A Corridor to Peace?

Every time a new leader is elected or seizes power in Pakistan, Indians and Pakistanis wonder if perhaps this time around relations between their two countries will finally improve. General Pervez Musharraf, Asif Ali Zardari, Nawaz Sharif, and now, Pakistan’s new prime minister, Imran Khan of the Pakistan Tehreek-e Insaf (PTI), have all said that they wanted to improve relations with regional power and neighbor India; indeed, Pakistan’s security and economic growth depend on good relations with its eastern neighbor. Yet, often the same cycle, of improved relations followed by escalating tensions and a restoration of a tense status quo, plays out.

Imran Khan’s government, backed by the powerful Pakistani military establishment, ensure a better outcome with India this time around?

While domestic constraints in India inhibit its ability to compromise with Pakistan on the final status of the disputed region of Jammu and Kashmir, for the most part, India has pursued peace with Pakistan, and acted in good faith with its western neighbor. Because of India’s larger size and focus on economic growth and development, its national trajectory is upwards in terms of social and economic development, despite all its problems, such as rampant poverty. It is a vibrant, 21st century society, about to surpass the United Kingdom to become the world’s fifth largest economy. Its soft power influence is wide too, with billions of people watching Bollywood films, for instance, including in Pakistan.

On the other hand, Pakistan, driven by an obsession with security issues related to India, has spent much of its effort and money on fighting terrorism and preventing the country from falling apart, instead of development. The government is only belatedly pursing infrastructure projects, but many of these now run the risk of being expensive and unviable without Chinese investment, which could lead to a separate set of problems, such as a debt trap. With over 200 million people, ample natural resources, and borders with both India and China, Pakistan could today be one of the world’s most dynamic economies. Instead, its human development statistics are abysmal. Much of the population remains stuck in the agricultural sector, disease is widespread, and literacy has dropped. Pakistan is in the process of negotiating its 13th bailout from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) since the 1980s. Military funding and debt servicing together cover about 60 percent of Pakistan’s annual budget.

Meanwhile, Pakistan continues to host militant, jihadist groups involved in attacks on India and Indian soldiers, particularly in India-administered Kashmir, and it often seems as though its strategy is to bleed India by a thousand cuts forever, because its nuclear shield protects it from harsh retaliation. By continuing to play up the Indian threat, Pakistan’s powerful military remains relevant and keeps the issue of Kashmir alive, which plays well to the general population, especially Islamists, whose energies may otherwise be turned against the state itself. While not engaging in major military provocations, the military still assists terrorist groups in entering Kashmir, and sometimes initiates live fire across the line of control (LoC) in Kashmir, often killing civilians and Indian soldiers, and drawing Indian retaliation. Shuja Nawaz, a distinguished fellow at the South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council has described the Pakistan Army’s strategy as a state of “no peace, no war.”

But unless Pakistan’s national dialogue is turned away from the issue of India and Kashmir and toward development and the economy, the country will continue to trod down an unstable path. Moreover, by destabilizing Afghanistan, Pakistan’s India security obsession has dragged the entire northwestern portion of South Asia down a dark and insecure road.

In the past, civilian leaders in Pakistan seem to have realized this, but were thwarted by the military establishment. However, this time, Imran Khan has pursued a cooperative relationship with the military; in fact, military pressure against judicial institutions, parliamentarians, and the media ensured that the PTI would win in Pakistan’s 2018 general elections. This means that any initiative Khan presents India with is likely to have the tacit approval of the military.

In addition to better civil-military relations, the military itself seems to want improve relations with India as the result of tensions with the United States, and a reluctance to become too dependent on China, though it does not say this openly. Some analysts refer to this line of thinking as the Bajwa Doctrine, after Pakistan’s army chief. General Qamar Javed Bajwa has expressed the view that Pakistan should be more cooperative toward its neighbors and strengthen trade ties with India. While the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) between China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and the Pakistani port of Gwadar is on track, there are many underlying tensions. In October, the Pakistani government announced that it would cut $2 billion on CPEC railway projects, with Minister for Railways Sheikh Rashid telling Reuters that “Pakistan is a poor country that cannot afford huge burden of… loans.” Many groups in Pakistan, such as the ethnic Baloch, fear that CPEC will exploit their lands without giving anything back to their communities. Baloch militants who vehemently oppose Chinese projects in Balochistan, where Gwadar is located, attacked the Chinese consulate in Pakistan’s largest city, Karachi, on November 23.

Despite a long history of tensions with India, trade and cultural relations between India and Pakistan could undoubtedly be smooth. India and Pakistan remain intimately connected by culture, geography, history, and religion. Sikh, Hindu, and Muslim holy sites, important to all South Asians, exist in both India and Pakistan (as well as in Nepal and Bangladesh), and traditional pilgrimage routes and circuits only need liberal visa regimes to be revitalized.

Perhaps it was this desire to test the waters of more openness with India that was behind Khan’s recent announcement setting up the Kartarpur Corridor between the two countries. The corridor would be a sign of goodwill, giving Sikhs in India access to Sri Kartarpur Sahib Gurdwara in Narowal, Pakistani Punjab, right across the Ravi River from Dera Baba Nanak in Punjab, India. The road would allow for visa-free travel for Sikh pilgrims to the gurdwara (a Sikh place of worship), where Guru Nanak, the founder of Sikhism, lived and taught for the last 18 years before his death in 1539.

It is possible that the significance of the Kartarpur corridor could be exaggerated. Some Indian analysts, such as strategist Brahma Chellaney, have suggested that it is a ploy by Pakistan’s government to revive armed Sikh separatism to restart the Khalistan movement, which in the 1980s demanded an independent Sikh state in Punjab. Indian Punjab’s chief minister, Amarinder Singh of the Congress Party, seems to be of this view as well. The central Indian government is also still wary of Pakistan, recently rejecting Pakistan’s suggestion to hold a South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit in Islamabad. It could be that the Kartarpur Corridor is more of a play to domestic audiences in both countries.

Nonetheless, in hope of turning a new leaf in Indo-Pakistani relations, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) welcomed the Pakistani move, which will go down well among many Sikhs. While it doesn’t hurt for India to take steps to reciprocate and hope Pakistan will be more conciliatory this time around, it should also remember the many previous false starts. Even if many in Pakistan want to improve relations with India, there are many civilian and political actors that do not, and will do what they can to derail closer ties. It thus remains to be seen if Kartarpur signals a genuine new attitude in Pakistan among the military and Imran Khan’s government.

Will the Pakistani military change its thinking? Perhaps it will take some time, and more disappointments, but eventually it must and take the requisite steps unless it wishes to preside over the husk of an overpopulated, violent, failed state.