Midterm Elections in the Philippines: The Risk of a Pyrrhic Duterte Victory

As things stand now, it looks like candidates that are close to Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte will dominate the May 13 elections. But while the outcome itself may play into the Duterte administration’s desire to claim another political victory, the issues that have surfaced during the campaign period could potentially undermine public support for the Duterte government in the longer term.

As of writing, the majority of the senatorial candidates endorsed by the coalition headed by Duterte are doing well in mainstream surveys. Many are popular senators running for re-election who come from established political dynasties, meaning their election victory is almost assured, barring any unforeseen major scandal or crisis in the weeks before the election.

Among the candidates who have soared high in the surveys are former presidential aide Bong Go and former police general Ronald Bato. These two are closely associated with Duterte. Go is known as the “national photobomber” because he is often seen in photographs accompanying Duterte at official events. Meanwhile, Bato is the police general who gained global notoriety for enforcing Duterte’s bloody war on drugs.

Some analysts and supporters of Go and Bato credit their popularity to Duterte’s enduring appeal among the electorate. Indeed, Go and Bato have not held elected posts in the past and their strong showing in surveys could be linked to their personal ties and proven loyalty to Duterte. If they win on May 13, the government can spin it as proof of public support not just for Duterte but also for his controversial programs like the anti-drug campaign.

Midterm elections in the Philippines often favor the administration. The ruling party has the resources, machinery, and media access to reach the large segments of the voting public. Go and Bato may be performing consistently high in surveys, but critics have said this was because their images are plastered everywhere, various state agencies are reportedly campaigning for them (which is prohibited by law), and the president himself is personally endorsing them. Duterte has actively toured the provinces to campaign for his candidates. He is an effective campaigner who also uses his public appearances to ridicule and demonize opposition candidates.

The administration’s coalition may be satisfied with amplifying Duterte’s voice, but it hasn’t broadened the messaging. At a time when the ruling party is seeking to affirm Duterte’s legacy, strengthen his presidency, and ensure continued public support even after the elections, its campaigning efforts have been narrow. So far, the ruling party’s campaign has not offered a clear narrative in defense of the Duterte government against its critics. This may win more votes in the short term, but it will be difficult to sustain if the president’s popularity diminishes.

There is a wider dynamic at play: While the ruling party is focused on bringing Duterte back on the campaign trail, opposition forces have managed to highlight issues that can be used to continue challenging Duterte’s presidency after the midterm elections.

With respect to the opposition’s focus, in the past month, several investigative reports were published exposing the connections between the Duterte family and alleged drug lords, designed to undermine the credibility of his drug war. There have also been reports about the hidden vast wealth of the first family, in order to peel back Duterte’s populist, anti-elite image.

While the opposition, running on an agenda of making the Duterte government accountable, has succeeded in including these damning reports in their campaign messaging, so far, Duterte’s response has been to attack and insult his critics. While this can briefly distract voters, the incriminating issues raised against Duterte will likely continue to haunt him and his government until the end of his presidency.

A case in point is the Duterte administration’s response to China. An opposition candidate exposed the onerous deals entered by the Duterte government with China, thereby raising concerns about its overall warming approach to Beijing under the administration’s so-called “independent foreign policy.” This led to more people expressing concern about China’s rising aggression in the South China Sea (known locally as West Philippine Sea) and its generous loans and aid to the Duterte government. Some protest actions were organized around these issues.

If this kind of public vigilance and outrage continues to simmer until it can gather more strength, that could weaken the Duterte presidency. More people might be inspired to join the opposition in condemning the continuing corruption, decrying the failure to end the drug menace despite the brutal killings, and protesting Duterte’s silence over China’s encroachment on the country’s sovereignty.

Given all this, it is not unreasonable to expect that we may see further opposition against Duterte after the elections. Even talk of a new impeachment case filed against Duterte after the elections is not beyond the bounds of the possible. It should also be noted that Duterte is facing a case at the International Criminal Court, which opponents are also keen to highlight. Protests can also escalate against other systemic issues as well, which could be in the headlines more and more over time, including corruption, human rights abuses, and the proposal to amend the 1987 Constitution.

It may well be the case that Duterte-linked candidates will dominate the midterm elections. But if the issues that surface during the campaign ultimately prove the undoing of the Duterte government, that could prove a Pyrrhic victory.