Why Bangladesh’s Authoritarian Turn Is Here to Stay

On December 30, Bangladesh held a general election that was handily won by the ruling Awami League and its allies, which took 288 of 300 seats contested. While the Awami League was widely expected to win, irregularities in the election were also observed and criticized by independent monitors and the opposition. Nonetheless, other countries, both Asian and Western, have recognized the election, and congratulated the winners, and it is unlikely that there will be any consequences for the government in Bangladesh stemming from allegations of rigging.

Bangladesh, birthed with strife and poverty from Pakistan in 1971, has come a long way in its four decades of independence. The last few years, in particular, have been some of Bangladesh’s best, with an average economic growth rate of 6 percent during the past decade, spurred by garment manufacturing. In the same period, literacy rose from 47 to 73 percent. Open defecation, previously prevalent, has all but been eradicated and population growth has slowed. According to the World Bank, the fertility rate in Bangladesh has plummeted to 2.1, and is now below the rates of neighboring Myanmar (2.2) and India (2.3), and well below Pakistan’s (3.5).

Although Bangladesh used to be synonymous with poverty, its economy has always had potential, given its large population, textile manufacturing base, and agricultural resources. It has little ethnic and regional strife, being a small, homogenous country: almost everyone is an ethnic Bengali, 90 percent of whom are Muslims, and the rest Hindu. The Bengal province of the Mughal Empire was its richest, contributing almost half of its revenues. Bengal suffered subsequently during the British period, and as a part of Pakistan, which was dominated by the western half of that country, despite the eastern wing, today’s Bangladesh, being more populous during that period. After being freed from Pakistan and the Pakistani military emphasis on diverting funds to security, newly independent Bangladesh was able to invest in human resources, a trend that has since accelerated.

This is why the reaction to Bangladesh’s latest election, which had been riddled with irregularities, stuffed ballot boxes, and a crackdown on opposition, has been met with muted criticism throughout the world, even though the ruling Awami League would have almost definitely have won the elections without the use of these measures.

Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who just won a third consecutive five-year term for her party, can claim credit for these economic achievements. During her prime ministership, which began in 2009, per capita income has risen nearly threefold, reaching $1,750 this year. Moreover, as one report noted, “the number of people living in extreme poverty – classified as under $1.25 per day – has shrunk from about 19 percent of the population to less than 9 percent over the same period, according to the World Bank.” By 2024, Bangladesh will be considered a developing country, and not a least-developed country, which had been its prior designation by United Nations criteria. This growth has largely been powered by Bangladesh’s ready-made garments industry. Bangladesh has used some of its newfound capital to expand its pharmaceutical and information technology industries. It has also grown rich enough to provide refuge to 750,000 Rohingya refugees from Myanmar.

Perhaps emboldened because of this, Bangladesh’s ruling Awami League is not overly concerned about holding free and fair elections. It sees itself as having guided Bangladesh to modernity, even if this means implementing some authoritarian policies. Sajeeb Ahmed Wazed, Sheikh Hasina’s son, underscored this point, tweeting recently: “Western media has called every eastern leader who developed his country rapidly authoritarian. Leaders like #Mahatir [sic] of #Malaysia, #LeeKwanYu [sic] of #Singapore. Can’t find any other fault, sling authoritarian mud!”

Bangladesh’s politics are complicated by the feud between its two largest parties, and the families that lead them. The Awami League was founded as the All Pakistan Awami Muslim League by Bengali nationalists in 1949, as a means of advancing Bengali interests in Pakistan. The party was lead by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who achieved independence from Pakistan in a war that involved Indian intervention in 1971. Also known by the epithet Bongobondhu (friend of Bengal), he served as the country’s first president, and then prime minister, before being assassinated in a military coup in 1975, along with most of his family. His daughter, the current prime minister since 2009, Sheikh Hasina, was out of the country, and subsequently returned to lead the Awami League. She was prime minister from 1996-2001, before her current stint in power.

Ziaur Rahman, an army general, was not involved in the 1975 coup against Mujibur Rahman, and his profile rose as a result. He became president in 1977, before being assasinated by army officers in 1981. His widow Khaleda Zia then led the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) that he founded in 1978, and served as prime minister from 1991 to 1996 and 2001 to 2006. For a while, it seemed as though Bangladesh’s two most powerful women would alternate power every five years. Instead, a caretaker government, backed by the military, took power between 2006 and 2008, incensed by the constant squabbling between the Awami League and BNP. Various political reforms were carried out to reduce corruption and upon the restoration of democracy, an alliance led by the Awami League won elections in 2008. It has ruled ever since.

While the Awami League made great strides for Bangladesh, it also “flagrantly wielded the full power of state institutions, from police to courts to the Election Commission, to promote its chances. Sheikh Hasina’s party also resorted to virtually every electoral trick in the bag,” as The Economist recently observed. Perhaps this is because “Sheikh Hasina seems to bear a personal grudge against perceived enemies, which springs both from the murder of her father and other relatives in 1975.” In fact, since coming to power, her party has set up an International Crimes Tribunal (ICT), which investigated and prosecuted suspects who had commited war crimes against Bengalis during the 1971 crisis. Many of these individuals are prominent members of Jamaat-e-Islami, Bangladesh’s largest Islamist party, and an ally of the BNP. Several have subsequently been executed for war crimes.

The BNP’s image has indeed been tarnished by its ties to Islamists, coups, and corruption. In the latest election, the party made an alliance with various democratic and opposition groups and ran Kamal Hossain, leader of a small party called the Gano Forum, against Sheikh Hasina, instead of one of its own leaders (Khaleda Zia was jailed in February 2018 for corruption). The Awami League has traditionally been more secular, progressive, friendlier with India, and has taken action against Islamist militants, some of whom cooperated with the Pakistani military in 1971, and have since made a tactical alliance with elements of the BNP. As a result, India has maintained close relations with the Awami League, and India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi, called Hasina within 24 hours of the election to offer his congratulations, with other countries soon following suit. As long as Bangladesh continues to develop, crackdown on terrorists, and maintains friendly ties with India and the West, it is unlikely that its democratic deficits will have any real consequences.

Yet, for the sake of its stability, Bangladesh may need to allow more protests and fairer elections, as people demand outlets for change, and to express their feelings about various government policies. Bangladesh was unstable for decades, mostly due to politics, so the warning of Michael Kugelman, deputy director of the Asia Program at the Wilson Center, rings true: “You do have to worry that some of the more hard-line opposition elements could be radicalized,” if they are shut out of the political process.

As protests over traffic safety last year, lead by young people, demonstrated, not all the dissent in Bangladesh can be boiled down to politics and military coups that happened decades ago. There are real, contemporary problems facing the average Bangladeshi, and if Bangladesh becomes a one-party state, its inability to respond to the demands of its people may be compromised, and turmoil could ensue. Yet, an onus also lies on the opposition to pursue political goals aligned with the interests of the Bangladeshi people, rather than flirting with Islamist and jihadist groups that are odds with the values of the vast majority of Bangladesh's population.