by the Soviet Union. Many observers since the end of the Cold War have pointed out that this posture needs to be drastically changed as Japan’s defense priorities shift first to countering the threat of ballistic missiles followed by the additional need to respond to increasing assertive Chinese behavior in the East China Sea. Yet such a change did not materialize until the release of the 2013 NDPG, when Japan announced its intention to designate a response to “grayzone” situations and remote island defense as the primary focus of its defense effort. The 2018 NDPG has taken the process that the 2013 NDPG began even further, to propose that the preservation of Cold-War era capabilities would be kept to a minimum.

Third, the 2018 NDPG identifies maritime transportation as a “joint” function.This decision, which has not attracted much attention, is potentially significant. It can not only serve as leverage to facilitate deeper operational cooperation between the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) as the two services work to improve JSDF’s amphibious operation capability, but also serve as a push toward joint transportation capability that includes the air mobility assets that belong to the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF). Transport capability is one area where all three services can think through their operational requirements for mobility assets, pull their own limited resources together, and potentially jointly decide which equipment to acquire, allowing the services to spend their service-specific acquisition budgets more efficiently.

Given these features in addition to the investment decisions to enhance deterrence capability that have been prominently discussed by many, the 2018 NDPG represents Japan’s genuine effort to transform the JSDF to better adapt to a security environment that, in the eyes of Japan, has been rapidly deteriorating for the last several years.

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, Japan has been uneasy about prolonged U.S. engagement in the Middle East. Despite official rhetoric that the Asia-Pacific (now Indo-Pacific) is the most strategically important region for the United States, Japan has seen first-hand how U.S. entanglement in the Middle East has created a power vacuum in the Asia-Pacific region, resulting in developments that have increasingly made Japan feel less safe. Despite the focused effort by recently dismissed Secretary of Defense James Mattis to sustain the strength of U.S. alliances, the current U.S. administration’s transactional approach to the alliance has further aggravated this anxiety among Japan’s defense policymakers. In short, the 2018 NDPG represents the first defense planning effort by Japan to maximize its own effort for national defense in the context of worsening serious security challenges on one hand and increasing uncertainty about the U.S. alliance commitment on the other.

However, in order to truly realize the vision that the 2018 NDPG laid out, there are challenges Japan needs to overcome, none of which are new. First and foremost, despite the ambitious goal the 2018 NDPG has set for Japan, the defense spending increase will be unlikely to catch up with the pace at which resources will be needed. Even though the FY2019 defense budget is projected to see a 1.3 percent increase from the current year, Japan must allow itself to consistently have a bigger increase in its defense spending for the next several years. Given the decision to purchase pricy F-35 aircraft along with other expensive acquisition decisions such as Aegis Ashore, incremental budget increases as usual will only deplete further resources from what is necessary to retain well-educated and well-trained personnel and maintain the operational readiness of JSDF equipment, resulting in a further hollowing out of the force.

In addition, with a declining, aging population, maintaining a robust force is an increasingly difficult challenge for the JSDF. The 2018 NDPG does recognize this challenge and suggests that the JSDF will attempt to tackle this problem with a combination of efforts, including extending the mandatory retirement age for some of the Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs), opening up more MOSs to female JSDF personnel, leveraging the reserves, and incorporating innovative technologies. While the list of their planned efforts is commendable, personnel is an “intangible” aspect of defense and therefore tends to get a lower priority and often ends up being under-resourced. There needs to be a conscious effort to avoid such an outcome.

Finally, for the vision laid out in the 2018 NDPG to be fully materialized, it requires broad support both inside and outside the Japanese government. In the government, it requires not only the JMOD/JSDF but also officials in the other agencies to support the new initiatives, especially the increase in defense budget that would be required. In the Diet, the support for the NDPG needs to extend way beyond Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, his cabinet members, his advisers, and the ruling coalition. A debate on how to better execute the NDPG, such as the efficiency of certain acquisition programs, in the Diet is healthy and should be encouraged. But the Diet, and opposition parties in particular, will fail in their expected job if their challenge to the government is always about the legality of government decisions about Japan’s defense posture. Already, critics are arguing the decision to convert Izumo-class destroyers to allow STOVL-capable fighter aircraft may be unconstitutional because it violates the principle that Japan will pursue an “exclusively defense-oriented” defense posture. If the government is constantly forced to defend the legality and/or constitutionality of their policies, it will be utterly unproductive.

In many ways, the 2018 NDPG is an upgraded version of the 2013 NDPG, which took full account of the changes in the security environment around Japan in the last five years. It gives the best effort to enable the JSDF to better respond to the rapidly changing security environment and security challenges that emerge from such changes. But these changes can go only so far without broad political support. Whether Abe and his cabinet can make the conscious effort to rally such support will be a critical factor as Japan embarks on its defense planning over the next several years.