Can Cambodia’s Opposition Survive?

Few long-term observers were surprised when opposition leader Sam Rainsy failed to return to Cambodia on November 9 to lead a promised peaceful uprising against 34-year ruler Hun Sen.

The plan was always a long shot, but as Rainsy heads into his fifth year in exile, many will begin to wonder whether he and the opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) can continue to remain relevant.

Coverage of the CNRP has tilted negative in recent months – many foreign correspondents seemed almost gleeful at Rainsy’s failure and stories abound of a split in the CNRP between its two founders, Rainsy and Kem Sokha.

The truth is, however, that the CNRP still retains its most important asset – popular support.

“I see no indication that the party’s support has dissipated. While the CPP has effaced the party as a legal entity, it has not succeeded in solving many of the problems that led a large chunk of the Cambodian electorate to vote for the CNRP in the first place,” said Sebastian Strangio, author of Hun Sen’s Cambodia. “If a free election were held tomorrow, with the CNRP participating, it would be likely a very close call.”

The CNRP won around 44 percent of the vote in the 2013 national election (despite widespread irregularities) and again in the 2017 commune election. This strong showing led to Sokha’s arrest for treason and party’s arbitrary dissolution prior to the 2018 national election. Despite the CNRP’s absence, none of the minor pro-democracy parties benefitted at the voting booths. Even the Grassroots Democracy Party, which has become something of a darling to Western media and academics, failed to attract any meaningful support.

The CNRP was formed in 2012 by a merger between the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) and Sokha’s Human Rights Party (HRP) in order to stop splitting the anti-government votes. There is undoubtedly some friction between the two sides – as there always has been – but reports of a split may be exaggerated. 

“In a very real sense, the party is its personalities, which accounts for both the persistent frictions between the Rainsy and Sokha wings of the party, and the CNRP’s general lack of policy detail,” said Strangio.

Much of the media narrative on the party schism has focused on comments from a single individual: Sokha’s daughter Kem Monovithya. There are others critical of Rainsy, including former high-ranking HRP members Muth Chantha and Ou Chanrath. But in dozens of interviews with everyday CNRP supporters in Cambodia, not once has somebody expressed this sentiment to me.

Ou Chanrith, a former HRP parliamentarian who participated in Rainsy’s return attempt, downplayed the division as one-sided.

“For me I don’t think we should take sides. It’s only those people from HRP, I don’t want to name them, it’s only a few of them that claim themselves as Kem Sokha’s supporter. I don’t think we have Kem Sokha side or Sam Rainsy side,” he said in a recent interview. 

Tensions first emerged when Rainsy declared himself acting president while Sokha was in jail, a decision Chanrith says was only logical as the co-founder of the party. Chanrith also points out that Rainsy only stepped down as president due to politically motivated criminal charges and an amendment prohibiting convicted felons from leading political parties. 

Mu Sochua, CNRP vice president and Rainsy’s closest political ally, strikes a reconciliatory tone, assuring that Rainsy will step down once Sokha has his political rights restored. 

“We consider Kem Sokha our president,” she said in a recent interview, but admitted it’s difficult to coordinate while the two leaders are “physically apart.”

Sokha was released on bail in November after Rainsy’s failed return, but his rights remain severely restricted as he waits for his trial to begin in January. Sokha cannot leave the country or engage in political activities; Rainsy is free to be political but can’t seem to find a way into the country.

Another criticism often leveled at the CNRP is its failure to train a new generation of young leaders, and how that will impact the party’s future. 

“It has never been easy for any opposition party to organize in Cambodia. Even in times of relative freedom, the CNRP has been subject to constant surveillance and pressure,” Strangio said.

A case in point is Sin Rozeth, who was clearly being groomed for leadership after being elected to a commune chief position at the age of 31 in 2017. She faced immediate obstructionist tactics from ruling party officials upon taking office, and when Rainsy announced his return, she was the epicenter of the government crackdown, subjected to the “surveillance and pressure” Strangio described.

Recently, the government annulled a slew of passports belonging to opposition activists, including 12 born after 1985.

“At this time, we are in crisis right now, we should not focus on young leadership, we have to survive,” said Chanrith.

To some extent, however, the CNRP will always be in crisis – it comes with the territory of being an opposition party in an authoritarian landscape. It is up to the CNRP to learn how to navigate a crisis while simultaneously promoting young leaders.

While they have made mistakes, in many ways, the CNRP is a victim of its own success. The level of government pressure the party has faced is a testament to how much Hun Sen fears it, and of course when put under pressure there are bound to be some cracks.

But the CNRP has now put Hun Sen under pressure, too. The opposition was dissolved because it posed an existential threat to his rule, but in disbanding the CNRP, Hun Sen incurred the wrath of the Western world. The EU is on the verge of withdrawing its preferential trade deal with Cambodia, a potential economic catastrophe.

It seems reinstating the CNRP is the only reform Europe will accept, so Hun Sen must now choose between economic failure, and the unrest it may provoke, or allowing the opposition to regain a foothold in the country.

The treason trial of Kem Sokha, set to begin January 15, will be a bellwether of sorts to gauge Hun Sen’s strategy going forward. Sokha will almost certainly be found guilty – the courts rarely ever admit fault in politically motivated cases like this. The first real test is whether Sokha will be immediately pardoned, a development most observers expect but isn’t guaranteed. Next, people will be watching to see if Sokha has his political rights restored and is permitted to freely leave and re-enter the country. 

In this best case scenario, Sokha would presumably be free to establish a new party and could be reunited abroad with Rainsy, even if it’s behind the scenes.

A new opposition party led by Sokha would probably satisfy the international community’s requirement of reinstating the CNRP, but the big players from Rainsy’s wing would likely remain barred from politics. Rainsy, Sochua, and Eng Chhay Eang have all been accused of plotting a coup over the failed attempt to lead mass demonstrations in November 2019.

Hun Sen appears to be preparing for Sokha to return to politics, as government spokespeople and pro-government media have already begun painting Sokha as a more moderate and reasonable opposition figure compared to the “extremist” Rainsy. This narrative is largely invented, however. Historically Sokha has probably been less willing to compromise with the government, and his treason trial stems from similar accusations that he plotted to overthrow the government with U.S. support. How, then, is Sokha any less extreme in the government’s eyes?

It’s a narrative of convenience meant to drive a further wedge between Rainsy and Sokha by only allowing one of them back into politics, while undermining Sokha by slyly suggesting that he is a more controllable form of opposition.

Back in 2012, in the last election before the two parties merged, Rainsy won twice as many votes as Sokha. Sokha’s integrity in the face of government persecution has won him many admirers in the Western world, but it is unlikely to have shifted that balance domestically. For the opposition to remain a significant force, Sokha must navigate the challenge of re-entering politics without Rainsy or Rainsy’s primary surrogates. To maintain widespread support, Sokha must be seen as representing Rainsy’s followers without inviting legal action for associating with a felon.

Looking even further ahead, continued association with Rainsy could be precisely what the government uses to crack down on the opposition in the future, when it inevitably poses another threat to Hun Sen’s rule.

Should Hun Sen take the more hardline approach – refusing to allow Sokha to re-enter politics and gambling on losing the EU trade deal – the CNRP’s future is murkier.

While the CNRP maintains popularity, it must be able to participate in the political process to remain relevant long term. While reports of a split may be premature, the longer the party leaders remain separated the harder it will be to remain united. While the absence of young leaders may be primarily due to government pressure, that pressure has been successful and threatens the party’s ability to connect with younger generations.

Tales of the CNRP’s demise have so far been greatly exaggerated, but the clock is ticking.