Balochistan and China’s Pakistan Ambitions

Balochistan province comprises almost half of Pakistan’s territory. It is rich in mineral and hydrocarbon resources, yet has suffered from gross underdevelopment for decades. According to a United Nations Development Program (UNDP) report, Balochistan is Pakistan’s poorest province. Mostly desert, Balochistan is also Pakistan’s least populous province, home to around 12 million people – Pakistan’s total population is more than 197 million. Only about half of the province’s population is ethnic Baloch, while a quarter is Pashtun and the rest other groups such as Brahuis, Punjabis, Sindhis, and Mohajirs.

Historically, Balochistan had little in common, politically or administratively, with the provinces of Punjab and Sindh to its east that make up Pakistan’s heartland. Before the partition of British India, the physical and cultural infrastructure of Punjab and Sindh were linked to neighboring provinces now in the Indian states of Gujarat, Maharashtra, Haryana, and Uttar Pradesh. Balochistan, along with other areas that now make up Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, were the frontier provinces of the British Raj, acquired not for economic exploitation, but to secure the heartland of the Raj. The British built little infrastructure in Balochistan, and the area was left to its own devices, mostly under the rule of princely states, particularly Kalat and Makran.

Partition and independence in 1947 did not really improve Balochistan’s economic conditions. Many Balochs felt that Balochistan functioned as little more than a colony for the newly independent Pakistan, which was dominated by ethnic Punjabis. There have been various low-level insurgencies in Balochistan since 1948, with multiple groups seeking different objectives, such as autonomy, separation from Pakistan, or merely a fairer share in resources or a greater stake in the Pakistani state. The latest phase of insurgency began in 2006 when a prominent Baloch leader, Akbar Bugti, was killed by Pakistani forces in a clash, exacerbating pre-existing tensions. 

One way that the Pakistani government is trying to tackle the root cause of instability in Balochistan – economic underdevelopment – is by partnering with China for investment, although cynics argue that the projects selected are only those that would benefit China’s economic and geopolitical interests, rather than Balochistan’s. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is an economic program now valued at $62 billion, mostly funded by the Chinese government, to modernize and expand transportation, manufacturing, and trade in Pakistan, and connect it with western China through Xinjiang. While there are CPEC projects throughout Pakistan, the keystone project is the port and special economic zone of Gwadar in southwest Balochistan on the Arabian Sea, near Iran. Gwadar would form the western hub of land transportation networks emanating through China and the rest of Pakistan. Gwadar’s deep-sea port and location near the Middle East are valuable to both Chinese and Pakistani shipping interests and geopolitically proximate to most of the world’s oil. The port also serves as a competitor to a similar Indian project in the nearby Iranian port of Chabahar. As such, Pakistan has been interested in developing Gwadar for a long time.

Yet despite Gwadar being considered the “linchpin” of CPEC in Pakistan, many Balochs feel that the project will not benefit them or bring development to their province, despite assurances to the contrary. Rather, many Balochs believe that the revenues and jobs created by CPEC will only benefit Punjabis and Chinese from outside the province, and that the majority of development in Balochistan will be concentrated in Gwadar, rather than the rest of the province. Ethnic Balochs, particularly fishermen, have reported being driven away from Gwadar and replaced in their own town with contractors from China, in what seems to be a move to turn Gwadar into a non-Baloch enclave. One source reported that “many people had to move to remote areas after the government started the construction work on Gwadar port.”

According to the Economic Times, there are plans to build a $150 million gated community for the 500,000 Chinese workers anticipated to live in Gwadar by 2022. Other projects, such as a $265 million luxury golf resort, do nothing to solve Balochistan’s basic infrastructure and human development problems. In fact, according to the agreement between Pakistan and China, only 9 percent of the revenue from Gwadar port will go to Pakistan over the next 40 years, with the other 91 percent reserved for the port’s operator, Chinese Overseas Port Holding Company. None of the portion earmarked for Pakistan will go directly to the provincial government of Balochistan.

When CPEC was initially envisioned, Balochistan was promised the second largest share of investment from among Pakistan’s provinces. However, these projects have not yet materialized. According to the Financial Times, only two out of the 21 energy projects that are projected to be installed through CPEC are in Balochistan. Recently, the provincial government of Balochistan was outraged to learn from Pakistan’s Planning and Development Department that barely any work on any projects outside of Gwadar was done over the past five years. The government also learned that major projects in the provincial capital of Quetta are now going to be financed by the provincial government’s own resources, instead of by CPEC.

Given these ground realities, it is difficult to see how the Balochs, and the various militant and separatist groups based in Balochistan, would believe the CPEC projects in the province are actually for the benefit of the people living there. Other than the projects in Gwadar, which are more relevant for non-Baloch interests than the province’s development, almost no work related to CPEC has been done anywhere else in Balochistan. Recent Saudi promises of investment in the province are also concentrated in Gwadar.

Frustrated Baloch groups have struck back against not only Pakistani forces, as they have for decades, but against Chinese interests directly. Militants have gunned down workers building mines and highways, and more spectacularly, the Balochistan Liberation Army attacked the Chinese consulate in November 2018 in the city of Karachi, though no Chinese personnel were killed in the attacks. A spokesman from the group accused China of “exploiting our resources.”

It is clear, then, that while CPEC is bringing some development to Gwadar, the rest of Balochistan is as economically neglected as ever, with no real attempt by Pakistan’s government to actively develop the province. Until this pattern of neglect and indifference changes, the conditions that fuel the low-level insurgency and violence will not go away, and the resentment that the Balochs feel toward the Chinese, and other Pakistanis, will continue to fuel strife.