The Indian Army’s Integrated Battlegroup Concept

The Indian Army is currently undergoing one of its biggest organizational reforms in decades. Over the past few years, military planners have been developing a new concept for swift, offensive, combined arms operations centered around so-called Integrated Battlegroups (IBGs), which were finally tested during military exercises in the summer and fall. This reorganization is significant as it constitutes the structural backbone to India’s controversial Cold Start doctrine, which decrees swift, offensive operations against nuclear-armed neighbors at the outset of war.

In October, the Army’s 17 (Mountain Strike) Corps conducted a mountain warfare exercise in Arunachal Pradesh in northeastern India, practicing defensive and offensive operations focused on swift counterattacks against a notional invading force while for the first time deploying IBG elements. 17 Corps will reportedly eventually be converted into three newly formed IBGs, with around 5,000 soldiers each. The service did not divulge details regarding the exercise, but the fact that the IBG concept was officially tested is noteworthy in itself.

Prior to the exercise, the Indian Ministry of Defense (MoD) greenlighted the conversion of elements of 9 Corps, part of the Western Command, into an IBG, which is expected to take around two years. 9 Corps has held exercises testing various aspects of the IBG concept in the summer.

Based on public statements by Indian military leaders it is fair to assume that IBGs will be primarily deployed against Pakistan in the event of a military confrontation. The Cold Start doctrine envisions offensive operations into Pakistani territory within 48 to 72 hours. This will be the primary job of the new IBGs.

The origin of the recent push toward IBGs – the idea for it has floated around military circles for almost two decades – goes back to last October’s Army’s Commanders Conference, where a study titled “Reorganizing and Rightsizing the of the Indian Army” was presented. The gist of the concept is to facilitate the creation of a smaller, more agile offensive army unit capable of rapid mobilization and combined arms operations.

India’s current Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Bipin Rawat, a champion of the concept for years, endorsed the paper. The study specifically recommends the restructuring of Indian military forces stationed along India’s northeastern and western borders facing China and Pakistan, in a phased approach that is supposed to take around five years. The creation of these IBGs will involve extensive practical testing of the new organizational and operational concept, according to the document.

The paper is in line with the latest iteration of the Indian Army doctrine from 2018, which also mandates the establishment of IBGs along the western border and a much smaller number of such units to be deployed in the mountainous northeast of the country. Various Indian military source put the number of IBGs to be stood up between eight and 14. This August, Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh finally approved the restructuring plan, although the specific size, structure, and number of IBGs has not yet been agreed upon.

According to his statements, General Bipin Rawat envisions that every IBG will consist of three to six infantry and armored battalions and two to three artillery regiments, next to air defense, logistical, signal, and headquarter units — overall 5,000 to 8,000 troops. The composition of the individual units will differ depending on whether they will be deployed in the country’s west or northeast.

IBGs deployed in north and northeastern India will be smaller, principally centered around light infantry and artillery elements. Units destined for service along the border with Pakistan will be larger and contain armor battalions and other anti-tank formations.

On the western border, “the IBGs, equipped with artillery, armored personnel carriers, main battle tanks, and infantry fighting vehicles, would be capable of launching limited strikes (50-80 kilometers deep) along different axes of advance into enemy territory supported by air power,” as I wrote in an analysis in February 2019.

Furthermore, as I’ve previously reported, the size of the IBGs would fall in between an undersized Army division and brigade in terms of manpower (a division on average has a strength of around 20,000 troops; a brigade from 2,400 to 3,200). War games to be held in the coming years will bring more clarity to the exact composition of these new units.

Standing up this new force will not be an easy task for the Indian Army.

One major obstacle to creating effective IBGs remains military hardware shortages, especially when it comes to close-air-support, artillery, and air defense capabilities. Joint-service warfare, where the Army works in close cooperation with the Indian Air Force (IAF), has also time and again proven difficult.

A perhaps less obvious difficulty will be logistics. The IBGs will only be able to mobilize rapidly and operate independently as long as they can rely on a steady flow of supplies to continue their offensives. The creation of the IBGs is bound to put additional strain on the Army’s centralized logistics system.

Nonetheless, these hurdles will likely not alter the reform plans for the time being. As recent developments this summer and in the fall indicate, the IBG concept is here to stay no matter what the composition of these new Army formations will eventually look like.