Rough Seas and Harsh Terrain: Security Challenges Under Modi 2.0

Following his party’s victory in the 2019 general elections, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has reaffirmed his commitment to a vigorous foreign policy. He invited the leaders Bangladesh, Bhutan, Kyrgyzstan, Mauritius, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Thailand to his swearing-in ceremony, and visited the Maldives and Sri Lanka on his first official visits in early June. However, as India looks to advance its interests in the neighborhood over the next five years, it will grapple with a security environment defined by a twin set of challenges. Not only will India continue to tackle its traditional continental challenges, but its growing maritime focus will generate a new set of security challenges as it attempts to overcome China’s growing influence in the region.

India’s Long-Standing Continental Challenges

Modi's focus on the neighborhood is prudent given the challenges India faces in the region. India has, over the past five years, been at the whims of changing governments in countries such as Sri Lanka and the Maldives. This trend, which is likely to continue, means that India is only able to engage constructively when a pro-India government is in power. India will also continue to grapple with the inroads China has made with countries such as Nepal, Myanmar, and Pakistan. These factors suggest the need for a new strategy for India in Modi’s second term.

In the words of Dr. Ashley Tellis, traditional Indian strategy, which broadly involved “insulat[ing] the subcontinent from external influences so that the weaker states would have to defer to superior Indian power… is well and truly dead.” In an increasingly globalized world, India can no longer depend on such a strategy of exclusion. Beyond China, Japan and the United States have also begun deepening their partnerships with countries in the region. Over the next five years, India will need to overcome its prior hesitation and work with partners such as Japan and the United States. New Delhi will need to see their efforts as force multipliers of India's own limited resources in the region in order to advance its own interests. 

Another central tenet of Modi's foreign policy has been transforming India’s longstanding “Look East” policy to an “Act East” policy. Engagement with Southeast Asia under this policy remains rooted in a continental vantage point, as demonstrated through the prime minister’s focus on the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC). Two immediate signals have come early in Modi’s second term. First, the leaders of BIMSTEC member states were invited to Modi’s swearing in ceremony. Soon after, India’s new minister for external affairs, Dr. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, said in a public address that BIMSTEC “fits in with that very optimistic vision of economic cooperation that we want.” These signals suggest that a continental-driven “Act East” policy will continue to be a focus for India over the next five years.

However, India's “Act East” policy remains limited by India’s internal security issues, particularly conflicts in the northeast. A key tenet of Act East has been promoting regional connectivity and land-based infrastructure connectivity, particularly through India’s northeast toward Myanmar, Thailand, and beyond. However, as I have written previously with my colleague, Kartikeya Singh, conflicts in the region, particularly the long-standing insurgency in Nagaland, have prevented effective implementation of Act East. Indeed, flare-ups in the Naga conflict in 2017 led to blockades along India’s national highways that connect to the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Project, as well as along the Trans-Asia railway. India will need to move forward on the Naga peace accord, a framework for which was announced by Modi but remains incomplete. Progress in conflict resolution in India’s northeast will unleash tremendous economic opportunities for India to further advance regional connectivity with South East Asia. 

Finally, Pakistan remains the most significant security challenge that India continues to face in the subcontinent. While both countries exchanged air strikes in February 2019, India has won important diplomatic victories in the aftermath, such as getting U.S. support for India’s right to self-defense and pushing China to drop its veto on a resolution designating Pakistan-based Masood Azhar, the founder of Jaish-e-Mohammed, as a global terrorist at the United Nations. However, despite India's goal of the “diplomatic isolation” of Pakistan globally, this aim will be thwarted by Pakistan's continuing and deepening relationship with China. In his second term, Modi will need to grapple with how to overcome not just the threat of cross-border terrorism from Pakistan, but the growing relationship between its two northern neighbors. 

India’s Emerging Maritime Focus

In addition to its continental challenges, India’s embrace of the free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) concept demonstrates New Delhi’s emerging maritime focus. Indeed, shortly after his swearing-in, Modi visited the Maldives and Sri Lanka, which the Indian government noted was a demonstration of "the priority India attaches to… the SAGAR Doctrine." The reference to SAGAR – short for Security and Growth for All in the Region – speaks to India's maritime focus, as the doctrine is aimed at “keeping the Indian Ocean Region peaceful and secure,” particularly in light of China's aggressive inroads in the region.  

This new maritime focus will require India to address its own limitations. India’s most recent budgetary allocation continued to provide the Indian Navy with the lowest portion of defense spending compared to other services. In the 2019 interim budget, the Navy received only 16 percent of the overall defense budget, leaving it with the lowest amount of funds for capital expenses and modernization. This has meant that India’s plans to purchases U.S. Sea Guardian drones and P-8i maritime surveillance aircraft have been pared back. Indeed, defense analyst Ajai Shukla noted that while India was looking to buy 22 Sea Guardians and 20 P-8i aircrafts, the navy will now only purchase 10 Sea Guardians and 8 to 10 P-8i aircrafts. 

Lack of resources for the navy has also led to under-investment in India’s strategically-located Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The islands, which are located at the foot of the Malacca Straits, are a natural platform for India to expand its capabilities on maritime domain awareness and reconnaissance in the Indian Ocean Region. While India announced the creation of a triservices command on the island in 2001, the focus on the command, retired Lt. Gen. Prakash Katoch wrote for the Indian Defense Review in 2015, “remains insufficient… despite aggressive Chinese designs and movements” and “mainly acts as a logistical facility for deployments of India's Eastern Naval Command.” As India looks to sharpen its engagement in the Indian Ocean Region, it will need to prioritize boosting its assets in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

As Modi begins his second term, he will need to grapple with a series of challenges, emanating from both India’s traditional continental security concerns, as well an emerging set of maritime concerns. The prime minister’s early actions on the foreign policy front show how India is gearing up to address these concerns head on. However, achieving India’s foreign policy interests in the broader Indian Ocean region, and in maintaining a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific, will present be met with rough seas and harsh terrain.