Abe’s Quest for a Diplomatic Legacy: Will It Pay Off?
The next few months will see Abe try to forge legacy-making diplomatic achievements, but the deck may be stacked against him.
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe seems to be focused on his quest for a foreign policy legacy as his term as Japan’s longest-serving prime minister enters its final stretch. At the upcoming G-20, he will meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin with the hope of achieving a breakthrough on negotiations over the disputed Northern Territories (known in Russia as the Southern Kurils). Abe has also signaled that he is open to direct talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un “without precondition” – a clear departure from the position that his government has long held. In addition, Abe seems to be doubling down on solidifying his relationship with U.S. President Donald Trump. Abe visited Washington, D.C. at the end of April, and as of this writing he was set to welcome Trump for a state visit from May 25-28 – the first state visit after the imperial succession – followed by yet another anticipated summit meeting in June for the G-20. Abe’s effort to improve Japan-China relations also continues.
Abe’s forward-leaning diplomatic moves come at a time when a couple of major developments are unfolding inside and outside Japan. Externally, with the U.S.-China trade talks showing no sign of reaching an agreement and U.S.-North Korea denuclearization talks at a stalemate, uncertainty in the strategic environment surrounding Japan continues to deepen. Internally, as Abe prepares his ruling coalition for the scheduled upper house election this summer, speculation has swirled that the prime minister might go for a “double election,” holding the election for the lower house simultaneously in a bid to resolidify his power base. Abe may need that boost to survive looming government decisions that will be politically unpopular, such as the consumption tax increase anticipated this fall.
At the same time, speculation on a “post-Abe” Japan has also picked up, with Abe’s term set to end in 2021. For instance, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga’s visit to Washington, while very little known outside Japan, has attracted significant media attention within the country as a sign that Suga may be potentially interested in joining the race to be Japan’s next leader.
Given these internal and external developments, it makes sense for Abe to try to achieve tangible results in his diplomatic efforts. Should he be able to break the stalemate in negotiations with Russia or achieve concrete progress with North Korea on abduction issues, he will have demonstrable results to point to as the fruits of his active leadership-level diplomacy. This will no doubt enhance Abe’s hand as he leads his ruling coalition into election. Moreover, having such diplomatic successes, buttressed by a U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship that is anchored by Abe’s strong personal relationship with Trump, can also potentially enable him to sustain his own political influence in the “post-Abe” era of Japanese politics.
However, these diplomatic efforts could turn out to be a high-risk, low-yield game for Abe. Many observers have already pointed out that the possibility of Abe being able to achieve a breakthrough in Japan-Russia negotiations on the Northern Territories is extremely slim. Similarly, even though more than 60 percent of the Japanese public supports Abe’s willingness to have an “unconditional” talk with Kim Jong Un, and the abduction victims’ families reportedly understand Abe’s posture, what Abe might be able to achieve in a direct conversation with Kim – if such a meeting happens at all – is highly questionable. Even as Abe signals his willingness to talk “without precondition,” he has not necessarily shown any flexibility in some key elements of the Japanese government’s position, including how Tokyo defines “the resolution of the abduction issue.” If he maintains the government’s position that Japan will not proceed with any meaningful engagement, including humanitarian aid, with North Korea until the abduction issue is completely resolved, there may be quite little that can be achieved even if Abe meets with Kim.
Moreover, Abe has already been receiving some criticism at home about seeming to invest so much effort and energy in sustaining a strong personal relationship with Trump. In particular, his government’s all-out effort to roll out the red carpet for Trump in May, which included the two leaders watching sumo wrestling and playing golf together, topped with Trump’s scheduled meeting with Emperor Naruhito, has raised serious questions. Abe may be walking an extremely fine line in using the Imperial House to his political advantage by hosting Trump as the first state guest following the imperial succession. More importantly, Abe already faces criticism at home that his effort to develop a personal relationship with Trump has not helped shield Japan from the Trump administration’s confrontational bilateral approach to trade.
With so many factors in flux, the next couple of months will likely be a time of big gambles for Abe. How well he can cash in, however, is far from certain.
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Yuki Tatsumi is a Senior Fellow and Co-Director of the East Asia Program and Director of the Japan Program at the Stimson Center. She writes for The Diplomat’s Tokyo Report section.