Identity, Education, and Patriotism: The Hong Kong-China Divide

As protests in Hong Kong continued into their sixth month, a number of the city’s university campuses transformed into new battlegrounds between protesters and police. In some respects, this may not come as a surprise given that young Hong Kongers have been at the forefront of the movement opposing not only the Hong Kong government’s proposed extradition law, but also more general signs of Beijing’s increasing influence in the metropolis. It is important to note, however, that this trend is not a new phenomenon but rather a reflection of a demographic shift within younger generations in Hong Kong society about their identity.

The city returned to Beijing’s sovereignty in 1997; people born that year are 22 now. Young students in their late teens and 20s have been at the frontlines of the latest three waves of protest to hit Hong Kong, in 2012, 2014, and 2019 respectively.

Notions of identity among Hong Kongers have long been dynamic, with layering of Hong Kong and Chinese categories. Surveys conducted by the University of Hong Kong have tracked identity associations since Hong Kong’s return to China. While the city’s population has often embraced a mixed identity, more and more respondents identify themselves as Hong Kongers or Hong Kongers in China. This trend is particularly acute for 18 to 29 year olds: In June 2019, 75 percent of respondents in this age group identified as Hong Konger, compared to only 2.7 percent viewing themselves as Chinese.

A primary vehicle for identity formation is education. As such, Beijing has increasingly criticized Hong Kong’s education system as a source of problems behind recent protests.

Notably, after China’s fourth plenum meeting, Shen Chunyao, head of the National People’s Congress’ committee overseeing the Basic Law (the law that guides the relationship between Beijing and Hong Kong) signaled Beijing’s frustration and intolerance for actions that challenge the “one country, two systems” framework that manages Beijing-Hong Kong relations. Shen also stated that “[we will] strengthen national education of Hong Kong and Macau people, especially civil servants and youth, including education of the constitution and the Basic Law, Chinese history and culture, in order to boost their national consciousness and patriotic spirit.”

Students, teachers, and the Hong Kong education system have all been criticized for having a hand in cultivating the current movement, which has lead to increasing violence and hostility between police forces and protesters. The Chinese University of Hong Kong prematurely ended its fall semester; at the end of November Polytechnic University was under siege, surrounded, and then cleared by police authorities after hundreds of students occupied the campus. Beijing has condemned the clashes as riots, finding sole fault with the protesters. Other voices claim the young protesters have been manipulated by their educators and that the system is in need of reform.

Earlier this fall, Xu Luying, a spokeswoman for the Beijing-controlled Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, condemned teachers for “[taking] advantage of their power and resources to disseminate seeds of violence and hatred, and instigate students to boycott classes, breaking the bottom line of the education profession.” Xu added that more should be done to evaluate the provision of national education in Hong Kong, “especially the cultivation of a sense of nationhood.”

Beijing’s emphasis on education “shortcomings” and a need to bolster a sense of patriotism echoes a narrative that the Chinese government once used more than 30 years ago, in the aftermath of the protests and crackdown at Tiananmen in 1989. At the time, the Chinese Communist Party faced a challenge to its legitimacy. Consequently, Chinese leadership opted to implement a patriotic education system designed to restore the CCP as the central driver of national progress and respect, as well as to fuse the party with national sentiment. Decades on, this educational system appears to have produced younger generations with a stronger sense of nationalism and pride.

While no such educational initiative is afoot in Hong Kong today, facets of the city’s schooling can still influence how students develop their sense of identity. In 2009, educational reforms introduced “liberal studies” to the core curriculum, which comprise a series of modules that feature material on citizenship, identity, law, and political participation. Conservative politicians in Hong Kong and officials in the mainland have disparaged the lack of standardization of these courses, whose content and textbooks can vary from school to school.

In 2012, Hong Kong officials proposed the introduction of “moral and national education,” an initiative that would have bolstered lessons on Chinese history and sought to develop national identity. However, the proposal was withdrawn after widespread demonstrations led by school-aged protesters took to the streets in opposition to what was viewed as a bid to force “pro-Beijing” sentiment into Hong Kong schools. (Joshua Wong, a now well-known student activist, co-founded Scholarism and organized a mass rally during this wave of protest.)

China’s Ministry of Education Party Group issued a directive in 2016 that unusually also included Hong Kong and Macau, calling for greater incorporation of patriotic education into schooling. It specified a need for greater support and services to help students in Hong Kong learn Mandarin and simplified characters (Hong Kong uses the traditional script) in order to strengthen their sense of belonging to China.

The increasing presence of Mandarin in Hong Kong, where the local language is Cantonese, has been another source of controversy. Public primary schools use both English and Cantonese along with some Mandarin lessons. At the high school level, schools are typically English-language or Cantonese-language with some electives offered in Mandarin. Official Hong Kong education policy has articulated the long-term goal of incorporating and adopting Mandarin “as a medium of instruction in Chinese Language Education.” Fluency in Mandarin has become increasingly important for Hong Kongers, particularly as they face greater competition with mainlanders in the job market. Mandarin language is seen as more and more beneficial as the economic relationship between Hong Kong and the mainland has changed.

While some in Hong Kong fear more Mandarin might erode elements of Hong Kong culture, the latest protest movement seems to suggest a different trend. The incremental rise of mainland presence in the metropolis is not weakening Hong Kong identity; instead protesters are actively tapping into a sense of local pride in stark opposition to what it might mean to be “Chinese.” It is difficult to disentangle how much elevated levels of student activism are a product of Hong Kong’s educational system or the city’s increasingly polarized political climate, but the Hong Kong debate over identity is unlikely to abate anytime soon.