James L. Schoff

In August, Japan and South Korea both upped the ante in their intensifying trade dispute. Japan made good on its threat to remove South Korea from a “white list” of trusted export destinations, meaning extra hoops to jump through for the export of sensitive technologies to its neighbor. South Korea responded in kind, removing Japan from its own “white list.”

Tokyo has repeatedly claimed that the new trade restrictions are the result of concerns over South Korean export controls, which Japan insists could let sensitive materials cross into North Korea or China. But many believe the restrictions are the result of a far more toxic brew of nationalism and historical issues, which is being reciprocated in South Korea.

To help sort through the root causes of today’s dispute, The Diplomat’s Ankit Panda spoke to James L. Schoff, a senior fellow in the Carnegie Asia Program. In the following conversation, Schoff explains 2019’s trade tensions in light of longstanding fractures in the Japan-South Korea relationship, and what that legacy means for 21st century geopolitics.

How much is the ongoing dispute really being driven by historical issues? Japan has sought to convince the international community that its decision to impose export controls was driven by legitimate national security concerns. Is that just a pretext to address other grievances?

In the first few days after the Japanese government announced its export control review (and imposed new requirements for three products in early July), Tokyo gave vague and conflicting accounts of what prompted the move. Since then, the government has been adamant that the export control decision is totally separate from ongoing historical disputes. This claim is hard to accept at face value.

The fact that the Japanese government is not actively trying to work with Seoul to address any specific concerns about South Korea’s export control processes tells me that the reason Japan downgraded South Korea to a second tier status was Tokyo’s depleted trust in the Moon administration overall. From the Abe government’s perspective, the only way that South Korea can get back on the export control “white list” is if it works to improve the wider political relationship with Japan, which includes the history issues.

This trust has been eroding steadily since last year, notably from Moon’s decision to abandon their bilateral agreement on “comfort women” and accompanying foundation; an incident at sea when a South Korean naval vessel pointed its fire-control radar at a Japanese Self-Defense Forces plane; an inability to resolve other disputes involving imports of Japanese seafood; and Korean Supreme Court decisions that order some Japanese companies to pay victims (and family members) of Japan’s forced labor practices during the colonial period and World War II.

Seoul tends to view Japan’s export control action as retaliation for the Supreme Court decisions in particular, but that is probably just one factor of many. Japan’s move to downgrade South Korea as a privileged economic partner reflects a broader disillusionment and loss of trust that flows in part from Tokyo’s dissatisfaction with the way the Moon government has handled sensitive history issues, but it also involves other disagreements regarding North Korea policy, territorial disputes, and how to balance against China’s rise — including protection against technology “leakage” to Chinese firms.

The Moon administration has rejected the 2015 “final and irreversible” comfort women deal that the Park Geun-hye administration concluded with Japan. Is Japanese frustration over that decision also playing into the ongoing crisis?

As noted above, Moon’s ultimate rejection of the agreement – after initially saying in early 2018 that “it is not possible to re-negotiate the deal” – contributed a lot to Japanese frustration and is connected to the current friction over export controls. Of course, Japan did not help its case with Moon or the Korean people by constantly emphasizing that the agreement settled the matter “finally and irreversibly,” as if continued efforts at reconciliation were not necessary to help satisfy the victims’ emotional and physical needs. Instead, Tokyo focused on the letter of the agreement, and Foreign Minister Kono had warned Seoul that bilateral relations could become “unmanageable” if Moon abandoned the agreement. In this sense, each side warned the other that it was ignoring either the spirit or the letter of their deal, and they either did not understand the size of the gap between them or chose to ignore it. This added to the frustration on both sides, because Seoul and Tokyo clearly expressed how much this issue meant to them and believed their cause to be just, but the other side would not compromise.

What role, if any, does the United States have to play here? These are two treaty allies and Washington has traditionally sought to encourage, if not cordial trilateralism, then at least bilateral cordiality between Seoul and Tokyo.

It was the United States that helped facilitate Japan-South Korea diplomacy from 2014, which eventually led to the comfort women agreement. Given this earlier U.S. role, some in Japan would argue that Washington should have tried more aggressively to convince Moon to stick with the agreement in 2018. For these Japanese officials, it is too late for Washington to now try to apply pressure on Tokyo to adjust its export control decision, when it failed to intervene on the front end of this bilateral downward spiral.

The current dynamic troubles the United States, which has promoted trilateral security and diplomatic cooperation ever since North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs increased threats to all three countries from the 1990s. Collectively they made gains, expanding cooperation in missile defense and maritime security, and broadening policy coordination internationally for development aid, health care, and environmental issues.

All of these efforts should continue, but the U.S. government should pay particularly close attention to trilateral security cooperation. This is the most uniquely valuable type of trilateral collaboration due to the shared threats they face, the important role that forward deployed U.S. forces play in all three countries’ security, and the high level of military interoperability and training opportunities they enjoy.

The United States might need to play a more central role as a node between two alliances, similar to what it did before Japan and Korea made some improvements to their security relations. For example, it would be preferable for South Korea to remain in the military information sharing agreement with Japan, but the allies can work around its absence if necessary.

Overall the United States should facilitate high-level Japan-Korea communication and encourage their friendship however it can, including areas of business, civil society, and security. We will all be better able to protect against regional threats and address global crises as a result.

Do you fear that Japan and South Korea might be entering a new era structurally in their bilateral relationship – one colored by greater competitiveness and acrimony in general?

I do. Some U.S. policymakers are beginning to understand that this episode of Japan-Korea diplomatic friction is different from past instances, requiring more careful attention. Japan and South Korea seem to have given up on each other to some extent, accepting a diminished economic and strategic relationship with its neighbor. The Moon administration’s behavior toward Japan in the past year suggests that it doesn’t care whether or not Japan remains a strategic partner, as it prioritizes Korean nationalism and North Korea. The Abe administration is now responding with similar disregard for the long-term national benefit of healthy bilateral relations. Both countries are catering to domestic politics, but there seems to be a level of indifference that is deeper than we have seen in the last few decades.

The latest Japan-Korea rift is surprising at a time when a U.S. president is creating doubt about his government’s commitment to allies by cozying up to North Korea’s leadership, demanding larger host nation support payments, and undermining the rules-based international trading system. President Trump’s behavior toward allies should be driving closer Japan-South Korea cooperation, given their shared interests, but instead Japan and Korea are ignoring each other in their strategic planning. The same could be said about China’s rise and instances of coercive diplomacy applied to both Japan and South Korea, and yet Seoul and Tokyo each think the onus rests with the other side for making a significant effort to improve relations. In this situation, the United States will need to invest more time and energy into each bilateral relationship if it wants to maintain its level of influence in the region.

Many of these wounds of history are persistent in Northeast Asia. What effect might demography – specifically the aging out of many of the victims of 20th century atrocities in Korea and elsewhere – have on the salience of these issues in the coming decades?

Demography seems a less critical variable than other factors, such as relative economic growth and the impact of globalization, perceived security threats, and political leadership. Identity politics and the politics of grievance in many countries have become more intense over the years despite the passing away of many people who lived through World War II and the Korean War. Territorial disputes have become more acute between Japan and China in the past decade, for example, and we have seen an increase in named days memorializing historical wounds (e.g., Takeshima Day in Japan or Comfort Women Day in Korea). Countries or interest groups keep investing in museums or other public relations activities to keep their stories alive (e.g., in Nanjing, Yasukuni Shrine, or families of Japanese abducted by North Korea in the 1970s and 1980s, among others).

In some ways, economic growth in East Asia has afforded people the luxury to pay more attention to historical grievances, and political leadership is highly sensitive to the influence that motivated groups can direct on particular issues. Concerns about a loss of national identity due to globalization might also be a factor, as it has fueled indigenous movements around the world seeking more local control – and promotion of nation over state – whether it is the United Kingdom trying to pull away from the European Union or Scotland trying to pull away from the United Kingdom.

It is hard to predict what kind of impact demographic change will have on the negative historical legacies in East Asia. On one hand, the passing away of a victimized generation could remove some of the personal stories and direct human connection to past pains that sustain historical arguments, and younger generations in all countries tend to have more in common with each other and show more favorable attitudes. But on the other hand, without victims to forgive the other side it could become harder to placate motivated groups, and the victims effectively could become martyrs with demands for atonement so high that they could never be achieved. It will require leaders in these countries to set ambitious goals for regional reconciliation and absorb political criticism for encouraging educators and civil society to expand historical inquiry, tolerance, and foster greater mutual understanding.