Nargis Kassenova

It’s been a wild few months for Kazakh politics, starting with President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s resignation on March 19 and interim President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s decision a few weeks later to call for early presidential elections, now set for June 9. Since then, Kazakhstan has renamed its capital and seen a series of public protests, flashes of frustration with the political process and persisting socioeconomic inequalities.

To put the ongoing changes in context, The Diplomat spoke to Nargis Kassenova, currently a senior fellow in the Program on Central Asia at Harvard University's Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies. Kassenova is also an associate professor at KIMEP University in Almaty, Kazakhstan.

A burning question I’ve had is about the choreography of this transition: Why bother with the theatrics of resigning when Nazarbayev could have simply called for early presidential elections, as he has often in the past? What do you make of the timing and order of recent events? 

I think you put your finger on the point: Theatrics is a very important aspect of our transition. President Nazarbayev clearly has a soft spot for spectacular politics, the pomp and circumstance. Calling for early presidential elections would be dramatic but not to the same extent as the “big bang” of resignation. It had to be a historic event on its own, mentally, emotionally, and temporarily separate from the upcoming elections. Scheduling it on the eve of the Nowruz celebration added to the symbolism. Why now? We don’t know and can only guess, but eventually we will find out. 

As for the choreography of the transition, it seems likely that there is no clear plan. Nazarbayev and people around him have seen a lot during their careers and understand the fluidity of politics and the role that accidents can play in it. The goals are to preserve the status, security, and wealth of Nazarbayev and his family, and to maintain his legacy as a statesman and Leader of the Nation. The rest can be subject to modifications. The main intrigue for me is whether this plan aspires for an upgrade of Kazakhstan’s political and economic system, or it’s focused on keeping the status quo as long as possible. Both would be tall tasks under the circumstances. 

On the one hand, the system has been rigid and risk adverse, with all the “screws tightened” for so long that the authorities seem to have lost the capacity of handling more complex systems. On the other, the maintenance of the system built around Nazarbayev would be impossible with him leaving the scene. Kazakhstan is a much more open and complex place for repeating the Turkmen scenario. [Editor’s Note: Turkmenistan’s first president died in office in 2006, followed by a smooth transition to a new, equally authoritarian, president chosen by elites, behind closed doors.] Elite power struggles are inevitable, and awakening of public politics is inevitable too. The thirst for change, even in the face of major uncertainty about the future, became clear on the day of the resignation. At present, both the elites and people are disoriented by the presidential duumvirate and the direction of change, but we definitely are moving into uncharted and tumultuous waters. 

A handful of candidates have registered to contest the election but analysts (myself included) have argued that these are virtual nobodies, most from parties that can hardly be cast as genuine opposition. Are we mistaken? What’s your assessment of the field of candidates? 

It is definitely not a star cast, which reflects the low capacity of our authorities to handle complex systems. We are given a palette of candidates that reflects the leadership’s understanding of different constituencies that need to be appealed to. I can imagine a list of boxes checked in the process: a bit of business interests, a bit of agricultural sector, a bit of industrial sector, a bit of gender equality/women’s representation, an indispensable bit of communists, a bit of nationalist agenda, and a bit of old-school opposition. Nevertheless, even this set of carefully selected candidates, lacking resources and given little time for an ad hoc campaign, sparks a bit of life in our tranquilized domestic politics. 

Nazarbayev isn’t president anymore, but he remains very much empowered. Considering the various ways Nazarbayev remains a powerful figure, what do you think the impact of this arrangement will be on Kazakhstan’s foreign relations? For example, Nazarbayev – not Tokayev – traveled to China in late April to attend the second Belt and Road Forum. Do you think trips like that convey the image that Nazarbayev remains the top guy to deal with in Kazakhstan, no matter who holds the office of the president?

It’s not fully accurate to say that Nazarbayev isn’t president anymore, both de jure – he is constitutionally the First President – and de facto – he features prominently in various public events both at home and abroad. He remains the “top guy to deal with in Kazakhstan,” which doesn’t help Tokayev in developing his legitimacy in the international scene. However, given that he doesn’t seem to have an approach to Kazakhstan’s foreign policy different from Nazarbayev – his presidential campaign program talks about the continuation of the “pragmatic, constructive, multivector” course – this two-president situation should not create problems in Kazakhstan’s relations with other countries.

In the last few months, social issues have flared passions among a wide swath of people in Kazakhstan, highlighting inequalities and exposing discontent with the status quo. What issues have people upset and how critical is it for the Kazakh leadership to tackle them? What steps has the government taken and do you think these are perceived as adequate?

There is a serious problem of inequality of opportunities in Kazakhstan. If you were born in a village during the Soviet times, due to the Soviet system of education and social lifts, you had a chance to advance in life; if you are born in a village in independent Kazakhstan, this chance is close to zero. Sadly, despite the rhetoric, the policies carried out by the government have been fostering inequalities rather than mending them. This creates fragmentations and tensions in society. The leadership is aware of the accumulating explosive potential, and we can see attempts to strengthen social policies, the latest being the “five social initiatives” announced by President Nazarbayev in 2018. 

The May 1 protests showed people’s growing discontent and desperation with injustices in their lives. The government suppressed the protests, but wants to capitalize on the society’s demand for justice. In fact, Tokayev’s campaign program has justice as one of the three pillars (along with continuity and progress). It does not envision political openings, and the social block (education, healthcare, housing) is pronounced and elaborated in terms of goals, but not in terms of ways to achieve them. The first pillar of the program is continuity, which raises a question of how serious systemic change can be made while maintaining continuity of policies. One has a feeling that Kazakhstan’s ruling class is afraid of the people and wants to appease them, but has little respect for citizenry, depriving them of voice and means of participating in the political life of the country. 

If you could give the next president of Kazakhstan a piece of advice, what would it be?

I would quote Machiavelli, who argued that “it is the common good and not private gain that makes cities great,” referring to the greatness achieved by Athens and Rome once they had freed themselves of tyrants and kings. I would encourage the person to steer our de jure republic, de facto quasi-principality in the direction of common good and strong citizenry. That would be real progress.