Termsak Chalermpalanupap

Early November marked the conclusion of yet another round of ASEAN summitry, with a range of headlines from the low level of U.S. representation to India’s withdrawal from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). To discuss the outcomes of this round of regional summitry, The Diplomat’s Senior Editor Prashanth Parameswaran spoke to Termsak Chalermpalanupap, a visiting fellow at the Thailand Studies Program of the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore. Previously, Termsak had served at the ASEAN Secretariat from 1993 to 2012.

Thailand was the holder of ASEAN’s annually rotating chairmanship for 2019 and helped manage the summits we witnessed this year. With the latest round of ASEAN summitry now completed, how would you assess Thailand’s chairmanship this year?

Overall, I would gladly give Thailand a passing grade of B+, or about 7.5 out of 10. This is in consideration of several factors, including domestic developments in Thailand, the conduct of summitry, and some of the outcomes.

In terms of domestic politics, after five years, the military junta of General Prayut Chan-o-cha was under growing political pressure to organize as soon as possible the long-delayed general election. And finally it happened; the general election was held on March 24. General Prayut, while he was still heading the junta, managed to host the 34th ASEAN Summit in Bangkok last June without any untoward incident. ASEAN Leaders at the Summit even managed to issue their ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) on June 23.

The military junta was also preoccupied with preparations for the historic royal coronation of King Maha Vajiralongkorn, which took place on May 3-5. Post-election infighting among major political parties was intense. The country saw furious horse-trading among major political parties. And finally the Phalang Pracharath Party managed to cobble up a coalition government of 17 parties (including 12 mini-parties with only 1 MP each). General Prayut won the race for the premiership, with strong support of all senators, whom his military junta had hand-picked. And the country suffered serious drought and then floods. The Thai economy has stalled, partly because of the Sino-U.S. trade war. No one seemed to pay any attention to ASEAN.

In terms of the conduct of summitry, the 35th ASEAN Summit in Bangkok and Nonthaburi in early November also went on smoothly, without any untoward incident. One big disappointment to the Thai host and chairman of ASEAN in 2019 was, of course, the failure to conclude the RCEP with India in it. Also disappointing was the relatively “low” level of the U.S. representative at both the ASEAN-U.S. Summit and the East Asia Summit (EAS).

In terms of outcomes, Thailand managed to lead in “selling” the AOIP to its Dialogue Partners in the EAS to win at least their tacit acknowledgment that now ASEAN has a common “outlook” on the Indo-Pacific. In addition, two concrete outcomes, and hopefully lasting legacies of the Thai chairmanship of ASEAN were the establishment of two ASEAN centers of excellence in Thailand: the ASEAN Center for Active Ageing and Innovation (ACAI) and the ASEAN Center for Sustainable Development Studies and Dialogue (ACSDSD).

One of the major headlines coming out of this round of ASEAN summitry was India’s withdrawal from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) as well as the joint leaders’ statement confirming the finalization of text negotiations with signing to commence next year. How do you asses these developments, and how does what we have seen with respect to RCEP play into the broader dynamics on trade in Southeast Asia and the wider Asia-Pacific?

India had had difficulties in participating in the RCEP negotiations since the beginning six years ago. However, ASEAN (especially Indonesia, which has represented ASEAN in leading the RCEP talks) as well as Japan tried to convince India to stay on board. India’s decision to leave RCEP is apparently motivated by domestic reasons. Inside India, RCEP has been misrepresented as being “anti-farmers.”

Without India, ASEAN and its five remaining dialogue partners (China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, and New Zealand) can now move on swiftly. They have agreed on all texts of the 20 chapters of the RCEP agreement; and they plan to sign the agreement in Vietnam in 2020. The RCEP ball is literally in front of the goal. Vietnam, which will chair ASEAN in 2020, needs only to tap it in to score.

It is well-known that RCEP is not a “high quality” agreement, especially when compared with the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). But it will nevertheless contribute to promoting multilateral trade in Asia-Pacific. It is good for a collective show of international support for economic multilateral cooperation, at this time when U.S. President Donald Trump has been drawing the United States into his “America First” unilateralism.

One of the other headline developments was the shape of U.S. engagement, with the fallout from the low-level delegation sent by the United States on the one hand and the invitation for a special U.S.-ASEAN summit and the release of a State Department progress report on the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). What is your view on how U.S. engagement in this round of summitry has been received by Southeast Asian states?

Most in ASEAN considered President Trump’s sending of just a national security advisor to the ASEAN-U.S. Summit and the EAS as an insult. President Trump and his administration need to realize that ignoring ASEAN doesn’t necessarily make ASEAN less important in Southeast Asia.

The Trump administration’s promotion of the FOIP is gaining little traction in ASEAN because it is essentially defense-led confrontation with China. ASEAN, as shown in its AOIP, emphasizes dialogue and cooperation, as well as inclusiveness and promotion of common interest. ASEAN is not a military bloc. ASEAN cannot join the United States in confronting China, because it is not in ASEAN’s interest to do so. Moreover, who knows when the United States will just walk away from its friends and allies, like it just did to the Kurds in northern Syria, and now even in NATO (according to French President Emmanuel Macron).

Nevertheless President Trump’s invitation to ASEAN Leaders for a special ASEAN-U.S. Summit in the United States in early 2020 is a welcome gesture. Another thing he can do now to erase the insult is to appoint a new U.S. ambassador to ASEAN. The post has been left unfilled for nearly three years now.

ASEAN’s perception of the United States is still, in my opinion, that the U.S. can serve a constructive role in counter-balancing China. But the United States needs to improve its economic role and provide more development aid to needy ASEAN countries, including those in the Mekong subregion. Washington also needs to avoid being held captive by its own rhetoric on human rights, religious freedom, or personal liberty. These are not life-and-death issues to most in the ASEAN region. But their livelihoods and their well-being are being threatened on a daily basis by negative fallouts from the Sino-U.S. trade war, and by numerous challenges to human security.

ASEAN has been engaging with the Indo-Pacific concept following the articulation of approaches by various countries including Australia, Japan, and the United States, including most notably with the release of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific earlier this year. How do you see this evolving, and what is your sense of the prospects for the evolution of the Indo-Pacific as a frame for regional order, relative to previous formulations such as Asia and Asia-Pacific?

Personally, I am afraid ASEAN has bitten off more than it can chew by claiming ASEAN centrality in the Indo-Pacific.

ASEAN is seriously over-stretching its credibility in making such a wild claim. How many ASEAN members actually see their national interests in the Indian Ocean, or in the Western Pacific? How many ASEAN members have an embassy in Madagascar or the Solomon Islands?

It bears noting that only five ASEAN members (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) have embassies in Timor-Leste’s Dili – which is actually part of the ASEAN region, and Timor-Leste’s application for the ASEAN membership has remained “under consideration” since submission in March 2011.

ASEAN Centrality is good and applicable only in Southeast Asia. Even in our home region, ASEAN has to earn international recognition for its centrality by action, by building a successful ASEAN Community.

The AOIP merely satisfies Indonesia’s wish to have a “common position” in the emerging new geographical construct of Indo-Pacific. Indonesia is the country within Southeast Asia that, as the world’s largest archipelagic state and truly straddling the two oceans by virtue of its size, may be able to see its own national interest at the Indo-Pacific level.

Thailand happens to be a suitable “neutral” chairman of ASEAN which can work with Indonesia in cobbling together the AOIP, whereas Singapore when it was chairing ASEAN in 2018 had less inclination to waste time on formulating such an ASEAN document.

ASEAN’s failure to keep India in RCEP should be a good lesson, a sudden “wake-up call” for ASEAN and all of its members to realize that ASEAN’s credibility and ASEAN centrality have to be earned, not simply claimed.

And it is gratifying to see Vietnam’s going for “cohesiveness and responsiveness” as the theme for ASEAN under the Vietnamese chairmanship in 2020. ASEAN and its members still have to prove themselves that they are truly united in giving due importance to ASEAN.

In an environment of rising U.S.-China competition, increasing populism and protectionism, there continue to be questions raised about ASEAN’s relevance as well as its centrality in the regional order. How would you evaluate ASEAN’s performance as a regional grouping in the contemporary setting, and what are some ways for it to overcome some of the challenges it is facing?

Centrality can be better understood as a relationship. When someone is “central” to you, you give all you have and do all that can for that someone. Likewise, in ASEAN, if ASEAN members claim that ASEAN is “central” to themselves, then they must fulfill all their regional commitments in ASEAN; ratify all signed ASEAN agreements without long delays; and more importantly, implement ASEAN agreements in good faith. This is the key: the internal dimension of ASEAN centrality.

What we tend to see is only the external dimension of ASEAN centrality, in ASEAN’s engagement in external relations in ASEAN-led processes. But this is secondary in importance. External partners can parrot their support for the ASEAN Centrality in every meeting with ASEAN, but their oral support doesn’t necessarily make real the validity of ASEAN centrality. ASEAN members have to give substance to ASEAN Centrality with concerted concrete action in building the ASEAN Community.

ASEAN certainly has the right to claim centrality in Southeast Asia, because this is our home region. This is where we, the 660 million Southeast Asians, live. ASEAN leaders and their ministers owe it to their 660 million people to create a real and successful ASEAN Community with concrete benefits to all.

Vietnam will be the holder of the ASEAN chairmanship for 2020. It will do so during the midway point of the ASEAN Vision 2025 Realization Plan and with a series of issues that remain to be addressed, including the conclusion of RCEP and the management of the South China Sea disputes. How do you expect Vietnam’s ASEAN chairmanship to play out in 2020, and what are some developments that you will be watching into next year?

Vietnam is now “more ASEAN” than some of the five founding members of ASEAN. Vietnam has benefited tremendously from the ASEAN membership since joining the grouping in July 1995. ASEAN has given Vietnam a good “brand name” of being pro-free trade and welcoming FDI to attract foreign investors and big businesses, even though it is a communist state.

Vietnam has surpassed several other ASEAN members in entering an FTA with the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union. Vietnam is also in the CPTPP, much to the envy of Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Vietnam has good and growing economic potential to overtake the Philippines in GDP size within the next few years.

However, when Hanoi talks about “cohesiveness” in ASEAN, the Vietnamese leadership may be thinking more about disputes in the South China Sea. Hanoi certainly hopes to see a more unified ASEAN stand on the South China Sea, and on the ongoing negotiations with China for a code of conduct in the South China Sea (COC). Hanoi is also keen to further strengthen cooperation in the ADMM and in the ADMM-Plus; the latter will celebrate its 10th anniversary in 2020.

President Trump will most likely skip next year’s ASEAN-US Summit and EAS again, because of presidential election in the United States reaching the home stretch in early November 2020. If that development occurs, one can expect this to be in the headlines again as well.