Will India Have a Say in Afghanistan’s Future?

Even as reconciliation talks gather momentum in Afghanistan, violence too has surged, underscoring the high stakes for all sides. Every day civilians are targeted by the Taliban to showcase their growing confidence and the inability of the extant political establishment in Kabul to maintain order. U.S. Special Envoy for Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad aims to reach an agreement on a road map to end the 18 year conflict with the insurgents by September 1. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has suggested that the Trump administration was aiming for “a peace deal before September 1.” The American public wants to see the war end and doing so was one of the main election promises by U.S. President Donald Trump.

The United States clearly wants to get out of Afghanistan and get out soon. This has never been in doubt. The Trump administration’s South Asia strategy, unveiled in 2017, merely tried to buy more time for the United States. With Trump already getting ready for his re-election campaign in 2020, he needs to showcase a major win on the foreign policy front and what could be a bigger win than the withdrawal of some 14,000 troops from Afghanistan? 

Seven rounds of direct talks have been held between the United States and the Taliban since October 2018. These talks have primarily been aimed at ensuring a safe exit for the United States in return for the insurgents guaranteeing that Afghan territory won’t be used by foreign terrorist groups, like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, and won't pose a security threat to the rest of the world. The latest round of talks in Doha were considered to be “most productive” and there is a new momentum in the negotiations after months of stalemate. Washington continues to insist that is seeking a “comprehensive peace agreement, not a withdrawal agreement,” even though few are taking this sentiment at face value.

Earlier in July, the United States issued a joint statement with China, Russia, and Pakistan, urging the Taliban to agree on a ceasefire and begin talks with the elected government in Kabul to usher in an era of peace and stability in the war-ravaged country. More significantly, these powers “welcomed” the involvement of Pakistan, seen as a main sponsor of the Taliban, signifying a dramatic shift in the American position from one of isolating Pakistan to that of using Islamabad to get the Taliban on board. Meanwhile, Pakistan has been keen to regain some traction with the Trump administration; ties have largely been in a state of deep freeze. Pakistan hopes that by cooperating with the United States in putting pressure on the Taliban to strike a peace deal in Afghanistan it can mend fences with an increasingly adversarial Trump administration. Last year, Pakistan released Mullah Baradar, one of the four top commanders who formed the Taliban in 1994, and since then Baradar has directed talks with Khalilzad as the Taliban’s chief negotiator. Given his key role in these talks, he was even feted by China last month. Pakistan’s role has once again emerged as central in the unfolding dynamic in Afghanistan. Washington’s long awaited invitation to Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan to visit the United States in July was also issued in this light.

Meanwhile, India has observed these developments with a sense of wariness as it has not been brought into the loop so far by Washington. It is only recently that U.S. officials have briefed India after New Delhi made its hesitations clear. India’s position of not having anything to do with the Taliban had become untenable. In November 2018, New Delhi finally decided to send two former Indian diplomats “at a non-official level” to participate in the Moscow round of talks with the Taliban. More recently, New Delhi has articulated certain conditions that it feels need to be met if negotiations with the Taliban are to succeed. 

Given India’s stakes in the incumbent government in Kabul, it has called for all initiatives and processes to include “all sections of the Afghan society, including the legitimately elected government.” New Delhi fears that marginalization of the Ghani government would signal the end of almost two decades of hard work by the international community in bringing some semblance of democratic normalcy to the conflict-prone nation. 

New Delhi has also underlined that “any process should respect the constitutional legacy and political mandate.” This is important as the Taliban remain reluctant to commit themselves to broader democratic processes and key aspects such as women’s rights even as they remain committed to their own interpretation of Sharia law. Finally, it is vital for India that any process in Afghanistan “should not lead to any ungoverned spaces where terrorists and their proxies can relocate.” In the past, when American attention in Afghanistan lapsed, giving Pakistan a free hand, Indian security interests were severely compromised. A rising tide of extremism and terrorism in Kashmir made India extremely vulnerable. 

It is not entirely clear how many of these objectives India will be able to secure as Washington seeks a quick departure from Afghanistan. India’s significant economic and cultural investments in the Kabul government would come to naught if it does not quickly correct course. Earlier this month, the Modi government. while allocating around $58 million as development aid to Afghanistan, also cut its allocation to Iran’s Chabahar port. This was a recognition of the changing ground realities in Afghanistan in which a future Indian role looks very uncertain.

Many in India will find in these developments a reason to blame the Trump administration. But that’s a trope New Delhi should avoid. Washington has its own interests in Afghanistan that it is trying to protect. It is likely that in the process the United States would safeguard some Indian equities in Afghanistan as well, as Washington needs India to maintain a favorable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. But India’s approach toward Afghanistan has, from the very beginning, been too dependent on the benevolence of others. New Delhi continues to insist that it wants to invest its soft power in Afghanistan, but the fact that its efforts have succeeded was due to the American security umbrella. India has done some great work in Afghanistan – being one of the largest aid givers, being a major source of cultural influence, building capacities in various sectors of democratic polity, and training security forces. But all of India’s achievements were built on the bedrock of reliance on others for hard power projection. 

For a nation that is looking to be recognized as a leading global power, India is not in a very comfortable position. Being too risk averse in foreign policy carries its own set of costs. There is too much at stake. New Delhi should become more proactively involved in the Afghan peace process and not be shy about drawing its own red lines. After all, India can also play the role of a disruptor if its interests are ignored. This is important to underline not only because Indian interests are involved but also because the hopes and aspirations of ordinary Afghans cannot be dealt a blow. New Delhi should make it clear that nice guys need not always finish last.