Australia’s Climate Change Problem

For the past decade climate change has been the third rail of Australian politics. Attempts to legislate any kind of emissions reduction scheme has been the primary driver of Australia’s revolving door of prime ministers. Elements within the conservative bloc of parties – and their media allies – steadfastly refuse to acknowledge climate change as a problem and actively seek to undermine any party leader or any legislative initiative that has endeavored to make even modest reductions in Australia’s carbon footprint.

At the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) meeting in mid-August, held conspicuously in Tuvalu – a country whose highest point is just 4.6 meters above sea level – Australia’s indecisive climate change politics made the jump from domestic circus to foreign policy dilemma. Pacific Island leaders wanted to use the forum to create a strong regional consensus that could be taken to the United Nations Climate Summit in New York in late September. However, a series of red lines issued by Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison – during a heated 12-hour meeting to iron out the forum’s communiqué – prevented the term “crisis” from being used to describe the impacts of climate change in the Pacific, and led to the removal of all but one reference to coal.

Beyond the ideological suspicions toward climate change within the Australia government, there are significant practical concerns around emission reductions targets that Pacific Island countries would like Australia to adopt. Around 75 percent of Australia’s electricity is generated by coal. Coal is also a significant export industry. A dramatic phasing out of coal usage would require a major realignment of Australia’s power generation, with untold knock-on effects for all other industries and households. This is a force that is very difficult to directly counter.

Beyond this, Australia’s coal-fired power generation is dwarfed by both China and the United States, which leads Australian politicians to make the argument that in the grand scheme of carbon emissions any reductions Canberra may attempt to implement would have little impact on a global problem. Pacific Island leaders understand these realities, but for them it is about recognition, respect, and intent; a desire for Australia to signal to its smaller neighbors that it understands their situation, and to demonstrate some leadership toward potential solutions. Obstinance from Canberra is an entirely unhelpful posture.

In recent years Pacific Island countries have been able to form a regional consensus on the existential threat they face from climate change. And due to this consensus they have become adept at pooling their collective diplomatic weight to amplify their concerns to a wider global audience. However, despite their advances in this regard Pacific Islands still lack diplomatic muscle equivalent to Australia’s. These island states rely on Australia – by far the largest and most powerful member of the Pacific Islands Forum – to internalize their concerns in order to further boost their signal. Without an ability to influence Australia, the power of Pacific Islands states is diminished.

However, this is a two-way problem. Australia has recently attempted to re-engage with the Pacific as a strategic priority. Increased competition for influence from China (and the fear of a growing Chinese military footprint in the region) has unsettled Canberra, which had until recently taken its regional primacy for granted. The Australian government now seems desperate to demonstrate that Australia is part of the Pacific family. Morrison came to the forum with a new regional assistance package – prioritizing “climate adaption” – worth $340 million. Yet for many of the Pacific Island leaders this felt like an attempt to buy them off, particularly when Morrison made direct note of the money Canberra was spending in the region during negotiations. Fijian Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama described Morrison’s gesture in that regard as “very insulting and condescending.”

Australia’s inability to be able to legislate any kind of national energy policy has produced three interrelated problems for the country. It has created an instability of political leadership, particularly in the conservative coalition that is unable to produce any kind of carbon reduction goals without an internal revolt. This has eroded operational certainty for the country’s energy suppliers and suppressed not only the market signals necessary for the development of a competitive renewables industry, but also the motivation for the country to move away from its dependence on coal. And this in turn has now begun to infect the country’s foreign policy and create conflict with the country’s regional strategic objectives.

This places Australia at an impasse when it comes to its relationship with the Pacific Islands. These islands are losing their trust in and patience with their most valuable strategic partner, even as maintaining this trust is essential for Australia’s wider regional interests. The ideological grievances in Australian domestic politics that are holding the interests of both Australia and the Pacific hostage are unlikely to be neutralized any time soon.