Japan-South Korea Intelligence-Sharing Pact Gets Last-Minute Reprieve

At the eleventh hour, Japan and South Korea averted the expiration of their bilateral intelligence-sharing agreement. The South Korean government announced its decision to “suspend” the expiration of the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) on the eve of the day the pact was set to expire. Although saving GSOMIA from expiration – even though it came at the last minute – was certainly a positive step, the bilateral relationship between Japan and South Korea has a long way to go before it can go back to being fully functioning.

It is hard to untangle the current complications between the two neighbors. When Seoul announced its initial decision to withdraw from GSOMIA in August, it referred to Tokyo’s decision in July to remove South Korea from the “white list” in its export control system as the direct reason for its own decision on GSOMIA. Since then, the South Korean government has kept the stance that it is open to discussing extending GSOMIA with Japan only if Tokyo reverses its decision on the treatment of South Korea in its export control system, putting it back onto Tokyo’s “white list.” 

Seoul also accused Tokyo of making its export control decision in “retaliation” for South Korean courts ordering Japanese corporations that used mobilized Korean workers during wartime to financially compensate them, even giving a green light to seize the assets of those companies that are not willing to pay up. For its part, Japan has consistently countered the South Korean government’s claim, arguing that Seoul ignited the current tension by reviving the wartime compensation issues that the two governments had settled when they normalized their relationship by signing the 1965 Basic Agreement. 

What hardened Tokyo’s stance vis-à-vis Seoul in recent months was the two countries’ disagreement over whether wartime Korean laborers retain the right to claim financial compensation against their former employers (Japanese corporations). Without bridging the two countries’ disagreement on this point, any progress in bilateral discussions on the other issues, including GSOMIA, will only be temporary and superficial.

Therefore, the biggest challenge for Japan and South Korea in the near term is whether the two can come up with a mutually acceptable solution to the wartime issue, and how much flexibility each side is willing to show to that end. Unfortunately, the prospect for that is bleak. 

Less than 24 hours after Seoul announced it would suspend its decision to withdraw from GSOMIA, Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi said, “the current biggest and most fundamental issue is that concerning former laborers from the Korean Peninsula. We’d like to keep demanding that South Korea eliminate the situation that violates international law as soon as possible.” Motegi’s remarks, delivered after a meeting with his South Korea counterpart Kang Kyung-hwa, suggested Tokyo is unwilling to show any flexibility on its position. With the South Korean government also showing no sign of softening its position on this issue, it is unlikely that we’ll see a mutually acceptable solution to this issue emerging anytime soon. 

Furthermore, engagement by the United States – which usually is successful in easing tensions between the two U.S. allies – has not been as effective because the U.S.-South Korea alliance is facing its own challenges. The unusually heavy public pressure from the United States on Seoul to reverse its decision on the GSOMIA withdrawal, which reflected the sense of urgency Washington felt because of the consequence of the pact, upset Seoul to the point where such an intervention may have been counterproductive. In addition, Washington and Seoul are already engaged in contentious negotiations to renew the Special Measures Agreement (the U.S.-ROK equivalent of a Host Nation Support agreement). The deadline for an updated SMA is fast approaching – December 31 – and the United States walked out of talks as recently as November 25. Thus the prospect that Washington can play a constructive role in ameliorating strained ties between Tokyo and Seoul looks remote at best. 

One cannot forget that the recent impasse in Japan-South Korea relations is also driven by diverging perceptions in the two capitals of the security threats posed by North Korea and China. For Tokyo, North Korea represent the most tangible security threat, with China representing a more complex but still alarming long-term security challenge for the country.  On the other hand, Seoul, at least under its current administration, seeks to reconcile with North Korea, despite the provocative steps that Pyongyang has taken with its missile and nuclear weapon programs. And as far as China goes, even though Seoul has its own concerns vis-à-vis Beijing, South Korea’s government is finding it more and more difficult to take measures to antagonize China, especially now that its confidence in its alliance with the United States is being tested by the current U.S. administration’s transactional approach toward its allies. 

Upon the South Korean government’s announcement that it would suspend its withdrawal from GSOMIA on November 22, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe expressed his belief that South Korea’s decision had been made “based on strategic perspective.” It will benefit not only Japan and South Korea but the stability of Northeast Asia if both capitals continue to approach their bilateral discussions based on broader strategic perspectives.