North Korea Talks Stalemate: What Should Japan Do?

The U.S.-North Korea denuclearization talks came to a halt after U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un emerged from their second summit meeting in Hanoi without any concrete agreement. Following what is considered to be a “failed” summit, the North Korean deputy foreign minister came out with a statement on March 15 that North Korea was considering suspending the denuclearization talks with the United States entirely.

While many in Japan, including the leadership, were no doubt relieved that Trump decided to end his summit meeting with Kim early rather than jumping to an agreement that could compromise Japan’s more acute national security interests (such as North Korea’s arsenal of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles), the return to a stalemate also means that North Korea will continue to present Japan with a serious security threat that has no end in sight.

What does this mean for Japan? First and foremost, it will need to continue to double down on ensuring that Japan’s alliance cooperation with the United States remains robust. That includes both buttressing Japan’s own defense capability vis-à-vis the North Korean threat, including Japan’s anticipated acquisition of Aegis Ashore, and maintaining close bilateral cooperation between the U.S. military and Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) on the operational side in areas such as missile defense, as well as policy coordination between the two governments.

Second, despite the pause in U.S.-North Korea bilateral talks, Japan should continue to engage other stakeholders diplomatically. In particular, now that Japan’s relationship with China is improving while Washington’s ties with Beijing remain tense, keeping a pulse on what China thinks about the way ahead on North Korean denuclearization can be extremely important for Japan.

Third, although it may be counterintuitive, Japan wants to pursue the opportunity for bilateral dialogue with North Korea. The key question here is whether Japan is willing to widen the scope of talks beyond the abduction issue, at least as an initial step to establish a solid line of communication with the Kim regime. Even if the steps that Japan is willing to take toward normalizing that relationship are essentially contingent upon Pyongyang addressing the abduction issue — the most important bilateral issue Japan has vis-à-vis North Korea — to Tokyo’s satisfaction, Tokyo at least needs to show willingness to discuss other issues with North Korea to reactivate the bilateral consultation process, which has been dormant for the last few years.

Finally, as hard as it will be, Japan will have to look for an opportunity to re-engage South Korea, if only to remind Seoul of the importance of maintaining close policy coordination between the United States, Japan, and South Korea. Since the inauguration of Moon Jae-in, Japan-South Korea relations, already tenuous under the previous Park administration, have taken a sharp downward turn. The new South Korean government practically nullified the 2015 agreement on comfort women, and has not taken any action in response to a series of rulings by South Korean courts on the issue of Japan’s wartime mobilization of Korean laborers. With the defense ministries of the two governments also at complete disagreement over what happened during a potentially dangerous encounter between a Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force P-3C and a Republic of Korea Navy destroyer, relations have descended to a new low. The inclination of the Moon administration in Seoul — leaning toward North-South reconciliation rather than revising policy coordination with the United States and Japan, despite the apparent pause in the U.S.-North Korea diplomatic process — certainly does not make it easy for Japan to look for an opening for engagement. That said, Japan needs to have at least a functional relationship with Seoul if it wants to avoid being diplomatically sidelined when the denuclearization talks restart again. At minimum, the pause in the U.S.-North Korea talks can offer a way for the defense establishments of Japan and South Korea to re-engage.

Except for the first item on the above “to-do list,” everything mentioned above will be hard for Japan to accomplish. In particular, renewed outreach to both North and South Korea will be difficult in the current political environment in Japan and requires political courage on the part of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. But if Abe wants to ensure that Japan will play a relevant role in shaping the future of the Korean Peninsula over the long term, now is an opportune time to reorganize Tokyo’s North Korea policy. That includes revisiting the wisdom of pressing on with the current “maximum pressure” tactics.